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INTRODUCTION 
A. The Problem of the Dissertation 
The problem of this dissertation is to illuminate 
the metaphysics of Leibniz and Schopenhauer by showing 
how they employ relations between aspects of their re-
spective theories of personality as anthropic1 analogies 
to help them reason in metaphysics. 
Moreover, it will be a further aim of this inves-
tigation to use this study of the role of analogies in 
metaphysics to shed light upon the distinctive features 
of these two philosophies, in some instances invoking 
contrasts which emphasize the characteristic features of 
these metaphysical systems. 
It is, in addition, a goal of this investigation 
to discover, in the process of studying the role of an-
thropic analogies in the metaphysics of Leibniz and Scho-
penhauer, the significance of analogical reasoning in met-
aphysics in general and to gain insight into the type of 
analogy which is best suited for metaphysical purposes. 
lrn our use of the term "anthropic" we will be 
following the interpretation of F.R. Tennant. The word 
at its best means after the likeness of man or human. 
Tennant suggests that the word, if it is to be useful, 
must be purged of erroneous attribution to reality of 
characteristics which are limited solely to man [F.R. 
Tennant, Philosophical Theolo~T' Vol. I (Cambridge: 
University Press, 1956, p. 17 . 
B. Limitations 
First, only those writings of Leibniz and 
Schopenhauer which have specific bearing upon their use 
of anthropic analogies in metaphysics will be treated, 
although their other writings will be surveyed for pos-
sible relevance. 
Secondly, no effort will be made to treat ex-
haustively Leibniz's or Schopenhauer's theory of the 
person. The study of these two theories of personality 
will be limited to those aspects of the person and their 
relations which are directly relevant to the aims of 
this dissertation. 
Thirdly, there will be no attempt to trace his-
torically the development of the various types of an-
alogy. Our discussion of the several modes of predica-
tion and analogy will be limited to the requirements of 
this study. 
C. Previous Research in the Field 
2 
Although there has been no previous literature 
which deals with the specific topic of this dissertation, 
there are several studies which treat various aspects of 
the thought of Leibniz and Schopenhauer and the problem 
of the role of analogy in metaphysics. Only those in-
vestigations which are especially relevant to this dis-
sertation will be cited and discussed here. 
3 
John B. Mondin's doctoral dissertation, "Analogy 
Old and New," 1 submitted to Harvard University in 1959 
is an analysis and criticism of Aquinas• analogy of 
intrinsic attribution, Tillich's symbolism and Barth's 
analogy of faith and an attempted resolution of some 
historical, philosophical and theological problems in-
trinsic to the doctrine of analogy. 
In this dissertation Mondin has analyzed analogy, 
symbolism and the analogy of faith with the aim of dis-
covering whether they are tools capable of giving adequate 
interpretation to the God-creature relation and a justifi-
cation of theological language. The problem is the mean-
ing of words as they are applied to God and creatures. 
Mondin's criterion for determining their adequacy 
is their ability to safeguard God\ transcendence and 
immanence. Notwithstanding the fact that Mondin's dis-
sertation deals with the relation between human concepts 
and the nature of God (it is essentially a theological 
1unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard Uni-
versity, 1959. 
4 
problem) and our dissertation is concerned with the way 
aspects of personality are employed to elucidate meta-
physical principles, the spirit of the two quests is 
similar. This conclusion is confirmed as Mondin says, 
"Today many of the greatest living philosophers and 
theologians consider some sort of analogy to be an in-
dispensable tool for any fruitful research in metaphysics 
and theology." 1 It will be one of the aims of this dis-
sertation to present evidence to support this thesis. 
Not only has this study benefited from the gen-
eral spirit and aim of Mondin's dissertation, but more 
specifically his new classification of types of analogy 
has illuminated the various kinds of analogy, the analogy 
of intrinsic attribution, the analogy of proper propor-
tionality, and improper proportionality or metaphor. 
Although Gerald B. Phelan's Aquinas lectures at 
Marquette University entitled St. Thomas and Analogy2 
primarily deals with the role of different types of anal-
ogy in the thought of St. Thomas, it is relevant to this 
study in as much as in these lectures Phelan: (1) main-
tains that without an understanding of the doctrine of 
1rbid., p. iii. 
2Gerald B. Phelan, St. Thomas and Analogy 
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1941). 
5 
analogy it is impossible to acquire a knowledge of meta-
physics; (2) states that the analogy of proper propor-
tionality, which will play an important role in this 
dissertation, is the only truly metaphysical analogy; 
and (3) studies and classifies types of analogy which 
will be utilized in our investigation of Leibniz's and 
Schopenhauer's metaphysics. 
In a doctoral dissertation submitted to Harvard 
University in 1940 entitled "A Comparative Study of 
Certain Basic Categories in the Philosophies of Leibniz 
and Whitehead,"1 Robert Luce attempts to evaluate the 
degree and significance of the affinity between the 
philosophies of Leibniz and Whitehead. 
Although Luce does not investigate the role of 
analogies in Leibniz's thought, his study does reveal 
the importance of rationalistic elements in Leibniz's 
philosophy, which is especially relevant to one of the 
problems of this dissertation--namely, the selection of 
an anthropic analogy which will illuminate the meta-
physical principle of individuality. According to Luce, 
the ultimate meaning of the principle of sufficient 
reason is disclosed in the statement that every truth is 
1unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard Univer-
sity, 1940. 
6 
analytic. Therefore, in every truth the predicate is con-
tained in the subject. 
This rationalistic interpretation is fatal to 
Leibniz's pluralism and his refutation of Spinoza. This 
interpretation which abolishes real contingency in Leibniz's 
thought and interprets the monads as logical subjects whose 
predicates are deducible from it, emphasizes a different 
aspect of Leibniz's thought than our study, which will 
employ the analogical method to highlight the importance 
of the individual in Leibniz's philosophy. Luce's search-
ing comparison of Leibniz's and Whitehead's thought, along 
with other sources, however, has led us to modify a more 
radical interpretation of Leibniz's notion of individual-
ity in favor of a position which recognizes the truth of 
the more rationalistic interpretations of Leibniz's 
philosophy, while endeavoring to preserve what we con-
ceive to be Leibniz's genuine interest in an individual 
which is not to be reduced to a mode of one all-absorbing 
substance. 
In a doctoral dissertation submitted to the 
University of Chicago in 1910, entitled "The Conception 
of a Kingdom of Ends in Augustine, Aquinas and Leibniz,"1 
Ella Stokes studies the kingdom of ends presented by 
the three philosophers and the relation of these con-
ceptions to the thought of Kant. 
Ella Stokes' dissertation is relevant to this 
study, since one of the important analogies which will 
be constructed in our study of Leibniz's thought will 
be the analogy of human purpose. This analogy will be 
utilized to illuminate the metaphysical principle of 
final cause. 
7 
In her dissertation she attempts to show that 
Leibniz believed that the category of final cause should 
be restored to physics. According to Ella Stokes, 
Leibniz did not regard science as only a means of mater-
ial advancement. Leibniz assigned to physics a moral 
and religious function in that it revealed the perfec-
tion of God. The sufficient reason which is a teleolog-
ical principle in Leibniz's thought, was a second guard 
(the law of contradiction being the first) which an 
idea must pass to become real. 
Although Ella Stokes' dissertation does illuminate 
the principle of sufficient reason and the notion of final 
cause in Leibniz's thought, she does not attempt to study 
the role of anthropic analogies in Leibniz's metaphysics. 
In a doctoral dissertation submitted to the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania in 1938 entitled "Platonism, 
Aristotelianism and Cabalism in the Philosophy of 
Leibniz"1 Joseph Politella's main purpose in this study 
is to set forth the essential correspondence between 
the Leibnizian and the ancient systems of philosophy by 
indicating similarities and differences. Politella at-
tempts to show that Leibniz, the master craftsman, is 
also the master eclectic. 
Although the aim of Politella's investigation 
differs from the intent of our study, it is relevant 
since it highlights, for the purpose of underscoring 
historical connection, certain aspects of Leibniz's 
philosophy which are related to our investigation. For 
example, Politella in stressing the influence of Plato 
upon Leibniz, states that Leibniz is indebted to the 
Platonic tradition, as well as the Kabbalistic system, 
for his belief that in some microscopic way, the immen-
sity and the absoluteness of divine life is within the 
life of man. Leibniz, according to Politella, was in-
fluenced by the Platonic belief that the idea of the 
1Joseph Politella, Platonismi Aristotelianism 
and Cabalism (Gettysburg, PennsylvanLa, 1938). 
8 
9 
absolute is a part of our innate knowledge. 
Politella points out that a God without exten-
sion, which is an important Leibnizian belief, is a 
Pythagorean idea. Politeila, moreover, underscores the 
fact that Aristotle's emphasis upon the hierarchy of 
nature and consciousness may well have influenced Leibniz. 
This notion is relevant to our study of the anthropic 
analogy which establishes the principle of continuity. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Politella's in-
vestigation is essentially an historical study, it has 
highlighted aspects of Leibniz's thought, which will be 
viewed in our study as anthropic analogies. 
Stephen S. Colvin in his Inaugural Dissertation 
submitted to the Kaiser-Wilhelm-University of Strassburg 
in Alsace entitled "Schopermauer's Doctrine of the Thing 
in Itself and His Attempt to Relate it to the World of 
1 Phenomen~' attempts to study the way in which Schopen-
hauer unifies the phenomenal and the noumenal realms. 
This study is relevant to our investigation in 
as much as Colvin believes that Schopenhauer pictures the 
world objectively under thought determinations. It will 
10 
be one of our aims to study the possibility of employing 
teleological, aesthetic and religious analogies to illumi-
nate reality. 
Although Colvin does not study specifically 
Schopenhauer's use of analogy, he underscores Schopen-
hauer's emphasis upon the intimate connection of all of 
the parts of the world through history. Consequently, 
Colvin suggests that Schopenhauer's philosophy is point-
ing toward an unconscious teleology. 
The will, however, is reduced to the position of 
a demiurge. It is the source of illusion and the intel-
lect intuitively recognizes the errors of earthly ex-
istence. The final principle of the universe, according 
to Colvin's interpretation of Schopenhauer's thoughtsis 
not a matter of knowledge, but discernible to the eye of 
faith. Consequently, religious determination is the 
final standpoint of the universe. Metaphysics must 
yield place to a philosophy of religion. 
Colvin concludes that the world is viewed as pro-
gressing toward a goal, which no finite mind can know, 
but the heart can fee1. 1 
1 Ibid., p. 64. 
Although our study will employ a method which 
differs from Colvin's approach and we may arrive at a 
different interpretation of the role of religious ex-
perience in Schopenhauer's thought, Colvin's disserta-
tion raises questions concerning the objective status 
of aesthetic, teleological and religious factors which 
will play an important role in our study. 
In a doctoral dissertation submitted to the 
11 
University of Pennsylvania in 1935, entitled "The 
Aesthetics of Pessimism,"1 John Stokes Adams Jr., at-
tempts to trace the relationship between Schopenhauer's 
aesthetics and his pessimism. 
Notwithstanding the fact that this study does 
not deal specifically with Schopenhauer's use of analogy, 
it is relevant to our study in as much as Adams studies 
extensively the role of the Platonic Ideas in Schopen-
hauer's aesthetic theory, a subject which will engage 
our attention in Chapter VII. 
Adams underlines the importance of art, in 
Schopenhauer's scheme, as a way of leading us away from 
our wills'relation to things. The silence of the 
1John Stokes Adams Jr., The Aesthetics of Pessi-
mism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1940). 
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negation of desire is, according to Schopenhauer, redemp-
tion. But, more important for our purposes, Adams be-
lieves that Schopenhauer's use of Platonic Ideas is a 
means by which his aesthetics may become a clamp that 
holds together his world view. 
According to Adams, Schopenhauer's Ideas are dis-
connected and single. There is, in Schopenhauer's scheme, 
no direction, aim or purpose. Since, at this point, 
Schopenhauer appears to divert from Plato's interpretation 
of the Ideas, Adams suggests that Schopenhauer followed 
the Ideas where he wished and where he did not he declared 
himself against Plato. 
Adams further suggests that getting to know the 
will through appearances does not satisfy the will. Ac-
cordingly, the primary aim of art for which art exists 
is a deeper insight into the nature of things. 
It is our belief that such questions as the status 
of the Platonic Ideas--phenomenal or ontic--the relation 
of an over-all purpose to the Ideas, and the aim of art 
in Schopenhauer's system, which Adams raises in his study 
of Schopenhauer's aesthetics, may be illuminated by an 
investigation of the role of anthropic analogies in 
Schopenhauer's metaphysics. 
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Radoslav A. Tsanoff in a doctoral thesis sub-
mitted to Cornell University in 1910 entitled 
"Schopenhauer's Criticism of Kant's Theory of Experience,"1 
underscores Schopenhauer's praise of Kant's method of dis-
tinguishing clearly between the phenomenon and the thing 
in itself. 
In this study Tsanoff investigates Schopenhauer's 
criticism of Kant's theory of experience in which Schopen-
hauer believes that Kant conceptualizes the material of 
sense impressions into so -called objective experience. 
Schopenhauer rejects this view. What is actually given, 
he insists, is the raw material of sensation. The under-
standing then transfers the meaningless sense-organ 
stimulation into a perception. 
According to Schopenhauer, it is only as the un-
derstanding begins to act that the subjective sensation 
becomes an empirical perception. Tsanoff contends that 
Schopenhauer does not consider adequately the role of the 
productive or creative imagination in Kant. 
Tsanoff recognizes Kant's too abstract formula-
tion of the categories resulted in the bifurcation of 
1Radoslav A. Tsanoff, Schopenhauer's Critieism 
of Kant's Theory of Exlerience (New York: Longmans 
Green and Company, 191 ). 
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the concrete sense perception and the pure understanding. 
But he believes that his inadequate expression of the 
concrete unity of experience should not be regarded as a 
failure. 
The solution, according to Tsanoff, is not the 
separation of perception and concepts which are abstrac-
tions of reason, which is apparently Schopenhauer's solu-
tion, but rather the interpretation of the categories in 
their true nature as functions operative in concrete ex-
perience--determining its progressive organization. 
This dissertation is relevant to our study in as 
much as Tsanoff concludes that Schopenhauer is not the 
true successor of Kant. He is fundamentally an irra-
tionalist. Instead of employing his criticism of Kant 
to discover the immanent organic unity of experience which 
Kant imperfectly realized and formulated, Schopenhauer 
goes so far as to assert the separation of elements in 
experience. 
More important for our purposes, Tsanoff states 
that had Schopenhauer satisfied himself with asserting 
the deeper significance of the conative as compared with 
merely the cognitive experience his position would be 
fairly defensible. But he goes on to deny of his will-
reality everything he had affirmed of the world as idea 
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with the result that the conative no longer dynamically 
rational, is described as ceaseless irrational striving. 1 
Tsanoff arrives at this conclusion by means of a 
study of Schopenhauer's theory of experience, while our 
study will attempt to investigate the role of anthropic 
analogies to elucidate the respective roles of rational 
and irrational factors in Schopenhauer's metaphysics. 
D. The Methodology of the Dissertation 
This study will consist of eight chapters. The 
task of Chapter I will be to show that analogy is valid 
for metaphysical purposes. In order to set forth 
clearly the distinctive characteristics of analogy 
which equip it for its role in metaphysics, it will be 
necessary to contrast analogy with other modes of predi-
cation such as strict logical unity of species and genus 
and mathematical predication. 
Not only will Chapter I be concerned with the 
validity of analogy, in general, for metaphysical pur-
poses, it will also have as its concern the task of dis-
covering which type of analogy is best suited for the 
1 Ibid., p. 76. 
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purposes of this study. 
After selecting a type of predication and a mode 
of analogy, the last section of Chapter I will narrow 
the field still further as it discusses the criteria 
which may be employed to test any specific analogy. These 
criteria will be employed throughout the dissertation to 
test the cogency of the various specific anthropic anal-
ogies which Leibniz and Schopenhauer utilize in meta-
physics. 
The task of Chapter II is to discover which anal-
ogies are relevant for Leibniz's metaphysical interest. 
This chapter will be developed in four stages. First, in 
Chapter II we shall attempt to discern whether or not 
Leibniz is interested in the metaphysical quest. Secondly, 
since, as we shall point out, metaphysics calls for the 
discovery of something not directly given in experience, 
it is especially important for this dissertation to 
establish the fact that, at the outset of the epistem-
ological venture, Leibniz recognizes the structural dif-
ference between the personal and the metaphysical realm. 
If this conclusion is supported, then the defini-
tion of metaphysics, the peculiar qualifications of 
analogy as a tool which may be employed to relate diverse 
realms, and Leibniz's methodology will be coherently 
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bound together. 
After underscoring Leibniz's metaphysical inter-
est and his recognition of differences between structures 
in finite persons and reality, three alleged analogies 
which appear to qualify for Leibniz's metaphysical pur-
poses will be discussed . This section will further sup-
port the conclusions of Chapter I regarding the require-
ments which an analogy must satisfy to be useful for 
metaphysical purposes, while pointing forward to the 
specific demands of Leibniz's metaphysical system. 
The analogies relevant to Leibniz's metaphysical 
purposes are finally narrowed down to two possibilities, 
the deductive analogy, which is related to and shares 
some of the characteristics of the analogy of attribu-
tion discussed in Chapter I, and coordinating analogies 
which will be related to the analogy of proper propor-
tionality. 
Although the final decision regarding the type 
of analogy which Leibniz is employing as a tool in 
metaphysics will be postponed until the completion of 
the investigation of Leibniz's world view, the study will 
procee~assuming, not without some justification, that 
Leibniz is employi~g an analogy of proper proportionality 
in his metaphysics. 
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Chapter III has as its task the understanding of 
the various aspects of the person and their relation to 
other phases in Leibniz's theory of personality. Since 
the analogy of proper proportionality will be employed 
in the study of Leibniz's metaphysics, it is necessary 
to understand the personal structures which will consti-
tute one of the analogates. 
In order to illuminate the various aspects of 
personality and their relations in Leibniz's thought, 
five concepts--unity, purpose, continuity, activity, 
and individuality--will be shown to be pervasive con-
cepts which are presupposed in the concrete functioning 
of the human person, such as in the perception of a 
physical object or in a specific ethical decision. 
It will then be shown that Leibniz clearly desig-
nates several analogical concepts which may be useful 
for metaphysical theorizing. It will be the final task 
of Chapter III to show that these analogical concepts 
cited by Leibniz are reducible, without loss, to the five 
pervasive concepts which were discovered in the study of 
Leibniz's theory of personality. 
It will be the task of Chapter IV to study the 
way in which Leibniz employs the analogy of the abiding 
self, which was studied earlier, to illuminate the 
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structure of phenomena. 
Since metaphysics, as will be shown, must include 
phenomenal categories in its final scheme, this chapter 
finds its place within a dissertation dealing with the 
use of analogy in metaphysics. Moreover, it would seem 
appropriate that the study of the structure of phenomena 
should precede the study of the structure of the real, 
since metaphysical principles, at their best, illuminate 
phenomenal structures. 
Accordingly, after the discussion of the role of 
analogies in illuminating phenomenal categories, Chapter 
V will follow and deal with the way in which Leibniz 
employs anthropic analogies to elucidate the structure 
of the real. 
In this chapter, various anthropic analogies of 
proper proportionality will be constructed harmonious 
with Leibniz's thought. In each case these proposed 
analogies will be tested by the criteria set forth in 
Chapter I. 
After the section dealing with the final analogy, 
the notion of individuality, suggested solutions to the 
problem areas--the type of analogy employed by Leibniz 
in his metaphysics and his interpretation of individual 
choice--will be discussed. 
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In Chapter VI the study turns from Leibniz's 
thought to a discussion of the role of anthropic analogies 
in Schopenhauer•s metaphysics. The first task of the 
study of Schopenhauer's philosophy is to discuss aspects 
of Schopenhauer's theory of personality which are rele-
vant to his use of analogies in metaphysics. Since, as 
will be shown, Schopenhauer does not employ theoretical 
categories as analogies in metaphysics, the principle of 
the sufficient reason which constitutes these active, sub-
jective categories, will be expounded, not for its future 
utility as an analogy, but for its use as an instrument 
to facilitate the understanding of the distinctive role 
of other anthropic analogies in the metaphysics of 
Leibniz and Schopenhauer. 
After the discussion of the theoretical cate-
gories in Schopenhauer's thought, the study turns to an 
investigation of Schopenhauer's doctrine of human will 
which he employs as an analogy in his metaphysics. 
Following the discussion of human will, Schopen-
hauer's interpretation of aesthetic experience andre-
ligious experience will be discussed pointing forward to 
their use as possible analogies in Chapter VII. 
It will be the task of Chapter VII, paralleling 
Chapter V which deals with Leibmzsmetaphysics, to study 
the role of anthropic analogies in Schopenhauer's meta-
physics. The anthropic analogy of irrational will is 
the first analogy which will be discussed followed by a 
study of the proposed aesthetic, teleological and reli-
gious analogies. In each case these proposed analogies 
will be tested by the criteria set forth in Chapter I. 
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The last chapter will be a final section summar-
izing the conclusions and comparative values revealed in 
the study as a whole. 
CHAPTER I 
THE VALIDITY OF ANALOGY FOR 
METAPHYSICAL PURPOSES 
A. The Nature of Predication 
1. Strict Logical Unity of Species and Genus 
One of the purposes of thinking is to bring order 
and clarity to our knowledge. Certain objects or beings 
are classified together because they possess similar 
properties. The common features which are discovered 
in individuals constitute the basis of the various 
schemes. For example, an individual confronts a rela-
tively unknown object. He examines this object and com-
pares it to what he knows and then classifies the object 
before him, for example, as a tree. 
The thinker in question has increased his knowl-
edge by relating the two objects by means of an identi-
cal or nearly identical meaning. Predication, therefore, 
is a mental activity by which meanings are connected. 
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We shall employ the word "univocation" to de-
scribe the type of predication in which the same term 
is predicated of many objects with an identical meaning. 
For example, the term "living organism" is predicated 
univocally of pigs and deer. These two beings share a 
common nature which places them in the same genus. 
It is necessary in a dissertation dealing with 
analogy to study other forms of predication in addition 
to analogy, in order to shed light upon the various 
degrees of difference between the meanings which are re-
lated in different forms of judgment. Some objects are 
very much alike and other objects which may be connected 
by some form of predication are extremely different. 
Our task, at this stage, is to highlight the distinctive 
function of analogy by means of a brief study of other 
forms of predication. 
The first type of predication, univocation, is 
the strict logical unity of the species or genus. This 
relation is based upon a "tight" unity in which in-
trinsic characteristics of the two subjects are related. 
But even in examples of univocation where the meaning 
unites two members of the same species, we recognize a 
difference between the two members. When a concept is 
applied to a novel event, the object presents a 
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a difference which enriches the universal as well as ex-
pressing a partial identity with the concept. 
In other types of predication this difference be-
tween the way in which the common concept is embodied in 
the two subjects which are compared or related may be 
even more marked. Another type of univocal predication 
besides the unity of the members of a species or genus 
is discovered in mathematics. 
2. Mathematical Predication 
In Hampus Lyttkens' book, The Analogy Between 
God and the World, 1 he discusses three types of mathe-
matical predication discovered in the pre-Socratic 
philosopher, Archytas. Archytas differentiates three 
types of mathematical predication: the harmonic, the 
arithmetical and the geometrical. 
We slia:ll briefly study these three types of 
predication in order to ascertain the relationship which 
connects the subjects compared. What Archytas desig-
nates as the arithmetical analogy applies to the mathe-
matical series. The similarity which establishes this 
~ampus Lyttkens, The Analof~ Between God and 
the World (Uppsala: Almquist and W sells Boktryckeri, 
1952), p. 16. 
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analogy, according to Archytas, consists in there being 
the same distinction between the numbers. 
Let us take, for example, the first three num-
bers, 1, 2, and 3. It may be said that the first num-
ber is to the second number as the second number is to 
the third number. 
The second type of mathematical analogy is the 
geometrical analogy. This type of mathematical univoca-
tion is labeled today "proportionality." For example, 
the relation between the proportions ~ : ~ illustrates 
this type of predication. The relation between ~ is ~ 
and the relation of 2~ is likewise ~ . Consequently, 
we discover an identity of relations which connects the 
two sides of the proportion. 
The third type of mathematical predication dis-
cussed by Archytas played relatively little part in 
later philosophy, but it further illustrates the identity 
of relations in mathematical predication. Let us turn 
to the harmonic type of predication. 
The analogous mean is a given number which by 
the same part is as much larger than another as it is it-
self smaller than a third. The number 4 is the lilarmonic 
1 1 
mean of 3 and 6, for 3 + J . 3 = 4 and 6 - J . 6 = 4. 
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In each of the preceding examples of the three 
types of mathematical predication we discover an iden-
tity of relation. In the arithmetical series the first 
number is precisely one unit less than the second num-
ber and the second number is precisely one unit less 
than the third number. 
In the second example the relation of ~ is 
the concept which is identical in the two sides of the 
proportion. 
In the illustration of harmonies, the number 4 
bears an identical relation to 3 and 6, provided we 
take into consideration the different meaning of the 
words "larger" and "smaller." In each instance of 
mathematical predication we find an identity or equal-
ity of relation which connects the subjects being com-
pared, be they members of the arithmetical series, 
mathematical proportions or Greek harmonies. 
Richard Robinson underlines this identity of 
relation which connects the two proportions in propor-
tional analogy in contrast to the type of connection 
discovered in other types of predication. He says, 
In mathematics it is possible to calculate 
the value of one term if given the value 
of the other three. In analogy in general 
where the relation is not quantitative it 
is impossible to ascertain1the nature of one term from the other three. 
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In mathematical predication, in contrast to 
other types of predication, it is possible to calculate 
the value of one term given the value of the other three 
because in mathematical predication the relation which 
connects the two proportions is identical. In short, it 
is a case of univocation. 
In the preceding examples of mathematical predi-
cation we have discovered a precise principle of con-
nection which unites the two structures which will be 
useful in this study as a contrast with various forms 
of analogy. 
Accordingly, we can eliminate mathematical pro-
portions as a type of predication which will be useful 
for the purposes of this study. Although it will be 
the aim of Chapter II to discuss more fully the qualifi-
cations which an analogy must satisfy to be relevant to 
a specific metaphysical theory, we are concerned in 
this chapter to uncover evidence which will support the 
valid use of analogy in metaphysics. What then are the 
1James Anderson, "Basic Propositions Concerning 
Metaphysical Analogy," "Connnents bl. George B. Burch, 
Richard Robinson and Joseph Owens,' The Review of Meta-
physics, Vol. V (March, 1952), p. 466. 
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general requirements an analogy must satisfy to be use-
ful for metaphysical purposes? 
We sh'all define metaphysics as an attempt to dis-
cover a system of general principles which will illumi-
nate first person experience. According to this defini-
tion, metaphysics calls for the discovery of something 
not directly given in experience--namely, principles of 
interpretation. Consequently, it will be impossible in 
metaphysics to compare directly the two subjects, such 
as a pair of horses, to confirm the identity of the con-
cept which is predicated as was the case in strict 
logical unity and mathematical predication. 
At this stage we shall simply say that if anal-
ogy is to be valid for metaphysical purposes it must 
function as a tool which will make possible a compari-
son of structures which are not identical. 
The mathematical model, however, as well as 
serving as a contrast with analogy, may shed light 
upon the structure of an analogy of proper proportion-
ality which is an analogy based on similarity of rela-
tions. However, the difference between univocation, 
which stresses identity, and analogy which underscores 
the difference between the similar structures must be 
carefully observed. 
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3. Analogy 
It has been intimated that analogy is not a 
relation of equality between the subjects connected by 
the common term, concept or relation. Consequently, it 
is not a univocal form of predication. Analogy is a type 
of predication in which the same term, concept or word 
is predicated of two or more objects with meanings that 
are partly the same and partly different. Analogies 
take place only when a property or relation is not pos-
sessed by an object in the same way. 
In an analogy we find a combination of similar-
ity and difference. It was indicated that univocation 
was based on a "tight" relation between the analogates. 1 
In the examples of mathematical predication the equality 
between the proportions was even more evident. A 
thinker who employs analogy correctly openly acknowledges 
the difference between the analogates. He does not claim 
to be relating two or more objects with an identical 
concept. 
1The word "analogates" will be employed through-
out this dissertation to refer to the concepts or rela-
tions which are the ground of any instance of analogical 
reasoning. 
Aside from the question of the type of analogy 
involved, when a thinker states, for example, that God 
is intelligent, he is employing the concept " intelli-
gence" to describe the nature of God in a way which is 
similar and yet different from the way this term is 
used when it is applied to the subject, man. 
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Since we have indicated that some things are 
very much alike and other things are different, it will 
be in the interests of this study to investigate differ-
ent types of analogies which will, in part, tend to 
clarify the relative degrees and types of similarities 
and differences which establish various analogies. 
a) Types of Analogy 
Although we shall assign certain meanings to 
terms which have been used in the history of philosophy 
and have been traditionally associated with certain 
thinkers, there will be no attempt to study or expound 
the way in which these concepts are used in the context 
of any particular system of philosophy. 
(1) The Analogy of Attribution.--The essence 
of the analogy of attribution is a diversity of rela-
tion to a single term which is considered the primary 
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analogate. There are, however, two types of analogy of 
attribution which we shall consider. 
(a) Extrinsic Attribution.--According to 
Gerald Phelan, the distinguishing mark of the analogy of 
extrinsic attribution is that there is one object called 
the primary analogate, which truly possesses the char-
acteristic and all other things compared with this prime 
analogate are only extrinsically named by it. 1 In con-
trast, the second type of analogy of attribution, in-
trinsic attribution, which will be discussed more fully 
later, explicitly signifies the similarity between 
primary and secondary analogate and attempts to show 
that in some sense there is an identity which relates 
the two analogates. 
In order to illustrate the analogy of extrinsic 
attribution, let us turn to the concept of health. 2 We 
can state that a long walk, medicine and color are all 
healthy. Health only resides formally, however, in 
living organisms. 
1Gerald B. Phelan, St. Thomas and Analogy (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1941), p. 35. 
2 Ibid., p. 34. 
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The essence of the word "healthy" is a condition 
of living beings, but the words can be employed to de-
scribe medicine, color and a long walk in as much as 
they are causes or effects of a healthy organism. 
The word "healthy," however, describes the real 
nature or the essence of living organisms and not the 
essence of the medicine, the color or the walk. Conse-
quently, the word "healthy" is predicated intrinsically 
only of the living organism. Since the word "healthy" 
does not describe the essence of the medicine, the 
color and the walk, but merely describes the object 
indirectly by means of its causal relation to the liv-
ing organism, it is an example of an extrinsic attribu-
tion of a concept which describes the essence of one 
object intrinsically but describes another object ex-
trinsically. 
It is possible, for example, to construct an 
analogy of extrinsic attribution between God and the 
world, since one might claim that the designation of 
God from His effects is an example of extrinsic attribu-
tion in as much as the names, such as love, goodness 
and others, take their meaning from things in the ~­
ated world. Consequently, they do not describe the 
essence of God. 
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Since we discover in this relation the applica-
tion of an attribute from one realm where it truly ap-
plies to another realm which is the cause of this realm, 
this analogy is similar to the preceding illustration 
which related medicine, a walk and color on the basis 
of an extrinsic analogy of attribution. Let us turn to 
a study of the analogy of intrinsic attribution. 
(b) Intrinsic Attribution.--It is possible to 
conceive of an analogy of intrinsic attribution as well 
as an analogy of extrinsic attribution. Whether or not 
this type of predication avoids univocation and qualifies 
as an analogy is an important question. 
Intrinsic attribution explicitly signifies the 
similarity between primary and secondary analogates. 
Intrinsic attribution expresses the fact that the rela-
tion of the analogous property to the secondary analo-
gate is an imperfect copy of the primary analogate. 
In relation to this religious question some1 have 
stressed the fact that God is the cause of all finite 
beings--beings are brought into existence by God. Con-
sequently, the similarity which connects the primary 
1George Klubertanz, in St. Thomas on Analogy 
(Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960). 
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with the secondary analogate is the act of existing. 
If one accepts this position and wishes to avoid 
univocation, it is necessary to underline the difference 
between divine existence and finite existence. There-
fore, the thinker who holds this point of view may turn 
to analogies of proportion to underline the fact that 
the act of existing must be related to levels of ex-
istence. 
The theologian who holds to extrinsic attribu-
tion maintains that concepts derived from the cause do 
not describe the essence of the primary analogate or God. 
George Klubertanz, attempting to avoid univocation and 
extrinsic attribution in a recent book says, "There is a 
likeness which is not based on any form in any species 
or genus, but rests as a non-formal perfection."1 Accord-
ing to Klubertanz, the act of existing is common to all 
inasmuch as they communicate not in the same form but the 
same act. He further states that this calls for a real, or 
ontological, grounding of the common act which all finite 
things have. 2 
Klubertanz recognizing the philosophical dangers 
of univocation and the theological pitfalls which ac-
company man's claim to know the essence of God, turns 
to the notion of the identity of the act of existing. 
1 Ibid., p. 138. 2Ibid., pp. 138-139. 
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Since intrinsic attribution involves the compar-
ison of the primary and secondary analogates, it would 
seem to presuppose something to compare. Even if it 
were possible to grasp in an intuition of the ontic the 
common act which all things have, this insight would 
appear to be of limited value as a support for the 
analogical method in metaphysics. 
It has been indicated that the purpose of think-
ing or predication is to bring clarity to our knowledge. 
If analogy is to promote this end, it must be used to 
continually bridge the gap from what we know to what we 
do not know. This must take place by way of a compari-
son of structural similarities. However, if our intui-
tion of the ontic merely reveals a common act, how then 
is it possible to compare structures when our knowledge 
of the primary analogate is limited to mere activity? 
It would appear that the attempt to retain 
intrinsic attribution, while avoiding univocation, re-
sults in an analogy which is not useful as a tool to 
further our understanding of the structure of the real. 
Recognizing the inadequacy of the analogy of in-
trinsic attribution, otbers1 have turned to the analogy 
1Gerald B. Phelan in St. Thomas and Analogy. 
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of proper proportionality to supplement the analogy of 
attribution. Phelan says, "It is only when the analogy 
of attribution is mingled with an analogy of proper pro-
portionality that it appears to give a firm foundation 
for metaphysical demonstration." 1 Phelan adds, "But 
even in such cases the metaphysical value of the demon-
stration rests wholly upon the analogy of proportional-
ity involved."2 Since Phelan underscores the importance 
of the analogy of proper proportionality for metaphysical 
purposes, it would be well to study briefly this mode 
of analogy. 
(2) The Analogy of Proper Proportionality.--The 
mode of proper proportionality, unlike the mode of at-
tribution, does not involve diverse relations to a single 
term, but it rather brings out a similarity between two 
or more relations. It was indicated that mathematical 
predication was based upon a comparison of two propor-
tions such as ~ : ri- Notwithstanding the fact that 
there is a similarity between the mathematical proportion 
and the analogy of proper proportionality, there is also 
a marked difference between the two. Mathematical 
1Gerald B. Phelan, St. Thomas and Analogy, p. 36. 
predication is an example of univocation in which the 
two analogates are equal. Whereas it has been indi-
cated that analogy is a relationship in which the two 
analogates are both similar and different. 
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Analogy is employed in instances where one does 
not know the precise relationship between the two ob-
jects or realms being compared. Consequently, the 
analogy of proper proportionality must be differentiated 
from mathematical proportion. Otherwise analogy would 
be reduced to univocation. 
It would seem, however, that there is no reason 
why the principle of proportionality should be limited 
to mathematical proportions. Proportions involve rela-
tions and comparison. It is possible to compare many 
types of relations. 
Aristotle employs analogies of proportion in 
biology. Aristotle points out that there is, for ex-
ample, no common name for the spine of a fish and the 
leg of some other animal, although the two are to some 
extent of a corresponding nature. 1 At this point uni-
vocal predication breaks down and Aristotle indicates 
lw.n. Ross (ed.), The Works of Aristotle 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), Post Analytics, II, 
14, 98a, line 20. 
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that one must turn to analogy. 
Although the analogy which is employed to com-
pare the relations in the preceding example is not a 
precise mathematical relation, it does highlight a paral-
lel relationship in two objects which can best be ex-
pressed by means of analogy. It will be necessary, how-
ever, to make explicit in a proper analogy of propor-
tionality the similarities between the two proportions, 
the role of the leg in relation to other aspects of the 
animal organism and the similar function of the spine 
of the fish within its system of relations, and finally 
the difference between the two beings, which makes 
univocal predication impossible, and necessitates the 
use of analogy. 
(3) Metaphor--Improper Proportionality.--An 
understanding of the difference between improper and 
proper proportionality is essential to a study which is 
dealing with the use of analogies in the metaphysical 
realm. 
A metaphor is a type of predication in which the 
same concept is applied to two different objects without 
an attempt to make explicit the particular relations 
which are the basis of the comparison. 
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In order to illustrate this point we shall turn 
to an example set forth by James Anderson in his book, 
The Bond of Being. Anderson points out that we may say 
that a man is a fox or a lion. Obviously, when one calls 
a man a fox, one means that he is really and truly wily 
or cunning and when one says that Shipwreck Kelly is a 
lion one affirms that he is really and truly courageous. 1 
Such expressions are metaphorical since the 
metaphor stresses the implied relation between fox and 
man. If we limit ourselves to saying that the man is 
cunning and the fox is cunning, we would not have a meta-
phor, but rather merely an analogy. 
As Professor Anderson indicates the metaphor 
arises only when we call the man a fox or a lion, in-
asmuch as the nature of the lion or of a fox is not found 
as an intrinsic property of man. 
Notwithstanding the difference between analogy 
and metaphor, metaphor has an analogical base. Meta-
phorical analogy is a proportionality since, if the 
relations were made explicit, it would present a 
1James F. Anderson, The Bond of Being (St. Louis: 
B. Herder Book Co., 1949), p. 170. 
----~·--
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likeness of relations or proportion between several 
terms-- cunning : cunning . But this proportion illus-fox man 
trates the major difference between metaphor and proper 
analogy. 
As one formulat~the proportion he begins to 
make explicit the relationship of the characteristic 
in question to the nature of the object as a whole. 
Moreover, as one constructs the analogy, under-
scoring similarities and differences, there will be 
less danger of identifying the formal nature of the 
fox and man, since the analogies will reveal more dif-
ferences than similarities in the nature of the beings. 
Consequently, one will recognize the fact that the 
metaphor is suggestive of similar characteristics and 
activities in diverse objects, but it is not a legiti-
mate method of extending knowledge from a knowledge of 
a more familiar structure to the knowledge of the na-
ture of an analogous structure. 
Metaphor is an example of improper analogy in 
as much as it does not make explicit, and in many 
instances the metaphor is not intended to function in 
this way, the similarities and differences which ground 
the analogy. 
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An analogy of proportionality is proper when the 
implicit similarities are brought to light and evaluated. 
Following this evaluation, one may be able to ascertain 
whether or not the analogy unites two concepts which 
share a similar formal nature. 
Since analogy is not a mode of mathematical 
predication, we must underline the word "similar" in 
the preceding statement. Notwithstanding this fact, the 
analogy of proper proportionali~y does not merely sug-
gest a similarity between two subjects. It analyzes 
the character and relations of the structures being 
compared sufficiently to ground the connection between 
the intrinsic natures of the two objects. 
The analogy of proper proportionality mediates 
between, on the one hand, the identity we discover in 
mathematical predication and some types of attribution 
which allegedly make possible knowledge of the primary 
analogate, and, on the other hand, metaphor which is 
suggestive of similar characteristics and actions be-
tween diverse objects, but in the use of metaphor the 
thinker does not explicitly analyze and relate these 
characteristics and relations in such a way as to iden-
tify the formal nature of the objects compared. 
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b) Summary 
Since it is one of the aims of this dissertation 
to investigate the type of analogy, e.g., analogies of 
attribution, proper proportionality or metaphor, which 
is being used by Leibniz and Schopenhauer as they relate 
personal and metaphysical structures, it has been neces-
sary to discuss briefly the various kinds of analogy. 
The essence of the analogy of attribution is a 
diversity of relation to a single term which is con-
sidered the primary term. In the instance of extrinsic 
attribution one object, the primary analogate, truly 
possesses the characteristic and all other things com-
pared with the prime analogate are only extrinsically 
named by it. 
The essence of intrinsic attribution is a sim-
ilarity between the primary and secondary analogate in 
which the secondary analogate is an imperfect copy of 
the primary analogate. 
Recognizing the dangers of univocation in this 
mode of analogy, Klubertanz turns to the similarity of 
the intrinsic property of acts of existing in the two 
realms being compared, in this instance, God and the 
existence of finite things. 
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The recognition that the similarity between the 
intrinsic property of acts of existing in the two realms 
does not shed light upon the structure of the realm we 
are seeking to illuminate, led us to a discussion of the 
analogy of proper proportionality. This mode of analogy 
is based upon the similarity of two or more relations. 
It was indicated that the type of relations upon 
which this analogy is based must be differentiated from 
the mathematical types of predication, since this type 
of reasoning is employed to illuminate structures in 
which the relation between the two structures being com-
pared is not identical. 
Finally, we turned to metaphor or improper pro-
portionality and pointed out that a metaphor is a type 
of predication in which the same concept is applied to 
two different objects without an attempt to make ex-
plicit the particular relations which are the basis of 
the comparison. 
The subject of metaphor is classified as analogy, 
in as much as it has an analogical base, since it in-
volves a relation between objects which are partly the 
same and partly different. 
We have set forth the various types of analogy. 
Now we must turn to the criteria by which we evaluate a 
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cogent and false analogy. 
B. Cogent and False Analogies 
Although several of the criteria of a good anal-
ogy have been mentioned in the process of defining the 
various modes of predication and analogy, the standards 
for a good analogy and the defects of a false analogy 
are of such importance to this dissertation that it will 
be necessary to deal with the subject in a separate sec-
tion. 
Let us turn to the discussion of the standards 
of cogent analogies and the defects of false analogies. 
A false use of analogy is one which: (1) fails to 
limit metaphysical analogy to probable results, (2) 
does not analyze the differences as well as the similar-
ities between the analogates, (3) places the emphasis 
upon the number of similarities rather than the degree 
of value or weight of importance of the resemblances, 
and (4) employs analogy as an argument against an ob-
served fact or an established law. 
A cogent use of analogy is one which: (1) lim-
its metaphysical analogy to probable conclusions, 
(2) is not characterized by hasty generalization and 
45 
superficial analogy, but rather analyzes similarities and 
differences, (3) places the emphasis upon the degree of 
value or weight of importance of the similarities rather 
than merely the number of resemblances, (4) clearly notes 
the unexplored area, (5) is suggestive and fruitful and 
(6) notes its relation to observed fact and established 
law. 
It has been indicated that analogy need not be 
a means of calculating or ascertaining the precise na-
ture of something not known from something known. The 
thinker who employs analogy, if he adheres to the above 
standard, does not seek a relation comparable to the 
3 • 9 
g•:27• If the philosopher mathematical proportion 
recognizes the probable nature of the conclusions which 
result in analogy, and the other criteria noted above 
are followed, this mode of analogy may establish some 
very fruitful hypotheses. Let us turn from the criterion 
which limits analogy to probable results to the criterion 
which underscores the importance of analyzing similari-
ties and difference between the analogates. 
Analogy, by definition, is a mode of predication 
which relates terms which are both similar and different. 
David Hume in Treatise of Human Nature sets forth a good 
example of an analogy which fails to meet the standard 
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noted above, since it overlooks significant differences. 
Hume says, 
[The oak] by [the] dropping of its seeds • • • 
produces a sapling below it, which, springing 
up by degrees, at last overtops and destroys 
the parent tree: I ask if in this instance 
there be wanting any relation, which is dis-
coverable in parricide or ingratitude? It not 
the one tree the cause of the other's -existence; 
and the latter the cause of the destruction of 
the former, in the same manner as when a child 
murders his parent? 'Tis not sufficient to 
reply, that a choice or will is wanting. For in 
the case of parricide, a will does not give rise 
to any different relations, but is only the 
cause from which the action is derived; and 
consequently produces the same relations, that 
in the ~ak or elm arise from-iome other prin-
ciples~ 
Dorothy Emmet points out that whether analogies 
can be arguments as well as illustrations of something 
known or partly known on other grounds depends on 
whether the relation illustrated is sufficiently alike 
in both cases for it to be possible to draw conclusions 
fromhe one instance to the other. 
The force of the argument in this quotation 
from Hume turns on whether the relation is only the 
similar relation of physical parenthood; or whether in 
the case of the human father and child other factors 
1David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: 
Selby-Biggs, 1896), p. 467. I owe this reference to 
Miss Dorothy Emmet [Dorothy M. Emmet, The Nature of 
Meta1hAsical Thinking (London: MacMillan Co., 1946), 
pp. - • -
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must be considered. 
For example, the self-conscious, rational nature 
of even a little child constitutes an important differ-
ence between the human and the non-human relationship. 
A child who knowingly kills or causes his parents suffer-
ing is showing ingratitude because it is possible for 
him to recall the kindness of his parents and compare 
his act which causes the suffering or will cause the 
suffering of his parents with their past kindness. More-
over, the human person is capable of experiencing an 
evolved emotional response to this situation, once it is 
understood, which further differentiates the human and 
the non-human relation. This example is inserted at 
this point in order to highlight the importance of in-
vestigating and underscoring the differences between 
analogates in any potential analogy. 
We shall briefly analyze the thought of two pre-
Socratic philosophers, Xenophanes and Empedocles, in 
order to illustrate the way in which two thinkers who 
actually employed analogies recognized the importance 
of analyzing the similarities and differences which 
established the various analogies. It is not our aim 
to evaluate the cogency of these analogies. 
The pre-Socratic philosopher, Empedocles, de-
scribes a ·force analogous to the human mind at work in 
the universe. He says, 
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He [God] has no human head attached to bodily 
members, nor do two branching arms dangle from 
his shoulders, he has neither feet nor swift 
knees nor any hairy parts. No, he is only 
mind, sacred and ineffable mind, flashing 
through the whole universe with swift thoughts. 1 
Notwithstanding the fact that Empedocles first underlines 
the differences between man and God, nevertheless, he 
concludes that God is mind. However, man possesses a 
mind which is limited to reflective knowledge, while 
God knows the structure of events immediately and di-
rectly. Empedocles apparently recognizes that a cogent 
analogy must explicitly set forth the similarities and 
differences which establish the analogy. 
Xenophanes, another pre-Socratic philosopher, 
even more emphatically underlines the importance of 
setting forth clearly the similarities and differences 
between the analogates which ground an analogy. In 
criticizing the loose analogy of the Ethiopians and Tracians 
1The Fragments quoted or referred to in this 
chapter are taken from the collection of Diels, Fragh 
mente der Vorsokratiker Band I (Berlin: Weidmaannsc e 
Buchand1ung, 1922), Dlels, 133, trans. by John Warbeke, 
The Searching Mind of Greece (New York: Appleton-
Century-Croft, Inc., 1930), p. 67. 
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he says, "Ethiopians have gods with snub noses and black 
hair. Tracians have gods with grey eyes and red hair."1 
Xenophanes, however, rejects a completely impersonal 
metaphysical view as he states, 
There is one God, greatest among gods and men 
resembling mortals neither in form nor in 
mind. The whole of him sees and the whole of 
him thinks, the whole of him hears. Without 
trouble he rules all things by the force of 
his mind.2 
According to Xenophanes, God is different than 
humans in form, since he does not possess bodily char-
acteristics such as a snub nose and black hair. He is 
spirit or mind. However, God's mind also differs from 
the mind of man. Man, for example, is not complete 
master of himself. He struggles against unruly emotions. 
It would seem from the passage quoted from Xenophanes 
that there is a vast difference between the way God 
rules all things and the way man struggles to gain a 
measure of control over his wants and passions. 
Furthermore, man's knowledge is greatly limited. 
It would seem, according to Xenophanes, that God's 
1Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic 
Philosophers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), 
p. 22. 
loiels, 23, 24, 25, Xenophanes. Translated by 
John Warbeke, The Searching Mind of Greece, p. 50. 
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spiritual nature pervades, rules and knows all. There 
are many potential objects of knowledge of which man is 
ignorant. Therefore, we must underscore the difference 
between human knowledge and god's knowledge. 
In Empedocles's thought, it would appear that 
the personal notion of love as a unifying force is em-
ployed to explain the attractive processes which account 
for change and order. He says, 
At one time things grew to be one alone out of 
many; and then again this fell asunder so that 
there were many from the one • . • fire and 
water and earth and • • . air; and apart from 
these, baneful strife, with equal weight 
throughout, and in their midst love, equally 
distributed in length and breadtfi.l 
He continues, "These [elements] never cease their con-
tinuous exchange, sometimes unity under the influence 
of love so that all becomes one, at other times, again 
each moving apart through the hostile force of hate." 2 
In speaking of cosmic love, Empedocles instructs 
man to look within, "Do not sit there with astonished 
eyes for the cosmic love is rooted in your own members, 
it vouches for itself."3 Empedocles, however, 
1Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic 
Philosophers, p. 53 (underltirlngmine). 
2Ibid. 
loiels, 17, 1, 20, translation and arrangement 
by John Warbeke, The Searching Mind of Greece, p. 67. 
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apparently noting differences between love and hate on 
the personal level and the attractive and repulsive 
forces of the universe says, "But in so far as they [the 
elements] never cease this continuous exchange, in this 
sense they remain always unmoved as they follow the 
cyclic process."1 This statement appears to underscore 
the difference between love and hate on the personal 
level and the cyclical process of attractive forces on 
the metaphysical level. Love and hate are merely imper-
sonal attractive and repelling forces on the metaphysi-
cal level, while they are significant feelings which move 
the individual to action on the personal level. 
The errors of hasty generalization and superfi-
cial analogies will be curbed, if similarities and dif-
ferences are analyzed as analogates are compared. A 
cogent analogy is not characterized by hasty generaliza-
tion and superficial analogy, but rather includes an 
analysis of the differences as well as the similarities 
between the structures compared. Another criterion by 
which one may test an analogy is the importance of the 
similarities which establish the analogy. 
1Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic 
Philosophers, p. 53. 
Bernard Bosanquet is well-known in the field 
of the logic of analogy for his emphasis upon the de-
gree of value or importance of the similarities rather 
than merely the number of resemblances. He says, 
"Everything turns [in analogy] on the 'importance' of 
the character which forms the common predicate."1 
Bosanquet further illuminates the notion of importance 
as he says, 
Any character in • • • a connected group 
of characters that gives the key to the 
prevailing purpose of the whole content 
under examination is an important char-
acter.2 
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As this dissertation progresses anthropic anal-
ogies will be applied to metaphysical problems. It will 
be one of our aims to indicate that certain suggestive 
anthropic analogies are helpful in understanding the 
manner in which certain metaphysicians have interpreted 
the data of experience. The fruitfulness of uhese 
1Bernard Bosanquet, Logfg' Vol. II, 2nd edition (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 11), p. 92. 
2rbid., p. 96. 
analogies will, in part, be judged by the manner in 
which they integrate the data of experience. 
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Notwithstanding the importance of an empirical 
starting point, the metaphysician who is seeking a set 
of general principles which will shed light upon his own 
experience, is not merely a fact collector. He is 
rather a fact integrator. Although the degree of value 
is a requirement of analogy in general, it is of spe-
cial importance in a dissertation dealing with the way 
in which anthropic analogies elucidate experience. It 
is our hope that this dissertation will place the empha-
sis upon degrees of value and weight of importance of 
the similarities, rather than merely upon the number of 
resemblances or differences. 
In the early stages of the use of analogy, the 
similarities noted between analogates are usually vague. 
These first intuitions may well be validated by means 
of further investigation, but this is a task which must 
be carried through as far as possible with a rigor and 
vigor which is characteristic of a thinker who realizes 
the dangers of analogy. 
Furthermore, on occasion, a thinker may not 
realize that he is employing analogies in reasoning. 
l 
It may be necessary in our study to make explicit the 
similarities and differences which establish the vari-
ous analogies under investigation. 
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The dangers involved in the use of analogy have 
been emphasized throughout this chapter. It would ap-
pear that the risks involved in this undertaking would 
outweigh the fruits of the quest. A good analogy, how-
ever, is suggestive. New hypotheses, concepts and laws 
depend upon analogy. Morris Cohen says, 
When we try to express general considerations 
of a novel or unfamiliar character • • • how 
can we apprehend new relations than under old 
categories?! 
The imagination and the reason of man, referred to in 
the preceding quotation, allow him to conceive of con-
cepts, laws, hypothesis and categories which synthe-
size similarities and differences. 
It may be a study of the use of anthropic anal-
ogies by Leibniz and Schopenhauer will illuminate the 
method by which they establish their metaphysical 
principles. 
~orris Cohen, A Preface to Logic (New York: 
Meridian Books, 1956), p. 506. 
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C. Summary 
Since the aim of this study is to investigate the 
role of anthropic analogies in the metaphysics of Leibniz 
and Schopenhauer, it has been necessary in this first 
chapter to set the stage for this inquiry: (1) by study-
ing the role of different types of predication in the 
interests of defining more precisely the nature of an-
alogical reasoning, (2) by setting in relief various 
types of analogy which may prove to be species of anal-
ogy employed by either or both philosophers under study, 
and finally (3) by presenting several criteria by which 
we may test the various analogies which will play an 
important role in the following chapters. 
Throughout this study, however, one purpose has 
guided the investigation--to ascertain whether or not 
analogy is adequate for metaphysical purposes. 
l 
CHAPTER II 
ANALOGIES ESPECIALLY RELEVANT FOR 
LEIBNIZ'S METAPHYSICAL INTERESTS 
The main task which stands before us in this pre-
liminary survey of analogies and metaphysics is briefly 
to show that: 
1. Leibniz is interested in the metaphysical 
quest, which we have defined as a system of general prin-
ciples which will illuminate first person experience. 
Moreover, if the first question is answered in the posi-
tive, we shall attempt to discover in this chapter, in 
a preliminary way, whether or not Leibniz believes there 
is a principle of unity which connects the personal realm 
from which the analogies are derived and the metaphysical 
realm to which these analogies are applied. If this 
question is answered affirmatively, it will encourage 
further the undertaking of this dissertation. Finally, 
it will be necessary to show that Leibniz is interested 
in discovering these strands of unity which bring added 
coherence to first person experience. 
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2. Since the use of analogy in metaphysics 
calls for the discovery of something not directly 
given in experience, it will be necessary, in order to 
open the way for our study, to show that at the outset 
of the epistemological venture Leibniz recognizes the 
structural difference between the personal and the 
metaphysical realms. Otherwise it would appear that 
his reasoning would become an instance of univocation. 
Therefore, the relevance of analogy to Leibniz's meta-
physical theory would seem to depend not only upon his 
interest in metaphysics, which is a search for unity, 
but also upon the differences between the metaphysical 
principles and the human models. 
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3. Certain types of analogies which seem to be 
candidates fail to qualify either as analogies or they 
do not appear to be relevant to the way Leibniz employs 
analogies to illuminate first person experience. 
4. There are problem areas, regarding the type 
of analogy which Leibniz employs in metaphysics, which 
preclude the possibility of a solution prior to an in-
vestigation of Leibniz's philosophy. 
A. Leibniz's Interest in the 
Metaphysical Quest 
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It has been indicated that the application of 
anthropic analogies in metaphysics presupposes an inter-
est in the metaphysical quest. If, for example, Leibniz 
believes that thinking is merely a process of manipulat-
ing logical entities without regard to any objects to 
which these structures refer, then a study of the role 
of anthropic analogies in his metaphysical theory would 
not be justified or worth undertaking. 
Would Leibniz reject the possibility of forming 
theories about the nature of that which is not directly 
given in experience? Would he venture beyond the first 
person experience in order to ascertain the nature of 
other types of activity which shed light upon and ex-
plain, in part, his conscious experience? It will be 
on the basis of a tentative affirmative answer to this 
question that this study will proceed. 
Leibniz says, 
If anyone says that the cause of phenomena is 
in the nature of our mind which contains the 
phenomena, he will affirm nothing false but 
nevertheless he will not be telling the wnole 
truth. I 
lLeroy Loemker (ed. and trans.), Leibniz: 
Philosothical Paters and Letters, Vol. II (Chicago: The 
Univers ty of Ch cago Press, 1956), p. 605 - (underlining 
mine). 
Leibniz also states that there must be a reason why we 
ourselves exist rather than not. He asserts, "All ex-
isting things are in intercourse with each other."1 
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He adds, "No one becomes a widower in India by the 
death of his wife in Europe unless a real change occurs 
in him. 11 2 Leibniz indicates that the cause which ac-
counts for this intercourse is the cause which perfectly 
expresses the universe, namely God. 3 In a letter to 
Arnauld Leibniz says, 
Different substances • . . are not able, if 
we speak with metaphy$ical strictness, to 
act one upon another.4 
He continues, 
Nothing happens to the substance except out 
of its own being and in virtue of its own 
law, provided we add the concurrence of God. 5 
For the word "interaction" Leibniz substitutes " inter-
correspondence." He indicates that we may conceive of 
substances as interfering or limiting one another. 6 
1Ibid. ' p . 606. 
3Ibid. 
5Ibid., p. 233. 
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Leibniz, by postulating other causes outside 
the conscious experience of the person which account 
for the changes which occur within first person experi-
ence is moving in the direction of the metaphysical 
activity. Furthermore, Leibniz sets forth several cri-
teria by which we can distinguish real phenomena from 
i maginary phenomena. Three criteria he mentions are: 
intensity, coherence and predictability. 1 But he 
declares, 
We must admit it to be true that the criteria 
for real phenomena . • . are not demonstrative, 
even though they have the greatest probability 
••• [and] they do not establish a metaphysi-
cal certainty.2 
But he adds, "If anything is real, it is solely the 
force of acting and suffering. " 3 
Leibniz contends that in the rigorous sense of 
metaphysical truth there is no external cause which 
acts upon us except God alone. 4 It would seem that 
"activity" then is at least one characteristic of God. 
1Leroy Loemker (ed.), Leibniz: Philosophical 
Papers and Letters, Vol . II, pp. 603-604. 
2Ibid., p. 604. 3 Ibid., pp. 606-607. 
4Leroy Loemker (ed.), Leibniz: Philosophical 
Papers and Letters, Vol. I (Ch!cago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 494. 
Leibniz appears to have confidence in the reality of 
action as well as the order of phenomena as indications 
of a real world beyond the first person experience. 
Leibniz says, "I am not of the opinion of certain able 
philosophers • • • who seem to hold that our ideas 
themselves are in God and not at all in us." 1 Leibniz 
believes that it is inconceivable that a person should 
think by means of an idea possessed by someone else. 
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The soul must not only have within it the passive powers 
of being affected, but also a power of ordering its 
perceptions from its own point of view. 
Although the above passages quoted from Leibniz's 
writings foreshadow his belief that one may gain insight 
into the metaphysical object by means of personal anal-
ogies, other statements even more explicitly point in 
this direction. Leibniz asserts, "The spirit not only 
has a perception of the works of God, but is even capable 
of producing something which resembles them, though in 
miniature. •• 2 He adds , 
1Ibid., p. 495. 
2Leroy Loemker (ed.), Leibniz: Philosophical 
Papers and Letters, Vol. II, p. 1041. 
Our soul is architectonic • • • in its volun-
tary action and in discovering the sciences 
according to which God has regulated things. 
• • • In its own realm and in the small world 
in which it is allowed to act, the soul initi-
ates what God performs in the great world.l 
He states further, "Reality is always and everywhere 
similar to what is within us. 112 
The following passage seems to suggest, perhaps 
less dramatically, but no less conclusively, that the 
metaphysical search is not only accepted by Leibniz as 
a legitimate venture; but that analogues of the general 
metaphysical notions may be rooted in our own being. 
Leibniz says, 
When we wish to consider what is in us • • • 
before all apperception, we are right in be-
ginning with the most simple. For the general 
principles enter into our thought, of which 
they form the soul and the connection. They 
are as necessary thereto as the muscles and 
sinews are for3walking, although we do not think of them. 
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Although the above passages are hardly sufficient 
evidence to prove the main thesis of this dissertation, 
they do indicate that Leibniz has a metaphysical interest. 
1Ibid. 
-
2Philip P. Wiener (ed.), Leibniz Selections 
(New York: Charles Scribner's -Sons, 1951), p. 396. 
3 Ibid., p. 405. 
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He is not merely satisfied with the ordering of phenomena 
within his conscious experience, he is interested in un-
derstanding the general principles which describe those 
activities which cause change in and limit his own ex-
perience. As Miss Emmet says, "The 'things' to which • • . 
activities are responsive transcend those activities."1 
She adds a rhetorical question which we believe Leibniz 
would answer in the affirmative. She says, 
If we • . • allow that we have no direct knowl-
edge of these processes [processes transcending 
our conceptual forms], we shall have to ask 
whether we are not forced to try to conceive of 
them in concepts drawn by analogy from interpre-
tations of experience.2 
Aside from the problem of the application of 
analogies to reality, which must await further develop-
ment, we may conclude that Leibniz took an active inter-
est in metaphysics and did not limit thinking to the 
process of manipulating logical entities without regard 
to any objects to which these structures referred. 
1oorothy Emmet, The Nature of Metaphysical 
Thinking, p. 86. 
2Ibid. 
-
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B. Leibniz's Recognition of Differences 
Between Structures in Finite 
Persons and Reality 
It has been indicated that another essential 
task of this chapter is to show that Leibniz recognizes 
the difference between the analogates. 
Before underlining the difference between the 
analogates, it will be necessary to describe briefly 
the two structures being compared. Since one of the 
analogates is to be taken from the personal realm, let 
us illustrate the personal analogate by means of human 
purpose. 
Employing the analogy of proper proportionality, 
we first study the relation human purpose bears to other 
aspects of the personality and then compare this per-
sonal structure to possible structures which interpret 
activities, which manifest themselves in experience 
merely as the coexistence and sequence of sense data, 
on a deeper level of analysis. 
How is this methodology directly relevant to 
the problem before us? We are attempting to show, in 
this section, that Leibniz recognizes the difference 
between the analogate derived from the personal realm 
and the similar structure which illuminates first person 
--·-
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experience. If there is an identity, similar to mathe-
matical predication, between the two structures, then 
it would appear that the study of the role of analogy 
in the metaphysical thought of Leibniz would not be a 
fruitful undertaking. 
In order to open the way for further investiga-
tion of this topic it is necessary not only to show 
that Leibniz is interested in the metaphysical quest 
which highlights unity, but that he is also recognizing 
the difference between the analogates. 
The difference between the unity which we dis-
cover within ourselves and the ultimate principle of 
unification on the metaphysical level can best be il-
lustrated in Leibniz's thought by turning to his doc-
trine of the levels of monads. 
Since it will be one of the tasks of this study 
to show that Leibniz employs analogies of personality 
to shed light upon these underlying sub-human unities 
which illuminate first person experience, we are not 
"begging the question" by employing these monads at 
this stage. We are merely utilizing the levels of 
monads to highlight the difference between levels of 
being, especially the difference between the human per-
son and more comprehensive principles of interpretation 
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in Leibniz's thought. 
Once justifying our task, it will then be neces-
sary to investigate step by step the way in which these 
personal analogies illuminate all levels of being, in-
cluding the sub-human and inorganic realms. 
Pointing out the differences between perceiving 
unities below the level of human and even organic nature, 
which represent the world from their own point of view, 
Leibniz says, 
I think it right that the general name of Monads 
or Entelechies should suffice for simple sub-
stances which have perception only, and the name 
Souls should be given only to those in which per-
ception is more distinct and is accompanied by 
memory.l 
He further states, 
Thus it is well to make a distinction between 
perception which is the inner state of the monad 
representing outer things and arperception which 
is consciousness or the reflect ve knowledge of 
this inner state.2 
Notwithstanding the fact that Leibniz distin-
guishes monads with memory from those which are limited 
to perception, he nevertheless, maintains that monads 
below the level of consciousness represent the rest of 
1Robert Latta (ed. and trans.), Leibniz: The 
Monadolog¥ and Other Philosoghical Writings (Oxford: 
Oxford Un~versity Press, 189 ), p. 230. 
2~., p. 411. 
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the world from their own point of view. 1 
The grading of perceptions in the non-conscious 
world, together with the recognition of levels of monads, 
suggest a hierarchy from the simplest monad to the most 
active conscious beings. This hierarchical approach is 
illustrated as Leibniz states that it is reasonable to 
suppose that below us there are substances capable of 
perception, as there are such substances above us; and 
that far from being the last of all, our souls occupy a 
middle position. 2 
The preceding discussion would seem to indicate 
that all levels of monads perceive the world from their 
own point of view. If we are able to discover the na-
ture of the criterion which distinguishes levels of 
reality, then it will be possible to apply this norm 
to human persons and ascertain why the soul occupies a 
middle position in the scale of being. 
Following this analysis, it may be possible to 
show that Leibniz believes that the ultimate principles 
of unification which are higher on the level of beings 
1G.W.R. Montgomery, Leibniz: Discourse on 
Meta~hysics, Correspondence with Arnauld, and Monadology, 
p. 2 6. 
2G.M. Duncan (ed. and trans.), The Philosophical 
Works of Leibniz (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1908), p. 255 • 
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are not so limited. This conclusion would support the 
thesis that there is a measure of difference between the 
model of the human person, one of the analogates, and 
Leibniz's system of general principles, the other anal-
agate. 
What is the criterion which distinguishes levels 
of being in Leibniz's thought. He says, "It is not as 
regards their object, but as regards the different ways 
in which they have knowledge of their object that Monads 
are limited."1 
All monads, Leibniz insists, seek to perceive 
the infinite or the whole, but they are limited and dif-
ferentiated through the degrees of distinctness of their 
perceptions. Inasmuch as distinctness of perception 
would appear to be Leibniz's ~riterion of activity, let 
us turn to his discussion of this norm. 
According to Leibniz, kno~ledge is distinct 
when one can enumerate or analyze one by one all the 
marks which are sufficient to distinguish one thing from 
another. 2 He says, "When everything which enters into a 
1Robert Latta, Leibniz: The Monadology and 
Other Philosophical Writings, p. 250. 
2Leroy Loemker, Leibniz: Philosophical Papers 
and Letters, Vol. I, p. 490. 
definition or distinct knowledge is known distinctly, 
down to the primitive concept, I call such knowledge 
adeguate."1 Leibniz adds, "There is an infinite dif-
ference between our intellect and the divine, for God 
sees all things adequately and at once, while very few 
things are known by us distinctly. " 2 
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Human persons, according to Leibniz, distinguish, 
analyze and relate their system of ideas, while the high-
est unity or the highest purpose sees all things at once. 
Consequently, there is a marked difference between any 
human purpose, or the unity of any person in the process 
of understanding his world and ideal values and the na-
ture of an ultimate unity in Leibniz's system. 
It has been indicated that Leibniz is interested 
in the metaphysical quest and has faith in the powers 
of man's mind to interpret and illuminate first person 
experience. However, this section has underscored 
Leibniz's recognition of the fact that the person must 
reproduce in human thought the objective fact. The 
structure of the real becomes ours, according to Leibniz, 
only as we reconstruct it in human thought. The 
2Ibid., Vol. II, p. 963. 
l 
I 
70 
discovery of this truth leads Leibniz to emphasize the 
difference between God who knows everything immediately 
and man, who is more active than some levels of being, 
but is still limited to discursive knowledge. 
Consequently, there is difference between man's 
concepts and reality. This difference between the per-
sonal and the metaphysical realms further opens the way 
for the undertaking of this study. 
C. Analogies which Fail to Qualify 
for Leibniz's Metaphysical 
Purposes 
It has been indicated that Leibniz was inter-
ested in the metaphysical quest. This fact together with 
his emphasis upon perspective and the difference between 
personal and metaphysical structures opens the way and 
even encourages the investigation of the role of anal-
ogies in Leibniz's thought. Since Leibniz would agree 
that the growth of knowledge is from that which is known 
to the unknown, it would seem that the use of analogy in 
metaphysics, which is precisely a method which employs 
an imaginative leap from a structure in one realm of dis-
course to the possible application of this structure in 
another realm of being, stands out as a possible key to 
the understanding of Leibniz's metaphysical synthesis. 
71 
It will be our purpose in the next few pages to 
evaluate several types of analogies which appear to be 
candidates for our study of Leibniz's metaphysics and 
decide which ones fail to meet the standards set forth 
earlier and which analogies may possibly be useful in 
our study. 
This evaluation will serve to sharpen the distinc-
tion between univocation, analogy and metaphor, while 
relating the subject of analogy to metaphysics and more 
specifically to the thought of Leibniz. Moreover, it 
will eliminate alleged analogies which fail to qualify 
for Leibniz's metaphysical purposes. 
According to Miss Dorothy Emmet there are five 
types of analogies used in metaphysics: 1 (1) the copy 
theory of analogy, (2) analogies as inductive arguments 
from parallel cases, (3) analogies based on a relation 
to an object in part experienced and in part not experi-
enced, (4) deductive analogies and (5) coordinating 
analogies. 
lnorothy Emmet, The Nature of Metaphasical Think-
~ pp. 8-18. These analogies will not beiscussed in 
~same order in which they are treated in The Nature 
of Metaphysical Thinking. 
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1. The Copy Theory of Analogy 
The first type of analogy used in metaphysics 
which we will discuss assumes that our ideas are some-
how duplicates of things, copying their essential struc-
ture. Those who hold to the copy theory recognize the 
fact that we can only be aware of clusters of sensations 
--appearances. Notwithstanding this fact they maintain 
that the pattern of sensations repeat the structure of 
the non-phenomenal object. In short, according to this 
position, our ideas are duplicates of the things which 
they represent. They copy their essential structure. 
This type of predication is put forward as an 
alleged analogy since the set of properties and rela-
tions which constitute the essence of the pattern is 
present in two mediums, the thought world and the 
thing world. 
First, it would appear that this alleged anal-
ogy would not seem to satisfy the criteria for an anal-
ogy set forth earlier. It appears to be an instance of 
univocal predication in which we discover an identity 
between the analogates. Although this type appears to 
be an analogy since the pattern is present in two dif-
ferent realms, actually the pattern, in the two realms, 
is identical. Otherwise it would not be labeled a copy 
theory of analogy. 
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It will be recalled that we rejected mathemati-
cal predication as a type of analogy since the two sides 
of the proportion or the relation between numbers in the 
number series was identical or equal. In as much as the 
definition of an analogy stipulates that there must be 
a difference between the two patterns compared if a 
type of predication is to qualify as an analogy, then 
the copy theory of analogy, like mathematical predica-
tion, would not appear to qualify as a type of analogy. 
Furthermore, the copy theory would appear to 
presuppose that the mind is purely passive and merely 
reads off the pattern of events. Even the sensory re-
action of beings with physiological and psychological 
natures such as human persons possess would seem to 
preclude the possibility of an identification of the 
pattern of thought and the pattern of events. 
It is our belief that Leibniz conceives of 
knowledge as organic growth or development. Patterns 
of sensations are not poured into the mind from without. 
Rather, the mind assimilates what is given to it accord-
ing to its own principles and returns to experience en-
riched by the way it has related and organized past 
l 
experience. Leibniz recognizes the function of the 
active mind as it enriches individuals and universals 
through the assimilation and transformation of given 
experience. 1 
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On the basis of the evidence set forth, it is 
safe to conclude that an idea as it appears in sensa-
tion could not be described, for Leibniz, as a copy of 
the thing, reproducing its properties and its structural 
relations. We may assume that Leibniz would reject such 
identity at least in the first stages of the knowledge 
process. Whether this assumption will be modified in 
the course of this study is a conclusion which must 
await a more detailed analysis of Leibniz's categorial 
system. 
2. Analogies as Inductive Arguments from Parallel Cases 
The second type of metaphysical analogy is the 
one in which a philosopher or theologian considers his 
argument as an inductive analogical argument from parallel 
cases. Arguments of this type presuppose that we can 
draw analogies between the nature of the world as a 
1This subject will be dealt with more fully in 
Chapter III. 
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whole and some class of phenomena within it. 
We are indebted to David Hume's discussion of 
the argument from design in the Dialogues Concerning 
Natural Religion for our understanding of this position. 
According to the exponents of ~ type of teleological 
argument for God, we would not expect that several 
pieces of steel thrown together without shape would 
arrange themselves so as to compose a watch. 1 Conse-
quently, we would, likewise, not expect that the universe 
could attain its present order and arrangement without 
something similar to human art. 
The inductive argument illustrated by 
Cleanthes' position in the Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion of watch-making and world-making would appear 
to be either a fallacious inductive argument, which if 
successful would be an instance of univocation, or a 
weak analogy in which the similarities and differences 
between the analogates have not been adequately elabor-
ated. If these similarities and differences were eli-
cited then the cogency of the analogy would be questioned. 
1Edwin A. Burtt (ed.), The English Philoso~hers 
from Bacon to Mill (New York: Modern Library, 193 ), 
p. 704. 
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Hume seems to believe that Cleanthes is employ-
ing a weak inductive argument. Hume says, 
That a stone will fall, that fire will burn, 
that earth has solidity, we have observed a 
thousand times and a thousand times; and 
when any new instance of this nature is pie-
sented, we draw the accustomed inference. 
He continues, "The exact similarity of the cases gives 
us perfect assurance of a similar event."2 Finally 
Hume adds, 
But whenever you depart, in the least, from 
the similarity of the cases, you diminish 
proportionally the evidence, and may at 
last bring it to a weak analoga, which is 
confessedly liable to error an uncertainty.3 
It appears that Hume is criticizing a weak 
inductive argument. Since Cleanthes would not be able 
to answer affirmatively Hume's statement "have worlds 
ever been formed under your eyes?'~it is doubtful 
that Cleanthes intended to establish an inductive 
argument which would connect two sense experiences such 
as world-making and watch-making. It would seem more 
plausible to assume that Cleanthes recognized the dif-
ference between the two realms and was rather endeavor-
ing to establish an analogy of proportionality between 
1 Ibid., p. 702. 2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 4Ibid., p. 708. 
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watch-making and cosmic intelligence. 
Hume states that whenever a thinker departs in 
the least from the similarity of the cases he diminishes 
proportionally the evidence and the argument may become 
a weak analogy. 1 
Assuming that Hume is not ruling out all analogy 
by this statement, it appears that he is rejecting 
Cleanthes' argument not because it is a defective in-
ductive argument, but because the differences between 
watch-making and world-making outweigh the similarities; 
therefore it is, as Hume says, a weak analogy. 
It would seem that the weak analogy criticism 
of Hume is well-taken and lifts the mask once and for 
all from all would-be inductive arguments, in the area 
of religion and metaphysics, which are in reality weak 
analogies. 
This criticism is in accord with the criteria 
of a cogent analogy set forth in Chapter I. A cogent 
analogy is one in which the differences as well as the 
similarities between the two analogates have been an-
alyzed. Is the alleged inductive analogy from parallel 
cases relevant to this study? 
1Ibid., p. 702. 
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The important question for us to consider in 
relation to this mode of analogy is whether or not this 
study will be advanced by selecting the argument from 
parallel cases as a mode of analogy suitable for our 
investigation of Leibniz's metaphysics. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the selection of 
a mode of analogy in the early stages of the discussion 
may be subject to modification as the study develops, 
it is our belief that Leibniz does ~ employ the in-
ductive analogy as a metaphysical tool. Moreover, it 
would seem that Leibniz is aware of the difficulties 
underscored by Hume. Leibniz says, "We must guard 
against the abuse of analogies."1 How must we guard 
against the abuse of analogies? Leibniz suggests a 
possible answer to this question in a letter to 
Michael Hansch, as he says, 
Every mind contains a kind of intelligible 
world within itself • • • But there is an 
infinite difference between our intellect 
and the diVine, for God sees all things 
adequately and at once, while very few 
things are known distinctly by us.2 
1Leroy Loemker, Leibniz: Philosophical Papers 
and Letters, Vol. I, p. 438. 
2 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 963 (underlining mine). 
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Although this passage alone will not suffice 
to prove the thesis of this dissertation, it does offer 
a negative suggestion regarding the mode of analogy 
which will not be selected as a tool to study Leibniz's 
metaphysical thought. Since the exponents of the 
argument from parallel cases are not, in many instances, 
sufficiently cognizant of differences between the 
analogates, it would appear that Leibniz would reject 
this approach to metaphysics. 
3. Analofies Based on a Relation to an Obiect in 
Part xperlenced and in Part not Exper enced 
The third type of metaphysical analogy is the 
one which is based on a relation to an object in part 
experienced and in part not experienced. The metaphor 
"God is Light" illustrates this analogy. The religious 
experience of divine guidance is an intellectual or 
spiritual experience analogous to the sensory experi-
ence stimulated by physical light. 
This alleged type of analogy would appear to 
be a metaphor, since it is an implied comparison. "God 
is Light" is a suggestive metaphor , but our primary 
concern in dealing with analogies which are to be 
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employed in metaphysics is to carefully show the simi-
larities and the differences between the structures in 
human personality and the metaphysical realm. Conse-
quently, it would seem that this alleged analogy must be 
ruled out. 
4. Problem Areas 
There are problem areas regarding the type of 
analogy which Leibniz employs which preclude the possi-
bility of a solution prior to an investigation of his 
philosophy. 
a) Deductive Analogies 
A fourth type of analogy is based upon an ini-
tial apprehension of the pattern of the universe. 
From this original pattern we are then able to deduce 
the pattern of empirical things. 
The deductive analogy appears to be similar 
to the analogy of attribution studied in Chapter I. 
It has been indicated that the essence of the analogy 
of attribution is a diversity of relations to a single 
term which is considered the primary analogate. The 
analogy of intrinsic attribution explicitly signifies 
the similarity between the primary and the secondary 
analogate. 
Some thinkers, however, recognized the dangers 
of lapsing into univocation if the difference between 
the two analogates is not underscored. It will be re-
called that Klubertanz attempted to avoid the pitfalls 
of univocation by turning to the act of existing to 
ground the similarity between the finite world and God 
--thus avoiding the formal identity of patterns on the 
personal and the metaphysical levels. 
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It was indicated, however, that for metaphysical 
purposes we are concerned with analogies which make pos-
sible the comparison of structures on the personal and 
metaphysical levels. If a thinker instead of comparing 
an act of existence on the two levels turns to the com-
parison of patterns in the personal realm which are 
copies of patterns in the metaphysical realms, then it 
would seem that the deductive analogy and the analogy of 
intrinsic attribution would be very nearly identical. 
Although it would appear that Leibniz, with his 
stress upon the activity of the mind in analyzing sensa-
tion and his emphasis upon the phenomenal nature of the 
mechanical categories, which will be discussed more 
fully in Chapter III, would rule out the deductive 
analogy at least at the outset of his epistemology. 
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Leibniz would seem to be stressing "the way of 
knowledge," the elaboration of sensory elements by 
means of the activity of the mind. However, we must 
await the completion of Leibniz's thought before we fi-
nally reject the deductive analogy. 
While Leibniz would appear to rule out the grasp-
ing of fixed patterns which apply to the world of fact, 
there is a possibility that the prime analogate in an 
analogy of attribution might be, for Leibniz, an impli-
cit universal which is being developed organically as it 
confronts a world of fact . 
If this were the case, Leibniz might still employ 
relations within personality to shed light upon the 
structure of the real, but as the philosophy develops 
and system moves in the direction of a monism--the 
identity of thought and thing--the analogies would ap-
pear to change to illustration or particular instances 
of a universal principle . 
Even if this conclusion were reached, this would 
in no way rule out the importance of the use of anal-
ogies in the development of Leibniz's metaphysics, 
since an organic epistemology, in its early stages moves, 
in a very real sense, from what is known to what is not 
known. The implicit idea is a potentiality. 
l 
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However, if we discover factors in Leibniz's 
philosophy which emphasize individuality, tendency and 
interest, then we may be forced to rule out the impli-
cit universal as relevant to Leibniz's philosophy and 
with it the deductive analogy. The burden would then 
fall entirely upon the analogy of proper proportional-
ity which would not merely be used to compare struc-
tures which reflect the difference between an implicit 
and explicit universal, but would be used to relate 
structures which are fundamentally and intrinsically 
different. 
For the preceding reasons we will bracket the 
question of the relevance of the deductive analogy to 
Leibniz's metaphysics until we reach the notion of 
individuality. Consequently, this question may be 
designated, at this stage, a problem area. 
b) Coordinating Analogies 
A fifth type of metaphysical analogy is the one 
which is designed to coordinate different kinds of ex-
perience in terms of an analogical extension of a key 
idea derived from one type. The philosopher who employs 
this type of analogy starts out from some key idea such 
as intellectual, an aesthetic or a moral experience 
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which he believes to be very significant. He then ex-
tends this idea to some other realm and thereby achieves 
a wider integration in terms of it. 
If we change the word "idea" in this statement 
to "relation" and reserve judgment whether or not any 
one relation which we may extend from one realm to other 
realms is a key idea, then this fifth kind would appear 
to be the type of analogy which we shall employ in the 
early stages of our investigation. 
This type of analogy, the analogy of proper 
proportionality, based upon similarity of relations be-
tween the personal and the metaphysical realms, is 
classified in the problem area since, at this stage, we 
cannot rule out all other types of analogy, nor can we 
as yet ascertain for certain whether or not the analogy 
of proper proportionality, as it is employed in 
Leibniz's thought, is another type of analogy in dis-
guise. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the final solution 
regarding the type of analogy which plays the predominant 
role in Leibniz's thought must await further study, we may 
begin our investigation of Leibniz's philosophy by tenta-
tively employing the analogy of proper proportionality 
based on a similarity of relations between aspects of 
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personality and metaphysical structures. 
The decision to employ this method as a starting 
point is not without some justification. Leibniz's em-
phasis upon beginning with "the way of knowledge," his 
stress upon the difference between phenomenal and nou-
menal structures which would seem to "cry out" for some 
tool to bridge the gap between the two, and his emphasis 
upon the phenomenal nature of space and other mechanical 
categories all suggest that Leibniz would select a mode 
of analogy which could be employed to gradually uncover 
similarities between the personal and the metaphysical 
realms without falling prey to the dangers of univoca-
tion. The analogy of proper proportionality would seem 
to satisfy these requirements. 
D. Suunnary 
Three questions which a critic might ask after 
reading the Introduction and Chapter I of this study 
are: (1) What evidence is there that Leibniz is inter-
ested in the metaphysical quest? (2) What evidence is 
there that Leibniz recognizes the difference between 
personal and metaphysical structures? and finally 
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(3) in order to begin this study, it is necessary 
tentatively to select some type of analogy to guide us 
as we seek to discover various anthropic analogies. 
Otherwise, at each stage all of the candidates will 
make their claims resulting in considerable confusion. 
Therefore, our critic asks? What evidence is there 
that Leibniz rejects certain alleged analogies and would 
seem to accept one type of analogy as a guide in meta-
physical reasoning? 
It has been the main task of this chapter to 
answer these three questions. The study as a whole is 
designed to cast more light upon these queries. How-
ever, in order to begin our investigation we have set 
forth evidence in this chapter which will allow us 
tentatively to conclude that Leibniz is interested in 
metaphysics and recognizes the difference between per-
sonal and metaphysical structures. Moreover, we have 
studied various alleged analogies and have shown that 
they fail to qualify for Leibniz's metaphysical pur-
poses. Finally, we have set forth a problem area which 
includes two types of analogy, the deductive and the co-
ordinating analogies. 
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The deductive analogy was compared to the anal-
ogy of attribution discussed in Chapter I and the co-
ordinating analogies were compared to the analogy of 
proper proportionality also presented in Chapter I. 
Although we indicated that Leibniz would appear 
to reject a deductive analogy which is based upon the 
grasping of a fixed metaphysical pattern, we pointed out 
that it would be in the interests of this study to 
bracket our final decision concerning Leibniz's use of 
this analogy until we reach the final stages of his 
thought, since the fixed pattern of the deductive mode 
might possibly refer, in Leibniz's thought, to an im-
plicit universal which is being developed organically. 
However, it was pointed out that even if this 
interpretation of Leibniz's thought proves to be cor-
rect, it is still necessary to move step by step from 
what we know to what we do not know to make the impli-
cit universal explicit. 
Consequently, we have turned from the deductive 
analogy or the analogy of intrinsic attribution to the 
analogy of proper proportionality to elucidate the 
process by which personal and metaphysical structures 
are compared. 
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It is a conclusion of this chapter, therefore, 
that we may begin our investigation of Leibniz's thought 
by tentatively employing the analogy of proper propor-
tionality based on a similarity of relations between as-
pects of personality and metaphysical structures. 
I 
CHAPTER III 
ASPECTS OF LEIBNIZ'S THEORY OF PERSONALITY 
RELEVANT TO HIS USE OF ANTHROPIC 
ANALOGIES FOR METAPHYSICAL 
PURPOSES 
It has been indicated that one of the aims of 
this investigation is to study Leibniz's use of anal-
ogies of personality in order to illuminate his system 
of general notions. It has been stated that we shall be-
gin our investigation of Leibniz's thought by tentatively 
employing the analogy of proper proportionality. Since 
analogies of proportionality are proper only when the 
relationship between the two realms or objects being 
compared i .s made explicit, it is essential, for a suc-
cessful application of this mode of analogy, to under-
stand the relations which ground the analogy. 
In as much as one of the analogates is a relation 
between aspects of personality, it will be necessary to 
investigate Leibniz's theory of personality with special 
emphasis upon those aspects of his theory of the person 
and their relations which will be utilized as analogies 
- 89 -
90 
in Chapters IV and V. 
With this purpose in mind we shall begin by turn-
ing to Leibniz ' s description of the pervasive character-
istics of the human person. Following this presentation, 
we shall show how each of the selected traits manifest 
themselves in specific conative and cognitive activities 
of the person. 
This section will serve three purposes: 
1. By relating the alleged pervasive character-
istics to specific functionings of the person, justifi-
cation of the use of the word "pervasive" will be pro-
vided. 
2. By studying the way in which the pervasive 
characteristics manifest themselves in the concrete 
functioning of the human person, we shall better under-
stand their relation to other aspects of the personal-
ity. This understanding will facilitate the process of 
establishing more precise analogies of proper propor-
tionality in Chapters IV and V. 
3. Investigating Leibniz's theory of the per-
son with the explicit intent of relating the complex 
functioning of the human person to a limited number of 
pervasive traits, which will be more fully utilized 
later, works in the interests of limitation of scope and 
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concentration of effort, as well as adding coherence to 
the study as a whole. Let us turn to Leibniz's descrip-
tion of the pervasive characteristics of the human per-
son. 
In the New Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
Leibniz says, 
Now reflection is nothing else than attention 
to what is in us • • • can it be denied that 
there is much that is innate in our mind, 
since we are innate so to speak, in ourselves? 
And that there is in us: being, unity, sub-
stance, duration, change, action, perception, 
pleasures and a thousand other objects of our 
intellectual ideas. And these objects being 
immediate to our understanding and always 
present, what wonder that we say that these 
ideas with all depending upon them are innate 
in us.l 
Since it is our purpose to employ the concepts 
which Leibniz mentions such as unity and action as 
analogies to illuminate metaphysical principles, rather 
than merely to expound Leibniz's theory of personality, 
we shall take liberties with the scheme which is pre-
sented in the preceding quotation. However, this 
passage from Leibniz's writings does justify, in part, 
our procedure, since Leibniz clearly recognizes some 
pervasive traits of personality. Consequently, the 
method we shall follow is not completely arbitrary. 
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For the purposes of our study we shall select 
the concepts of unity, activity, continuity, purpose and 
individuality as pervasive traits of the person which 
will receive special attention. Inasmuch as these con-
cepts are closely intertwined, it will be necessary to 
set forth a scheme at the outset which will guide the 
investigation. 
This study of aspects of Leibniz's theory of 
personality will be divided into five sections: 
1. A brief preliminary discussion of three of 
the five pervasive traits of personality selected as 
tools for this investigation--unity, continuity and pur-
pose. 
2. A study of the pervasive concept of unity 
as it actually functions within the active person. 
This section also will necessarily illuminate the per-
vasive concepts of activity and purpose and lay the 
foundation for a better understanding of the concept 
of continuity. 
3. Since the pervading concept of purpose and 
especially the concept of continuity are better under-
stood after we have completed the investigation of the 
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various activities of the person and stand back, as it 
were, and view the whole range of activities from sensa-
tion to complex ideas, we shall briefly treat these two 
pervasive concepts in a separate section following the 
more detailed inquiry of the active person in the pre-
ceding section. 
4. An investigation of the concept of individu-
ality. 
5. In this section we shall explicitly set 
forth a suggestion which points toward Chapters IV and 
V- -namely, Leibniz's use of certain intelligible ideas 
as analogies which may be employed to answer metaphysi-
cal questions. After citing evidence from Leibniz's 
writings which justify this suggestion, we shall at-
tempt to show that all of the intelligible ideas which 
Leibniz intends to use as anthropic analogies in his 
metaphysics may be reduced, without loss, to the five 
pervasive concepts studied in this chapter. 
1. Unity 
A. A Brief Survey of Three Pervasive 
Factors in Personality 
Since Leibniz's conception of the person is 
organic with an emphasis upon growth and development, it 
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will be impossible to thoroughly understand his concep-
tion of unity until the sensations which initiate the 
process of reflection are seen in relation to a compre-
hensive system of ideas. For this reason we shall, at 
this stage, limit ourselves to a brief discussion of 
Leibniz's conception of the unity of the person and then 
show step by step, in our discussion of Leibniz's notion 
of activity, how the unity of the person is illustrated 
at each stage. 
Although the concept of activity presupposes the 
unity of the person, unity is better illustrated by a 
study of the actual functioning of the person. 
He says, 
Let us first turn to Leibniz's own statements. 
We have in ourselves experiences of a multi-
plicity in simple substance, when we find the 
least thought of which we are conscious in-
volves variety in its object.l 
He states that a living soul contains a world of diversity 
id 1 •t 2 F. 11 h am rea un~ y. ~na y e says, 
This correspondence of internal and external, 
or representation of the external in the 
1Robert Latta (ed.), Leibniz: The Monadology 
and Other Philosophical Writings, p. 226. 
2G.R.W. Montgomery, Leibniz: Discourse and 
Metathlsics 2 Correspondence with Arnauld, and Monadology, pp. 9 -195. 
internal, of the composite in the simple, 
of multiplicity in unity, constitutes in 
reality perception.l 
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Leibniz insists that the human soul which rep-
resents outer things cannot be destroyed or broken up. 
The essence of the unity is representation which is 
indivisible. The unity which one discovers in percep-
tion is not an externally imposed unity. 
Leibniz rejects the position of those who main-
tain that one part of an extended thing cannot exist or 
be conceived without the other. 2 Leibniz says, "As I 
understand unity such things are more properly to be 
called many, and they do not constitute a unity except 
as an aggregate." 3 Although the inadequacy of unity 
by aggregation for a metaphysical theory will be the 
subject of further study, at this stage unity by aggre-
gation has been discussed to highlight the contrast 
between this kind of unity and the unity we discover in 
perception. 
1Philip Wiener {ed.), Leibniz Selections, p. 505. 
2Leroy Loemker, Leibniz: Philosophical Papers 
and Letters, Vol. II, p. 844. 
3Ibid. 
-
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If we were to choose an analogy to illuminate 
the unity we discover in perception, it would be closer 
to an organic rather than an inorganic analogy. For in 
an organism we discover a reciprocal relation between 
parts and the whole. The harmonious adaptation of 
parts constitutes the unity . The whole and the parts 
interpenetrate. Underscoring the inadequacy of the 
mechanical analogies to shed light on real unity 
Leibniz says, 
The unity of a clock . • • is entirely dif-
ferent with me • • . from that of an animal, 
which latter is capable of being a substance 
endowed with a true unity, like what we call 
the ego in us; whereas a clock is nothing 
but an assemblage.l 
In perception, according to Leibniz, the soul 
unifies the world from its own point of view. What 
is perceived and the perspective of the representa-
tion interpenetrate. Consequently, in human percep-
tion we discover real unity in diversity rather than a 
unity of an aggregation. Let us turn to a study of the 
unity of the self as it transcends time. 
Leibniz does not limit the unity of the person 
to one moment of time nor does he believe that these 
1G.M. Duncan (ed. and trans.), The Philosophical 
Works of Leibniz, p. 91. 
unifications are attached to each other mechanically 
like a cluster of externally connected barges. Leibniz 
says, 
The sense of one's particular self is without 
other characteristics, because I know it well 
when I think and reflect • • • the identity 1 of the mind is not destroyed by any changes. 
He adds, "All true beings or minds which alone are 
unities, increase always in perfection."2 
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Leibniz believes that real and personal identity 
is proved with the utmost certainty by present and im-
mediate reflection. It is proved sufficiently for most 
purposes by our memory. 3 But consciousness is not the 
only means for constituting personal identity since the 
testimony of others may prove it. Leibniz asserts that 
he is the same ego which was in the cradle. 4 He be-
lieves the self is a unity which abides through time 
or endures through change and increases in perfection. 
1Leroy Loemker (ed.), Leibniz: Philosophical 
Papers and Letters, Vol. I, p. 252 (unaerlining mine). 
2Ibid. 
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Our preliminary study of the pervasive concept 
of unity has disclosed Leibniz's belief that we best 
understand the concept if we turn from the mechanical 
analogies to the inner experience of perception of a 
unity in a manifold and the identity of the self through 
time. From the concept of unity let us turn to another 
pervasive trait of personality. 
2. Continuity 
It has been indicated that we shall study three 
pervasive traits of Leibniz's theory of the person. 
The concept of unity has been briefly introduced and 
will receive further illumination as we study the con-
cept of activity. 
A second concept, continuity, will now receive 
our attention. Following the same methodology which was 
employed in the discussion of unity, we shall briefly 
introduce the concept of continuity as Leibniz conceives 
of it within the nature of personal experience. 
Since the concept of continuity, for Leibniz, 
is related to various series of perceptions within the 
person it will be in the interests of this study to in-
vestigate the notion of continuity further following the 
discussion of the concept of activity. 
It has been shown that, according to Leibniz, 
human perception must be viewed in the wider setting 
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of the various types of activities above and below the 
human person. The various forms of activity express 
the continuity of all forms of activity from the activ-
ity of the pebble to that of an angel. The notion of 
continuity is underscored as Leibniz says, 11The law 
of continuity declares that nature leaves no gaps in 
the order she follows." 1 According to Leibniz, men 
are connected with animals and animals with the plant 
and these with fossils. Leibniz says, 
Since the law of continuity demands that when 
the essential determinations of a being ap-
proach those of another so that likeWise 
accordingly all of the properties of the 
first must gradually aP£roach those of the 
last, it is necessary t at all orders of 
natUral beings form only one chain, in the 
different classes, like so many links, con-
nect so closely the one to the other, that 
it is impossible for the senses and the 
imagination to fix the precise point where 
anyone begins or ends.2 
Following our study which has briefly under-
scored the continuity of personal experience with the 
non-conscious world in Leibniz's thought, we shall now 
expound the law of continuity as it relates to the 
levels of activity within the person. 
1rbid., p. 334. 2Ibid., p. 713. 
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It was a great error, Leibniz insists, to be-
lieve that there were no perceptions in the soul be-
sides those of which it is conscious. His doctrine of 
petites perceptions underscored the existence of uncon-
scious perceptions gradually rising in degree from in-
finitely little perceptions, which apparently are in-
distinguishable from the absence of perception, upward 
to the fuller perceptions of waking life. 1 
We are not clearly aware of these petites 
perceptions because the impressions are either too small 
or too numerous or too closely combined so that each one 
is not distinct enough by itself, but, nevertheless in 
combination with others each has its effect and makes 
itself felt at least confusedly, in the whole. Accord-
ing to Leibniz, the perception of light or color, for 
example, of which we are conscious, is composed of many 
minute perceptions of which we are not conscious. 2 
On some occasions we are not aware of impres-
sions because we do not attend to them. Leibniz points 
out that when we are not admonished and advised to 
1Robert Latta (ed.), Leibniz: The Monadology 
and Other Philosophical Writings, p. 370. 
2 G.M. Duncan (ed. and trans.), The Philosophical 
Works of Leibniz, p. 210. 
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attend to some of our present perceptions, we let them 
pass without reflection and even without being noticed, 
but if some one calls our attention to them immediately 
afterwards and makes us notice, for example, some noise 
which was just heard, we remember it and are conscious 
of having had at the time some feeling of it. 
Further underlining the importance of uncon-
scious perception, Leibniz turns to an analysis of 
dreams. He says, 
It does not follow in this state [dreamless 
sleep] the simple substance is without per-
ception. That, indeed, cannot be •.. it 
cannot continue to exist without being af-
fected in some way, and this affection is 
nothing but its perception.l 
These examples of unconscious activities illus-
trate an important principle of Leibniz's philosophy. 
He believes that we do not discover anywhere a being 
without activity. Underlining this point he says, "A 
substance once in action will be so always, or all 
impressions remain and are merely mixed with new ones."2 
This statement is in accord with the principle 
of continuity which states that we pass always from 
1Robert Latta {ed.), Leibniz: The Monadology 
and Other Philosophical Writings, p. 230. 
2G. M. Duncan (ed. and trans.), The Philosoph-
ical Works of Leibniz, p. 205. 
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the smaller to the greater through various degrees. 
In the preceding discussion we have indicated 
that Leibniz does not believe that there is a radical 
break between conscious sensation and desire and the un-
conscious perceptions and tendencies of the person; 
nevertheless, in order to advance our discussion it is 
necessary to move into the conscious realm and discover 
what elements present the matter for the higher intel-
lectual activities of the person. Leibniz says, "The 
senses furnish us with the matter for reasoning."! 
According to Leibniz when the monad has organs 
so adjusted that impressions may be received by means 
of them and also the perception which represent these 
impressions are heightened and distinguished then this 
• 2 may amount to sensat~on. 
Leibniz defines sensation as a perception ac-
companied by memory, "a perception of which there re-
mains a kind of echo for a long time." 3 Moreover, 
Leibniz differentiates perception which is the inner 
state of the monad representing external things and 
apperception which is conscious or reflective knowledge 
1Leroy Loemker (ed.), Leibniz: Philosophical 
Papers and Letters, Vol. II, p. 896. 
2Ibid., p. 1035. 
of this inner state itself and which is not given to 
all souls or to any soul all of the time. 1 
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Leibniz states that human persons have true 
sensation. 2 It would seem that he means by~ 
sensation, sensations which have been sufficiently dis-
tinguished and retained to be useful for the higher 
cognitive activities. 
Since our concern in this section is with the 
continuity of activities within the person, it will be 
well to summarize our conclusions up to this point. 
The grouping of activities which we discover in the human 
person is affected by impressions which are perceived. 
Many of these perceptions remain below the level of con-
sciousness. However, on occasion certain groupings of 
petites perceptions, made possible, in part, through 
the activity of our sense organs, result in sensation. 
In some monads sensations become true sensations 
.............. 
when they can be remembered and utilized in the higher 
cognitive activities. We have not as yet reached the 
stage where sensations are organized by the mind into 
1 Ibid., p. 1036. 
2Leroy Loemker (ed.), Leibniz: Philosophical 
Papers and Letters, Vol. I, p. 166. 
concrete objects such as juicy apple, hard chair and 
blue book. 
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It would appear that the word "perception," as 
Leibniz employs it, is a general word which must be 
classified by the degree of perception which character-
izes the activity under discussion. 
First, in Leibniz's thought we discover uncon-
scious perceptions. Secondly, occasionally he seems 
to employ the word "perception" to refer to sensations, 
and, thirdly, he speaks of the perception of universal 
and necessary truths as well as other rational disposi-
tions within the nature of the soul. 
We have indicated that, according to Leibniz, 
the senses furnish us with the matter for reasoning. 
Confinning this statement he says, 11But as to man, his 
perceptions are accompanied by the power of reflection 
which passes to the act when there is an occasion."1 
This statement, as well as others noted in this section, 
indicate that sensation, which is higher in degree of 
activity than unconscious perceptions, will become the 
matter for further unification and heightened activity. 
1G.M. Duncan (ed . and trans.), The Philosophi-
cal Works of Leibniz, p. 211 . 
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The notion of continuity of perceptions within 
the human person is further emphasized by Leibniz's 
doctrine of clear and distinct ideas, discussed in 
Chapter II, which evaluates an idea on the basis of 
its level of clarity and distinctness as compared to 
other ideas below and above it in the hierarchy of 
relative degrees of perception. 
It has been the purpose of this brief introduc-
tion to the law of continuity as it is exemplified in 
Leibniz's conception of the person to: (1) indicate 
that conscious perception is merely one type of per-
ception within a hierarchy of representative unities, 
(2) to show that even within the person there are 
unconscious activities which gradually emerge into 
consciousness and (3) to indicate that, according to 
Leibniz, the levels of activity may gradually increase 
in perfection until they approach the perfection of 
God who has clear and distinct ideas. 
It has been indicated that the pervasive trait 
of continuity which has been introduced in this section 
will receive further clarification in the section deal-
ing with the concept of activity. This approach seems 
to be in the interests of clarity, since the higher 
levels of activity which fill out the chain which 
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connects unconscious perceptions with the relatively 
clear and distinct ideas of a rational human person are 
best illustrated by a study of the actual functioning 
of the person. 
Consequently, as was the case in our study of 
the concept of unity, we shall await the investigation 
of Leibniz's notion of activity to complete our study 
of the concept of continuity as it is exemplified on 
the personal level. 
3. Purpose 
According to Leibniz, every monad has appetition 
or tendency as well as perception. Appetition is the 
principle of change in the monad which results in the 
monad passing from one perception to another. 
In short, appetition and perception always 
accompany each other. As Robert Latta points out, every 
perception, for Leibniz, has an element of feeling and 
activity, although the degree may be very small. 1 Ac-
cording to Latta, every perception, in Leibniz system, 
1Robert Latta (ed.), Leibniz: The Monadology 
and Other Philosophical Writings, p. 139. 
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has a value or a worth. 1 Bu~ as Latta points out, it 
must not be forgotten that, according to Leibniz, this 
value is not anything absolute or preeminently real, 
but is merely the unrealized potentiality of clearness 
and distinctness. 2 
Since the concept of rational volition will be 
employed as an analogy in Chapter V, it will be neces-
sary to investigate its relation to other aspects of 
personality more fully. As was the case in our study 
of unity and continuity, we shall postpone our final 
conclusions on the subject until we have analyzed the 
notion of activity which will elucidate the concept 
of purpose by describing it as it actually functions 
in the human person. Let us turn to Leibnizsconcept 
of rational volition. 
According to Leibniz, even in our evil purposes 
we are moved by a certain perceived appearance of good 
even though we miss the mark. Consequently from the 
psychological point of view everyone is seeking his own 
good whenever he gratifies an appetite or an impulse. 
Leibniz, however, is unwilling to remain merely 
on the psychological level, but introduces us to the 
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ethical sphere. This is not to say, at this stage of 
our discussion, that elements which constitute the 
ethical realm transcend psychological description, 
since such aspects of the person as reason, sensation, 
feeling and desire are integral to the ethical sphere, 
but the integration of the above noted aspects of per-
sonality takes a different form in ethical investiga-
tion. For example, the unique relation of reason to 
impulse in ethical thought, in which the tendencies 
become specified and the implications and consequences 
of the given action and concomitant emerging feelings 
are analyzed, constitutes a different approach to the 
same processes which are described on the psychological 
level without this unique relationship. 
On the unconscious level there is a constant 
tendency in every monad to move from one perception to 
another following the law of its development in Leibniz's 
system. Accordingly, a correlation may be noted between 
Leibniz's notion of degrees of perception and the vari-
ous grades of volition. It has been indicated that 
empirical knowledge results from the observation of 
invariable connections between distinct existents, while 
Leibniz maintains that true knowledge is obtained when 
one discovers the reason for any event or set of events. 
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Likewise in the realm of volition Leibniz underscores 
the various degrees of volition. 
In the lower degrees of volition persons may act 
for conscious particular ends such as the relief from 
pain by means of an operation, but as they increase in 
their knowledge of the connection of events, they may 
reject this action and choose another. For example, one 
may endure pain because he knows that an operation may 
cause transfer of the difficulty to a more vital area. 
How does reason operate in the area of volition? 
Essentially reason operates in volition in the 
same way that it functions in the theoretical realm. 
Reason seeks to find connections between events, it re-
lates past experience to present experience, it compares 
and contrasts, it analyzes and synthesizes and it pre-
dicts and anticipates. Reason connects qualities, 
designates things, studies the relation between things 
and qualities and notes causal relations and other types 
of implication. 
Leibniz employs the word "desire" or the phrase 
"degrees of volition" to describe the continuity which 
persists between his two main divisions--appetition and 
voluntary action. 
I 
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If we were able to trace our individual history 
back to the point of our f irst volitions we would dis-
cover, according to Leibniz, our first conscious speci-
fications of an impulse. There are, of course, many 
unconscious urges which are constantly being felt by 
mature persons. But in the early stages of desire we 
perceive the first workings of reason. The initial 
transformation of blind impulse into desire results in 
greater continuity of effort . The attention is not 
readily drawn from the object . As the power of repre-
sentation develops the end toward which the appetite 
impels the person becomes more clearly specified in his 
mind and becomes an object of desire. 
Leibniz maintains that until one knows what he 
wants he remains on the level of unconscious appetition. 
It is only after a person is able to specify the object 
which will satisfy his uneasiness that he has reached 
the stage of full grown desire . But this specification 
of the desire involves reason, since the mind must 
implicitly identify the object specified and compare it 
with what it is not. This involves at least a minimum 
of synthesis and analysis. Reasoning, on the level of 
desire, moreover, facilitates prediction and anticipa-
tion. 
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Furthermore, the desires, according to Leibniz, 
are not to be taken at face value, but are to be weighed 
and compared. But this process of evaluation is based 
upon analysis which is one of the functions of reason. 
This analysis in turn has grown out of prior synthesis. 
Leibniz agrees with Locke that a man suffering from gout 
analyzes the possible results of the removal of the pain 
by means of an operation and realizes that certain 
other less desirable consequences are quite likely to 
be connected with the satisfaction of this desire. As 
the result of this reasoning he chose ~ to have the 
pain removed. 1 Why is it that at times persons do not 
act in the light of the ideal? 
It has been indicated that Leibniz believes 
that the will follows the greatest good or that it 
flees the greatest evil. Living knowledge is neces-
sary to arouse us. 2 Leibniz accounts for the disparity 
between .ideals and actions by maintaining that men do 
not analyze their ideals. He asserts, "Sometimes [men] 
have ideas of an absent good or evil, but very feeble. 
1A.G. Langley (ed. and trans.), New Essay Con-
Cerning Human Understanding 1 by Gottfried Wilhelm 
he1.])n1.z; Together with an Append1.x of Some of H1.s 
Shorter P1.eces, p. 1~7. 
2Ibid., p. 190. 
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It is no wonder that they are scarcely affected."1 
According to Leibniz, if we prefer the bad it is 
because we perceive the good which it includes without 
perceiving either the bad which is implicated with the 
good or we fail to consider the good in the contrary. 
This process of registering the good and evil of an act 
or the consequences which follow from the act is not 
merely a mental activity. It is a vital living process. 
Leibniz says, 
When we [merely] look at these [ideals of 
actions], our thoughts and reasonings con-
trary to the feelings are a kind of 
psittacism (a state of mind in which one 
thinks or speaks like a parrot).2 
Leibniz asserts that the most beautiful pre-
cepts of morality are effective only in a person who 
is sensible--a feeling being. 3 He says, "If our eyes 
could see the beauty of virtue, we should love it 
warmly."4 
The cold idealis not realized because it is not 
clearly perceived. Leibniz's interpretation of the 
relation of desire and reason is underscored in the fol-
lowing suggestion for the development of the moral life. 
1 Ibid., p. 191. 2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
-
4Ibid., p. 192. 
He asserts, ''When a man is in the midst of a good im-
pulse, he ought to make laws and regulations for the 
future. ul 
113 
Thus, in rational volition, according to Leibniz, 
the person is employing his rational powers to analyze 
the consequences of specific acts in order to evaluate 
certain lines of action. In this way the individual 
is able to bring order to his ethical life. Not all de-
sires or value claims are desirable, according to Leibniz. 
Rational analysis must determine which values are best 
as well as the way these values can best be integrated 
in a finite life span. It is this relation between 
desire and reason within the personal realm which will 
be significant in Chapter V. 
We have employed Leibniz's notion of rational 
volition to illuminate the pervasive concept of purpose 
since the characteristics of rational volition, as 
Leibniz describes them include: (1) an end or goal, 
(2) the rational evaluation and analysis of the end, 
{3) the construction of a plan which includes the best 
possible means to this end (which is implicit in 
Leibniz's analysis of the operation, since the 
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individual in question realizes that an operation, at 
this time, would not be the best means to happiness in 
as much as the tumor might be moved to another area), 
(4) the idea of the best possible end which would seem 
to be based, in Leibniz ' s thought, on the criteria of 
the greatest quality and scope of values and finally 
(5) the correlation of this ideal with a corresponding 
degree of desire which moves the individual to realize 
this end . 
In the sections dealing with the pervasive per-
sonal traits, unity and continuity, as well as in this 
section dealing with rational volition, it has been 
indicated that these concepts would receive further 
illumination in the discussion of the concept of activ-
ity. It is to this subject that we will now turn. 
B. The Concept of Activity and 
its Relation to Other 
Pervasive Traits of 
Personality 
It has been indicated that an understanding of 
the roles of unity, continuity and purpose within the 
human person is essential to the aims of this disserta-
tion, since these concepts will be employed as anthropic 
analogies to elucidate metaphysical principle in 
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Chapter V. Likewise, an understanding of the role of 
activity within the person is essential for the purposes 
of this study. 
For the most part in the preceding analysis of 
unity, continuity, and purpose we have studied these 
concepts as structures rather than viewing them as 
activities. 
It has been intimated, however, that the monads, 
which are metaphysical substances, are active. More-
over, it has been suggested that God, whose purpose 
coordinates the various activities, is also completely 
active. 
Although the justification of these conclusions, 
which are merely stated with little support at this 
point, will depend upon the strength of the arguments 
in Chapters IV and V, it is safe to conclude, even at 
this juncture, that any analogy of personality which is 
to shed light upon the system of monads, in Leibniz's 
thought, which constitute the universe and the being 
who orders these activities, must include an active 
element. With this purpose in mind we have briefly 
introduced the concepts of unity, continuity and pur-
pose and have pointed forward to this section in which 
these concepts will be studied as they actually function 
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within the person. 
1. Leibniz's Unique Interpretation of Activity 
In analyzing Leibniz ' s doctrine of activity of 
the soul in thinking, his unique interpretation of 
activity must be kept in mind. He states, "Nothing 
enters naturally into our mind from without ." 1 Conse-
quently, the word "activity" does not mean interaction 
or transeunt causation in which energy is passed from 
one object to another in Leibniz's thought. 
Notwithstanding this unique interpretation, it 
may be possible to define the word "activity" in such 
a way that it will refer to a stream of dynamic, 
internal processes. The investigation of this possi-
bility will be one of the tasks of this chapter. 
It has been indicated that Leibniz conceives 
of the universe in terms of a multitude of active, per-
ceiving units which he labels monads. Perception or 
mental unification, therefore, is not a prerogative of 
man alone. Notwithstanding the fact that the activity 
of man is not sharply distinguished from the activity 
~eroy Loemker (ed.), Leibniz: Philosophical 
Papers and Letters, Vol. I, . p. 492. 
I 
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of sub-human monads, it has been shown that Leibniz 
clearly differentiates the two. He distinguishes per-
ception which is the inner state of the monad and apper-
ception which is conscious or reflective knowledge of 
the inner state. 1 
After recognizing the continuity and the differ-
ence between non-human perception and the activity of 
the person, it is necessary to state at precisely what 
point this unique conscious reflective activity takes 
place. 
2. Leibniz's Rejection of Locke's TABULA RASA Interpre-
tation of Mind 
In approaching the problem of the activity of 
conscious experience, Leibniz continues to employ the 
distinction which differentiates mechanical action and 
teleological activity. He rejects an interpretation 
of the person which maintains that it is not the organ-
ism itself but what happens to the organism from the 
outside that is important. Leibniz, consequently, does 
not believe that the person is a mere group of actions 
nor simply a place of actions. The person is rather 
the source of actions. The person acts the way he does 
1rbid., Vol. II, p. 1037. 
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because he is striving for ends. 
In contrast to the teleological conception of 
the person, the receptive nature of the knowing person 
is illustrated by a quotation from John Locke ' s Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding. Locke says, 
The understanding is not much unlike a closet 
wholly shut from light, with only some little 
opening left, to let in external visible 
resemblances, or ideas of things without.l 
According to Locke, sensation implies a minimum 
of activity on the part of the mind; it is rather a 
process which brings ~ to the mind that which de-
termines its activity . Locke says, '~en I say the 
senses convey into the mind, I mean they from external 
objects convey into the mind, what produces their true 
perception . n2 Locke compares the mind to a mirror 
that cannot refuse, alter, or obliterate the image or 
ideas which the object sets before the mind. 
It is not the aim of this section to formulate 
any definitive view regarding Locke's notion of activ-
ity. His view is rather introduced in order to illus-
trate the position which regards the mind as relatively 
1Edwin A. Burtt (ed.), The English Philosophers 
from Bacon to Mill, p. 282. 
2Ibid., pp. 248-249. 
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passive and is presented here for the purpose of setting 
in relief a more active interpretation of the person. 
Let us develop the consequences of the mechanical inter-
pretation of conscious experience. 
A position such as the one ~~represented by 
the Lockean view cannot be reduced to a mere interrela-
tion of physical events, since an idea, for Locke, means 
an object of the mind when it thinks. Moreover, the 
mind is not completely passive in Locke's epistemology, 
since it responds to stimuli from without and compares 
ideas--noting similarities and differences. 
It would appear that a notion of personality 
constructed upon the mechanical model, if it is to re-
main consistent, must explain the mind as a grouping of 
associations and stimulus response arcs. Gordon Allport, 
noted Harvard psychologist, says, 
Its [the Lockean point of view] representatives 
are found in associationism of all types includ-
ing . • • behaviorism, stimulus response psy-
chology and all other stimulus-oriented psy-
chologies.l 
A consistent theory of the association of ideas recog-
nizes only the interaction of presentations and their 
1Gordon W. Allport, Becoming: Basic Considera-
tions for a Psychology of Pe~r~s~o~n~aTl~i~t~y~(~N~e~w~H-a~v~e-n~:~"Y-aTfe 
University Press, 1955, p . 8. 
traces. Ideas, according to this view, tend to repel 
and attract each other. 
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Those who hold to the theory of the association 
of ideas conceive of the mind as made up of particular 
units of feeling and impressions which group themselves. 
This view minimizes the importance of a unitary self 
which connects the impressions by means of judgments 
and evaluates action in the light of a unifying ideal. 
Although the final conclusions regarding the 
meaning of the word "activity," for Leibniz, must await 
a discussion of the pervasive trait of individuality, 
it will be possible, at this stage, to show that 
"activity," according to Leibniz, does not mean "pas-
sive" or "derivative" in the Lockean sense. 
In contrast to the Lockean position, as this 
chapter develops we shall investigate the way in which 
the person, according to Leibniz, brings its own 
rational dispositions, habits and ideas to the non-
rational sensory experience. Let us turn to the in-
vestigation of the process by which sensations are 
ordered by the rational person. 
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3. The Activity of the Person in Sense Perception 
In the New Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
Leibniz says, "I will say then, that it is sensation 
when an external object is perceived."1 Since Leibniz 
rejects the Lockean view which asserts an external 
relation between the objects of knowledge and the mind, 
we shall suggest that the phrase "external object" 
could be interpreted to mean that the person faces a 
task. 
It will be one of the aims of this section to 
explore the plausibility of this interpretation of the 
phrase "external object" by investigating the way in 
which the mind operates upon sensation. 
In our discussion of the notion of activity 
we shall follow the plan which Leibniz sets forth as 
he says, 
There are • . . three levels of concepts: 
those which are sensible only, which are 
the objects produced by each sense in 
particular; those which are sensible and 
intelligible, which appertain to the com-
mon sense; and those which are intelligible 
1A. G. Langley (ed. and trans.), New Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, by Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz; Together with an Appendix of Some of His 
Shorter Pieces, p. lb5. 
9nlyi which belong to the understand-
~ng. 
Accordingly, we shall discuss these concepts 
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in the following order: (1) sensible concepts, (2) con-
cepts which are sensible and intelligible and finally 
(3) those which are intelligible. 
a) Sensation 
Although there are activities which are taking 
place in the body of human persons prior to reflection, 
according to Leibniz, ideas of sensation are simple for 
the intellect and constitute the matter for reasoning. 
Leibniz's words support this conclusion as he says, 
It is manifest . • . that green arises from 
a mixture of blue and yellow; thus it is pos-
sible to believe that the idea of green ap-
pears to us as simple as that of blue or that 
of warmth ••• [They are] not as simple as 
they appear. I readily consent, howeve~ to 
treat these ideas as simple ideas, because 
at least our apperception does not divide 
them, but it is necessary to proceed to this 
analysis by means of other experience and 
reason, in proportion as they may be rendered 
more intelligible.2 
1Leroy Loemker- (ed.), Leibniz: Philosophical 
Papers and Letters, Vol. II, p. 892. 
2A.G. Langley (ed. and trans.), New Essay Con-
cerning Human UnderstandinX, by Gottfriea Wilhelm 
Leihniz; Together with an ppendix of Some of His 
Shorter Pieces,pp. 120~121. 
Following Leibniz's lead we shall treat the 
ideas of sensation as simple, bearing in mind that the 
problem raised by the analysis of sensation must be 
faced later. 
b) Imagination 
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It has been indicated that Leibniz employs the 
word "perception" to refer to unconscious activities, 
sensations and even to refer to perception of universal 
and necessary truths. 
Leibniz also uses the word "imagination" in 
more than one way. Professor Leroy Loemker, in a note 
in his two volume collection of Leibniz papers and let-
ters, states that the reader of Leibniz should be 
warned against the many meanings of " imagination" which 
range from imagination through sense perception to 
intuitions. In general the term implies the activity 
of mind as opposed to sensation and is therefore 
closely related to the intellect. 1 
For example, Leibniz underscores this point in 
the following contrast: "Mere simple terms are found 
1Leroy Loemker (ed.), Leibniz: Philosophical 
Papers and Letters, Vol. I, p. 556, note 33. 
only among beasts, the sense perception [imaginatio] 
of man is never without some reflection."1 
The role of the active intellect in imagina-
tion is further underscored as Leibniz says, 
Since, therefore, our soul compares the num-
ber and shape of colors, for example, with 
the numbers and shape.s discovered by touch, 
there must be an internal sense where the 
perception of these different external 
senses are found united. This is called 
imagination, which comprises at once the 
concepts of particular senses, which are 
clear~ut confused, and the concepts of 
common sense, which are clear and distinct. 2 
Since sensory qualities are united with other 
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qualities and spread out in space by the imagination, 
according to Leibniz, there is a further question we 
must ask. How does the person utilize the intelligible 
objects to construct the objects of sense perception? 
(1) The Use of Intelligible Concepts to 
Construct Objects of Sense Perception.--It has been 
indicated that, for Leibniz, ideas which are said to 
come from more than one sense such as space, figure, 
motion and rest are given by the common sense. 3 He 
then adds, "That is to say, the mind itself, for these 
1Ibid. ' p. 140 • 2Ibid., Vol. II, 890. 
3Philip Wiener (ed.), Leibniz Selections, 
p. 414. 
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are ideas of the pure understanding, but which have re-
lation to externality and which the senses make us per-
ceive."1 
At this point we are concerned with the way in 
which the sensory qualities are unified, extended and 
placed in a spatial-temporal setting with other per-
ceptual objects and change when preceded by other con-
figurations of qualities. 
Leibniz's notion of the common sense, or that 
which is contributed by the mind, would seem to indi-
cate that on the occasion of sensation, dispositions of 
the mind are set into action. 
(a) Leibniz's Explanation of How Qualities 
are Extended in Perception.--The mind orders sensations 
according to the mathematical concepts of size, shape, 
motion, rest, space and time. We can not explain ex-
tension, according to Leibniz. We can only describe 
how the mind acts. Comparing extension to two other 
ultimates, Leibniz says, "We cannot explain what it is 
to think any more than what white is or what extension 
is."2 
1rbid., pp. 414-415. 
2Leroy Loemker (ed.), Leibniz: Philosophical 
Papers and Letters, Vol. I, -p. 142 (underlining mine). 
' 
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Do we start with a predisposition to order ob-
jects according to the concept of extension? Appar-
ently, Leibniz's answer to this question is "Yes." 
This conclusion is confirmed as Leibniz discusses a 
difference of opinion between Father Malebranche and 
Locke. 
Leibniz says that Malebranche maintains that 
the idea of the infinite is prior to that of the finite. 
Locke objects and states that a child has the idea of 
number or a square sooner than the infinite. 1 
Leibniz presents his solution to the problem 
raised by these two thinkers as he says, 
He [Locke] is right, taking the ideas as 
images, but in taking them as the founda-
tion of notions he will find that in the 
continuum the notion of an extended taken 
absolutely, is prior to the notion of an 
extended where the modification is added.2 
Perhaps it will be helpful to call upon an 
illustration from the more abstract realm of mathe-
matics to explain how sensory qualities are spread 
out or extended. Leibniz says, "By repeating the idea 
of a unit and joining it to another unit, we make a 
1Philip Wiener (ed.), Leibniz Selections, 
pp. 497-503. 
2Ibid., p. 501. 
I 
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collective idea which we call ~."1 Applying this 
principle to geometry he adds, "Let us take a straight 
line and prolong it until it is double the length of 
the first." 2 Let us apply this procedure to the realm 
of sense perception. 
Leibniz states that sensations are simple 
qualities which are ordered by the understanding. More-
over, he declares that space is the coexistence of 
things. 3 It would then appear that the qualitative 
aspects of conscious experience which originate in 
sensation are the entities which are given this form 
and are extended or coexist. How does this take 
place? 
It seems that Leibniz believes that the mind 
is predisposed to compare qualities and give them a 
spatial setting. Extended qualities are experienced, 
according to Leibniz, as simultaneous with one another. 
Con-
2 Ibid., pp. 162-163. 
3Leroy Loemker (ed.), Leibniz: Philosophical 
Papers and Letters, Vol. II, p. 1083. 
128 
The pervasive traits of unity and activity 
pervade this process by which qualities are extended. 
First, the self is active as it brings the sensory 
qualities under its forms. The qualities, according 
to Leibniz, do not merely group themselves. The abid-
ing self brings order to the qualities as it compares 
qualities and adds one to another. This order is a 
contribution of the mind. 
Secondly, the pervasive concept of unity is 
present, since the mind must see these qualities as 
coexisting or extensions of each other. The mind 
which relates these qualities grasps them in one uni-
fied act. Let us turn from the activity and unity 
of the mind in extension to the study of the co-
existence of sensation of one kind with qualities of 
other kinds. 
(b) The Coexistence of Diverse Qualities.--
Not only are qualities extended, but they coexist with 
different qualities. The book before me is blue, hard 
and rather warm. The emphasis in the preceding section 
has been upon the repetition of a quality in space, 
but qualities are also united with diverse qualities. 
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It has been indicated that in imagination the 
understanding is already present uniting diverse quali-
ties, according to Leibniz. Therefore, the coexisting 
qualities of sense perception involve concepts which 
are at once sensible and intelligible. 
The whole book, which includes blueness, warmth, 
hardness and also a rectangular shape is a particular 
unification of these elements made possible by the 
abiding self which is able to unify the many in a one. 
The person is active in ordering diverse quali-
ties in as much as the qualities of the diverse senses 
do not group themselves, but the mind as it compares and 
relates qualities makes a contribution and unifies the 
qualities given in sensation. Leibniz, underscoring 
the activity of the person, says, " I believe that 
qualities are but modifications of substance, and that 
the understanding adds thereto the relation."1 
As was the case in our discussion of extension, 
the unity of the self is presupposed to explain the 
ability of the person to apprehend in one unified grasp 
the many coexisting qualities which constitute the ob-
ject of sense perception. Let us turn to a study of 
1Philip Wiener {ed.), Leibniz Selections, p. 421. 
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another active disposition of the understanding which 
operates on the level of sense perception. 
(c) Logical Incompatibility of Diverse Quali-
ties.--As we proceed further in our study of Leibniz's 
theory of personality we discover that the mind is not 
only predisposed to extend sensory qualities and to re-
late qualities of diverse senses, but it also relates 
the qualities according to certain logical laws. 
According to Leibniz, the same surface cannot 
be black and red or the same line cannot be curved and 
straight or the same figure round and square. Some 
qualities are mutually exclusive. 
Leibniz in a revealing quotation indicates 
that the concept of logical identity is a predisposi-
tion which is called into action. He says, 
I may say to you. if they [innate principles] 
were not known, they would none the less be 
innate, because they are recognized as soon 
as heard; but I will add further, that at 
bottom everyone knows them and makes use at 
every moment of the principle of contradiction 
(for example) without examining it distinctly, 
and there is no barbarian, who, in a matter 
which he considers serious, would not be 
shocked at the conduct of a liar who contra-
dicts himself.l 
1rbid., p. 400. 
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Leibniz, therefore, adds logical identity which 
is presupposed by the concepts of extension and relation 
to the active predispositions which are present within 
the mind as the person actively constructs objects of 
sense perception. Let us turn to an investigation of 
the role of intelligible ideas in the spatial order. 
(d) The Spatial Order of Qualities.--As we 
seek to understand our world we move beyond the coexist-
ing qualities which constitute phenomenal objects to a 
spatial order. We shall turn to Leibniz' s correspondence 
with the theologian Samuel Clarke to clarify Leibniz's 
notion of space. 
First, Leibniz clearly states that space is 
phenomenal as he says, " I have demonstrated that space 
is nothing else but an order of the existence of things, 
observed as existing together. " 1 He adds, "There is no 
real space outside the material universe. 112 Finally, 
he declares, "Space in itself is an ideal thing." 3 
We shall attempt to show the importance of the 
pervasive traits of activity and unity as we discuss 
1rbid., p. 246. 
3rbid. , p. 247. 
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Leibniz's theory of how men came to form the notion of 
space. 
According to Leibniz, as men consider many 
things existing at once they observed a certain order 
of coexistence among the phenomenal objects. Leibniz 
states that this relation of one thing to another is 
more or less single. He adds that this order is 
designated situation or distance. When one of the co-
existing things changesits relation to a multitude of 
others, which do not change their relation among them-
selves; and that another thing, newly comes, and 
acquires the same relation to the others, we say that 
it has come into the place of the former. 1 
Leibniz concludes by stating that the new ob-
ject has now taken the place of the other object. He 
says, "And that which comprehends all those places is 
called space."2 
In order to have an idea of place, according 
to Leibniz, it is sufficient to consider the relations 
and rules of the change. It is not necessary, accord-
ing to Leibniz, to believe in an absolute space outside 
the things whose positions we consider. 
1Ibid., pp. 251-254. 2Ibid., p. 252. 
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For example, the place of B is the same as the 
place of A when the relations of B to C,D,E, and F agree 
with A's previous relation to these entities. 
In what way do the pervasive traits of activity 
and unity pervade the concept of space? First, the 
notion of space presupposes the activity of mind in 
constructing the perceptual objects which occupy posi-
tion in space. Secondly, the mind observes the rela-
tion of these entities and then compares the order of 
entities at one moment of time with the order of en-
tities at another time. 
This idea of space does not merely appear to a 
passive mind, according to Leibniz. The person directs 
its activity of comparison and relates entities in a 
certain way, namely, according to position. 
Space, as Leibniz says, is " a certain order 
wherein the mind conceives the application of relations."1 
On the occasion of sense perception, the mind actively 
relates objects spatially. Entities do not group them-
selves, according to Leibniz, in a spatial-temporal 
framework. This order is the contribution of the com-
paring, relating mind. 
1Ibid., p. 253. 
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In what sense does the concept of space, de-
scribed by Leibniz, involve the concept of unity? First, 
the notion of space presupposes coexisting qualities or 
phenomenal things which depend upon the unity of the 
mind. Secondly, the conception of things related in 
places, prior to the developed concept of space, pre-
supposes the unity of the mind which grasps the things 
related in a single space. 
Secondly, the continuity of the self, the per-
manence of the self through time is a necessary pre-
supposition of the comparison of A to C,D,E, and F and 
B to C,D,E, and F. If the self at the time of the 
first relation was different from the self at the time 
of the second relation, the notion of space, as 
Leibniz explains it, would be impossible. 
Let us turn from the concept of space to a 
study of the role of the pervasive concepts in causal 
sequence. 
(e) Causal Sequence of Qualities.--Entities 
not only are related in a spatial-temporal framework, 
but some groups of coexisting qualities change when 
preceded by other coexisting groups of qualities. 
Our primary concern at this stage is to show that the 
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pervasive concepts of unity and activity are necessary 
presuppositions of the concept of phenomenal cause. 
As one puts a match under a spoonful of solid 
butter, one notices the change in the entity which we 
designate butter. Its shape changes, what was hard be-
comes a liquid. The smell may change and perhaps even 
the color will be slightly altered. If we repeat this 
experiment on several occasions, we will come to ex-
pect a certain reaction when fire is placed under butter 
based on the orderly sequence of impressions. 
How are the pervasive concepts of activity and 
unity exemplified in phenomenal cause. First, the 
phenomenal cause presupposes the unity and activity of 
the mind which unifies the sensory qualities which con-
stitute the entities under scrutiny in this experiment. 
The mind is not merely passive in ascertaining 
phenomenal cause, since it holds before itself a limited 
number of entities and studies them from a certain point 
of view, determined in large part by interest. More-
over, the person repeats the same experiment on several 
occasions to confirm this relation. The controlled ex-
periment underscores the contribution of a selective 
person who does not merely read off relations from the 
outside world--thus underlining the importance of 
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purpose in guiding the process of discovering phenomenal 
causes. 
Although there is evidence in Leibniz's writings, 
already cited, which supports the conclusion that ra-
tional purpose orders desire and impulse, it is our be-
lief that rational purpose also guides the process by 
which the rational dispositions articulate sensations. 
Notwithstanding the fact that our final conclusions re-
garding the relation of motivational and cognitive fac-
tors must await the study of the concept of individual-
ity, we believe that Leibniz recognized the role of 
interest in guiding cognition, just as he underscored 
the importance of reason guiding interest in his doc-
trine of rational volition. Leibniz would seem to con-
firm this conclusion as he says, 
The truth of sensible things is proved by 
their connections which depend on the intel-
lect truths founded in reason • • • and these 
reasons • • • give us a means of judgin£ of 
the future in relation to our interest.I 
Although the emphasis in this section is upon a study 
of epistemic activity, we must not lose sight of the 
role of conative factors in the knowing person. In 
studying the way in which the mind orders and selects, 
1 G.M. Duncan (ed. and trans.), The Philosophical 
Works of Leibniz, p. 247. 
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in part, the patterns of regular sequence on the basis 
of interest, we are reminded of the role of the cona-
tive factors in cognition. 
The pervasive concept of unity is likewise 
exemplified in phenomenal cause. First, the entities 
which are being related presuppose the unity of the 
self. Secondly, the notion of causal sequence pre-
supposes the coexistence of two or more entities in 
one mental grasp. Otherwise the entities would not 
be related. 
Moreover, the confirmation of the causal rela-
tion presupposes repeated instances of the same relation 
--thus requiring the unity of the self through time. 
If the person was not an abiding unity, there would be 
no way to confirm the regular sequences, since the 
self which performed the second experiment would not 
be able to relate this experiment to the first one. 
(2) Summary.--In the preceding section dealing 
with the activity of the person in sense perception, we 
have emphasized the role of the active intellect in 
imagination. We have, furthermore, paid special atten-
tion to the way in which the intelligible concepts are 
employed, in Leibniz's thought, to construct objects of 
sense perception--the way in which the sensory qualities 
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are unified, extended and placed in a spatial-temporal 
setting with other perceptual objects and change when 
preceded by other configurations of qualities. 
Moreover, we have attempted to show that the 
pervasive concepts of unity and activity pervade the 
process by which intelligible ideas such as extension, 
relation and identity are applied in the imagination 
to sensory qualities resulting in the construction of 
perceptual objects. We must now direct our attention 
more specifically to the intelligible objects. 
c) Intellectual Factors 
Leibniz opens the way for the discussion of 
intellectual factors as he says, 
There are . • • also objects of another na-
ture, which are not at all included in what 
we have observed in the objects of either 
the particular senses or the common sense, 
and consequently are also not to be con-
sidered objects of imagination. Besides 
what is sensible and imaginable, therefore, 
there is that which is only intelligible 
since it is the object of the understanding 
alone.l 
At this stage of our discussion we are con-
cerned with elucidating still further the intelligible 
1Leroy Loemker, Leibniz: Philosophical Papers 
and Letters, Vol. II, p. 891. 
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ideas with regard to the way in which these concepts 
illustrate the pervasive character of the concepts of 
unity and activity. What other intelligible concepts 
besides extension, identity and relation do we discover 
in Leibniz's thought? 
Let us first turn to several of Leibniz's state-
ments and then attempt to relate these statements in a 
systematic way, in order to shed light upon various 
intellectual factors. Leibniz says, 
He adds, 
Thus it is the ideas and truths are for us 
innate, as inclinations, dispositions, habits 
or natural potentialities and not as actions; 
although these potentialities are always ac-
companied by some action--often insensible 
which corresponds to them.l 
Thoughts are activities; and knowledge or 
truth, in so far as they are in us, even 
when we do not think of them, a~e habits or 
dispositions; and we know2very many things of which we hardly think. 
What is the difference between a disposition 
and a habit, according to Leibniz? He defines habit 
very clearly. Leibniz says, "I define [habit] as a 
1A.G. Langley (ed. and trans.), New Essay Con-
cerning Human UnderstandinX, by Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz; Together with an ppendix of Some of His 
Shorter Pieces, pp. 45-46. 
2Philip Wiener (ed.), Leibniz Selections, 
p. 406. 
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permanent but acguired readiness to act. " 1 This defini-
tion would seem to conflict with his apparent identifi-
cation of habits and dispositions in an earlier quota-
tion. It is our belief that Leibniz intended to employ 
the word "disposition" and possibly "inclination" to 
refer to the more general, natural tendencies of the 
person which order sensations such as we have described 
earlier. 
Leibniz appears to use the word "habit" for the 
acquired, more specific responses of the person to 
stimuli. All of the illustrations in the article2 in 
which he defines habit as an acquired readiness to act 
are specific examples. In this section dealing with 
intellectual factors we are especially interested in 
the readiness of the mind to order its experience in 
certain ways. Leibniz would appear to accept a theory 
of intellectual habits which are acquired and specific 
tendencies to order experience according to certain 
patterns. 
1Leroy Loemker (ed.), Leibniz: Philoso~hical 
Papers and Letters, Vol. I, p. 135 (underline mLne). 
211A New Method for Learning and Teaching 
Jurisprudence" in Leroy Loemker {ed.), Leibniz: 
Philospphical Papers and Letters, Vol. I, pp. 134-143. 
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There is another intellectual factor in addition 
to habits and the type of dispositions which have re-
ceived our attention to this point. Leibniz says, "Rea-
soning in the true sense depends on necessary eternal 
truths as are those of logic, number and geometry."1 
For example, we could conceive of the structure of a 
triangle as an unconscious tendence which is provoked 
on the occasion of sense perception. 
What then are the various types of intelligible 
ideas? Leibniz would seem to classify intelligible 
ideas accordingly: (1) general dispositions which are 
called to action on the occasion of sensation such as 
identity, relation and extension, (2) specific acquired 
habits which are indebted for their content to the 
activity of the dispositions in ordering sensations, 
(3) ideas of reason or perfections which are called 
forth by sensation and finally (4) an intelligible 
idea which we will be discussing more fully later, ana-
logical concepts. 
We have shown how the pervasive concepts of 
unity and activity are presuppositions of the active 
1Leroy Leomker (ed.), Leibniz: Philosophical 
Papers and Letters, Vol. II, p. 1036. 
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dispositions of relation and extension. What relation 
do these pervasive concepts bear to the intelligible 
ideas of habit and the ideas of reason? Let us study 
the relation of the concepts of activity and unity to 
habit. 
(1) The Relation of Intellectual Habit to the 
Pervasive Concepts of Activity and Unity.--The concept 
of activity is a presupposition for the formation of 
habits since habits depend upon the previously estab-
lished connections contributed by the mind as it con-
structs its phenomenal objects, regular sequences and 
spatial relations. 
One expects that the rubber ball will bounce and 
that fire will continue to melt butter. These habits 
depend upon the previous activity of the mind. 
Intellectual habits likewise presuppose the 
unity of the self. First, since habits are based on 
previously established relations and unifications, they 
presuppose the unity necessary for establishing these 
relations. Secondly, intellectual habits depend upon 
memory in as much as the present configuration or 
relations calls forth the memory of the past event. 
Thus, the unity of the abiding self is required, not-
withstanding the rapidity of the operation, to account 
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for the ability of the person to recognize that the 
present pattern is similar to a past configuration. 
What is the relation of the ideas of reason, in 
Leibniz's thought, to the pervasive concepts of unity 
and activity? 
(2) The Relation of the Ideas of Reason to 
the Pervasive Concepts of Activity and Unity.--Since 
the ideas of reason, for Leibniz, would seem to be per-
fections which the mind does not construct, they in-
volve less activity on the part of the person than the 
objects and relations previously discussed. Notwith-
standing this fact, the person is active even in the 
application of these structures, in as much as the 
thinker must compare the concrete object and the men-
tal structure and recognize a similarity before apply-
ing the mathematical rules to the object in question. 
Moreover, the ideas of reason presuppose a 
unified self, since a geometrical structure, for ex-
ample, involves rules which govern the relation between 
points, lines and angles. These must be grasped by a 
unified self if the perfection is to remain a unity. 
Moreover, the comparison of the mathematical perfection 
with the concrete object presupposes the unity of the 
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self, without which the unity of the concrete object and 
the perfection would never be brought together. 
We have discussed the role of the pervasive con-
cepts of unity and activity in sense perception, intel-
lectual habits and in the various mental dispositions. 
Now we must turn to the role of these pervasive notions 
in the construction of empirical concepts. 
d) Empirical Concepts 
Differentiating empirical concepts from disposi-
tions, Leibniz says, "Expressions which are in the soul 
whether conceived or not, can be called ideas, but 
those which are conceived or formed can be called notions 
or concepts."1 
Distinguishing the concept from the percept and 
the image Leibniz adds, 
Thought is a perceptible thing without awareness 
of parts, for thought is that "something, I know 
not what" which we perceive when we perceive 
what we think • • • when, for example we per-
ceive that we have the image of Titius in our 
mind, for this has parts, of course; such an 
image is not enough for thinking • • • but we 
perceive besides, that we have been aware of 
this image of Titius, and in this awareness of 
our image we find no parts.2 
1Leroy Loemker (ed.), Leibniz: Philosophical 
Papers and Letters, Vol. I, p. 494. 
2 Ibid., p. 174 (underlining mine). 
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We may suggest that the "what" of the "I know not what" 
or "the idea of Titwus which is more than an image which 
has parts" possesses many of the characteristics of the 
empirical concept. Leibniz's use of the "I know not 
what" suggests that this activity of thinking is a 
unique function not exemplified on lower levels of 
existence, but which can only be experienced through 
personal introspection. It may be suggested that his 
use of the word "what" and his differentiation of the 
"what" from a "that" (an image) indicates that the per-
son through the activities of comparison and abstraction 
has wrested a meaning from its concrete context. 1 
Relating the empirical concept to the activity 
of classification, Leibniz states that the idea of 
ordering things into genera and species is important 
2 
and is useful for judgment and memory. He states fur-
ther that ordering object in terms of species and 
genera is a question of more or less similitude. 
1Leibniz underlines this point as he differen-
tiates the activity of animals and men. He says, 
"They [beasts] know apparently whiteness and notice it 
in chatk or in snow; but this is not yet abstraction, 
for that requi~es a consideration of what is common 
[and] separated from what is particular." [Philip 
Wiener (ed.), Leibniz Selections, p. 419.] 
2Philip Wiener (ed.), Leibniz Selections, p. 451. 
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Leibniz says that it is natural to notice any sort of 
similarity or agreement and consequently to employ 
general terms of all degrees. 1 However, it is the abil-
ity of the human person to form the empirical concept 
which makes possible the classifications of species and 
genera. 
How does the construction of empirical concepts 
reflect the activity, purpose and unity of the person? 
First, the empirical concept depends upon the perceptual 
object which presupposes the activity of the person. 
Secondly, empirical concepts do not construct themselves. 
There is not a hard core which is attached to all per-
ceptual objects which dislodges itself when the person 
thinks. As Leibniz indicates, the active person 
selects, to a degree, which feature or features will 
serve as the basis of the comparison between particu-
lars of a certain kind. The person then abstracts the 
common quality which constitutes the empirical concept. 
The resulting empirical concept is as much due 
to the activity of the person as it is to the original 
qualitative factors. Let us relate the empirical con-
cept to human purpose. 
1rbid., pp. 449-450 . 
The purpose of the individual or society in 
question may determine what features are selected as 
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the defining characteristic of any species or genus. 
Leibniz says that we give attention to the objects which 
we distinguish and prefer to others. 1 The purpose of 
the biologist or the sociologist may determine, in part, 
the defining characteristic of a species or genus. 
Finally, we come to the pervasive concept of 
unity. First, the empirical concept depends upon the 
perceptual object which presupposes the unity of the 
person. Secondly, the empirical concept presupposes 
the comparison of two or more objects. The thinker 
who is constructing an empirical concept must unite 
several properties which make up the defining quality 
and then compare this defining quality in two or more 
objects. If the person were not able to grasp the de-
fining quality in one act or if he were not able to re-
late the similar objects in one act of comparison, then 
he would not be able to construct the empirical concept. 
The preceding study seems to indicate that the 
empirical concept presupposes the pervasive concepts 
of activity, purpose and unity. 
1 G.M. Duncan {ed. and trans.), The Philosoph-
ical Works of Leibniz, p. 216. 
c. A Reassessment of the Pervasive 
Concepts of Purpose and 
Continuity in the Light 
of the Study of the 
Notion of Activity 
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Two of the pervasive concepts which we set out 
to elucidate, unity and activity, have received more at-
tention in the epistemic section than purpose and con-
tinuity. There is good reason for this. First, it is 
difficult to ascertain the specific purpose of any 
particular unification. There is little doubt, however, 
that human purpose motivates and guides the way in which 
the rational dispositions bring order to sensations, 
for Leibniz, in the same way that they bring order to 
impulse and desire. 
Leibniz states that there come to us involuntary 
thoughts, partly from outside by means of objects which 
strike our senses, and partly from within by reason of 
the impressions (often insensible) which remain from 
preceding perceptions whose action continues and which 
mingle with those which appear for the first time. Re-
garding these impressions we are, for the most part, 
1 . 1 . 1 re atLve y passLve. 
1A.G. Langley (ed. and trans.), New Essay Con-
cerning Human Understandinf, by Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz; Together with an ppendix of Some of His 
Shorter Pieces, p. 182. 
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Leibniz states that these are flying thoughts 
which are not under our control. He continues, however, 
and says, 
But our mind, perceiving some images which 
recur to it, may say: stop there, and, so 
to speak arrest it. Moreover the mind enters, 
as it seems good to itself, into certain 1 trains of thought, which lead it on to others. 
It would seem that this statement further underscores 
the findings in the section dealing with the pervasive 
concept of activity--namely, that for Leibniz, the mind 
is an organic teleological process. 
Although the person may employ his reason to 
serve other needs in addition to the need to understand, 
the primary motive which impels the various activities 
which we have described is the purpose to think clearly 
and distinctly and to order sensations into a rational 
system. Therefore, all of the activities which further 
this end, as well as those which serve more pressing 
needs, illustrate the concept of purpose. 
Consequently, purpose is not only a pervasive 
concept in Leibniz's ethics, but it also pervades an 
epistemology in which rational purpose guides the 
process of thinking toward greater clarity and 
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distinctness. Let us turn to the pervasive concept of 
continuity. 
Since continuity involves the relation between 
all of the various levels of activity it is in the 
interests of clarity, to compare the levels of percep-
tion after, rather than during, the process of expound-
ing Leibniz epistemology. 
Prior to our discussion of the concept of activ-
ity, we briefly discussed the concept of continuity 
within the person, stressing the importance of uncon-
scious perceptions gradually rising to conscious sensa-
tions. 
We suggested that the levels of activity may 
gradually rise from simple sensations which provides 
material for the understanding, to systems of ideas 
which are relatively distinct compared to the lower 
levels of activity. 
However, we postponed the connection of the 
links between relatively passive sensation and rela-
tively active rational systems until we studied the 
active process by which the "matter" of sensation is 
ordered by the various rational dispositions under the 
direction of the person. 
We have now completed this study. What are 
some of the links which fill the gaps between sensa-
tion and the type of rational system we would find in 
a mature thinker. 
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First, in imaginatio, for Leibniz, the sensory 
qualities are repeated and placed side by side or ex-
tended. Moreover, the qualities of different senses 
are united by the common sense. 
For Leibniz, the development of the objects of 
sense perception from sensory elements is a gradual 
process. The phenomenal object is the result of a step 
by step process of connecting qualities along with the 
continual repetition of the process until finally one 
forms an idea of a particular phenomenal object. 
At this stage, habit takes over and the mind 
continues to search out new lands to conquer. This 
gradual process by which the perceptual object is con-
structed illustrates the law of continuity within first 
person experience. 
Hand and hand with the development of sense per-
ception, these phenomenal objects are placed in a 
spatial-temporal setting. Notwithstanding the fact that 
the spatial order would seem to be a contribution of the 
mind, for Leibniz, this order becomes explicit only as 
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the person relates objects in space. Gradually we con-
ceive of sensations, not only unified as perceptual ob-
jects, but as ordered in a spatial-temporal framework. 
The step by step process by which perceptual objects are 
related in a spatial-temporal system likewise illustrates 
the law of continuity. 
Not only do we conceive of objects as related 
spatially and temporally, but we can better understand 
these groups of coexisting qualities if we correlate 
changes which take place in objects with the appearances 
of other groups of qualities. The phenomenal object 
which is ordered by a person such that it has a place 
in a causal system is more distinct, than a phenomenal 
object which is merely understood in terms of spatial 
and temporal relations. Objectij therefore, which are 
causally related, are on a level a step above objects 
not so related. As these two objects are compared one 
becomes aware of the continuity of activities within 
the person. 
Finally, Leibniz contends that our phenomenal 
objects become more distinct as we employ anthropic 
analogies in the metaphysical realm to shed light upon 
the phenomenal objects. This subject will receive 
further consideration in Chapter V. 
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The advance from sensations to metaphysical 
concepts, in Leibniz's epistemology, does not involve 
abrupt leaps, rather there is a gradual progression 
from unconscious perceptions through various stages of 
clarity and distinctness until the more general notions 
of metaphysics are reached. 
Throughout our study of Leibniz's theory of 
personality up until this point we have discovered the 
importance and pervasiveness of the concepts of unity, 
activity, purpose and continuity . Let us now turn to 
the fifth pervasive concept, individuality. 
D. Individuality 
In the section dealing with the pervasive con-
cepts of human purpose and activity, it has been indi-
cated that each human person is not merely passive in 
the Lockean sense, but rather brings the forms of his 
understanding to the elements of sense and desire. 
In Leibniz's epistemology, these forms are ac-
tive dispositions and habits . In ethics the person, 
according to Leibniz, employs rational volition to 
analyze and evaluate his desires and impulses. Conse-
quently, even before studying the concept of 
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individuality we recognized an element of activity, in 
Leibniz's thought, by which given perspectives order the 
world from their own point of view. 
There is still another question, however, that 
we may ask: Do we discover in Leibniz's theory of the 
person an irreducible or unique activity by which the 
individual person actually introduces novely into the 
world as he orders the world from his own perspective? 
If Leibniz recognizes such an activity in his 
theory of personality, then a further contribution of 
the active person must be underscored--namely, the 
activity of a selective subject organizing and relating 
presentations into perceptions and novel systems of 
ideas guided by a unique purpose. 
We have discussed the various rationalistic 
contributions of the person such as space and time, 
quantity, identity and causal relations. Is it possible 
that, for Leibniz, the person also contributes a novel 
integration of events which is the result of his individ-
ual aims and purposes? The selectivity which is based 
on the elaboration of implicit universals, either in 
epistemology or ethics, while it does involve a measure 
of activity, since the subject brings his own tools to 
the elements of sense and desire, does not involve the 
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same degree of contribution as we would find in an 
individual subject organizing the data on the basis of 
individual, unique ends. 
Moreover, if Leibniz accepts the interpretation 
of the person as a unique, individual cause, then his 
ethics would include an element of choice which would 
defy reduction to rationalistic elements alone. 
In an early section we viewed purpose from the 
point of view of unity. For example: (1) the way in 
which the desires of an individual were given further 
unification by rational volition and (2) the manner 
in which human purpose motivates and guides the way in 
which the rational dispositions bring order to sensa-
tions. 
Accordingly, it would seem justifiable to employ 
the words "activity," "purpose" and "selectivity" to 
describe logical development. According to this view, 
reason elicits the relations which are already present 
in an implicit universal, but which must be unraveled 
by logical process. 
This position is well illustrated by Professor 
Brand Blanshard's theory of the idea. Blanshard con-
ceives of knowledge as a process, but not a process 
which takes place in time. He illustrates this point 
I 
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by employing the example of a mathematician working on 
a problem. "He [the mathematician] is given the gen-
eral conditions of the solution and he bends his thought 
to filling the blanks in his knowledge."1 After a while 
the mathematician reaches his end. Blanshard states 
that this is a clear example of a fulfillment of a pur-
pose. 
He adds that it is also clear that the process 
of fulfillment was not a temporal process in which the 
end, presented itself only at the end; although time 
was the condition of the mathematician's advance and 
without this movement from stage to stage would have 
been impossible. Blanshard contends that it would be 
absurd to say that the conditions framing the solution, 
and constituting what we mean by the transcendent mean-
ing of the idea were merely stages in the process--they 
were there all along. 2 
Consequently, when Blanshard speaks of the rela-
tion between idea and the object as that of unrealized 
1Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, Vol. I 
(London: George Allen and Unwin LTD, 1939), p. 515. 
2rbid., p. 516 (underlining mine). 
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to realized purpose, 1 he is referring to what may be 
called an essential or logical aspect of that relation, 
not of the temporal lapse or process through which we 
come to know it. According to this theory of knowledge 
the individual person is not a unique cause introducing 
novelty into the world. He is rather merely uncovering 
relations which were present all along. 
The question which we now face is: does a study 
of Leibniz's theory of personality reveal a pervasive 
concept of individuality? 
Since Leibniz's philosophy is admittedly ration-
alistic, at this stage of the discussion, we may be 
limited to the setting forth of intimations of individu-
ality in dialectic tension with statements which seem to 
deny the relevance of this pervasive concept in Leibniz's 
thought. If this is the case, then it will be necessary 
to consider the concept of individuality as a problem 
area and bracket its final solution until we reach the 
ultimate concept of individuality on the metaphysical 
level. 
Let us turn to Leibniz's interpretation of the 
terms "choice" and "free will" in order to see whether 
these concepts will illuminate the pervasive concept 
1rbid., p. 517. 
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of individuality. 
1. Leibniz's Doctrine of Free Will 
Although Leibniz divides the motivational fac-
tors of the person into two classifications, the volun-
tary and the involuntary, it is necessary to study his 
system further to ascertain whether or not he conceives 
of the individual person as a unique cause. It is to 
that task which we now turn. 
a) Rationality and system 
Underscoring the importance of rationality and 
system, Leibniz says, "The nature of things requires 
that every event should have beforehand its proper 
conditions • the existence whereof makes the suffi-
cient reason of such an event. " 1 Although the doctrine 
of sufficient reason will receive fuller treatment at 
a later stage of this study, it will suffice at this 
point to indicate that the above quotation underlines 
Leibniz's belief that rational intelligibility presup-
poses that every event has its place within a system of 
events. In short, there are no unexplainable or 
1Leroy Laemker (ed.), Leibniz: Philosophical 
Papers and Letters, Vol. II, p. 1138. 
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uncaused objects, events or actions in Leibniz's system. 
He says, "Nothing occurs without reason."1 It was 
Leibniz's belief that free personal choice would result 
in the breakdown of the rationality of the universe 
grounded in the sufficient reason. 
b) Free Will and Motives 
According to Leibniz, the mind acts by virtue of 
motives which are its dispositions to act. 2 His rejec-
tion of a free will is set forth in his correspondence 
with Clarke. Leibniz says, 
To pretend, as the author [Clarke] does here, 
that mind prefers somet imes weaker motives to 
stronger ones • . • this I say is to divide 
the mind from its motives as if they were 
without the mind • . • as if the mind had 
besides motives, other dispositions to act 
by virtue of3which it could reject or accept the motives . 
Leibniz seems to reject the notion of the soul which 
describes freedom as the self-activity of a person 
deliberating about alternative courses of action. This 
1Philip Wiener {ed . ), Leibniz Selections, p. 436. 
2Leroy Leemker {ed.), Leibniz: Philosophical 
Papers and Letters, Vol. II, 1137. 
3Ibid., pp. 1136-1137. 
160 
explanation of free will would apparently fall under 
his criticism of Clarke's view expressed in the phrase, 
"As if the mind had besides motives, other dispositions 
to act by virtue of which it could reject or accept the 
motives."1 According to Leibniz's view, action would 
follow immediately upon the presentation of a reason 
in the same fashion that action would follow upon an 
experience of uneasiness. 
The execution of a desire is suspended or ar-
rested when the desire is not strong enough to move us. 
But, according to Leibniz, a desire may be strong enough 
to move us and still be arrested by a stronger motive. 2 
c) Choice 
Although on occasion Leibniz employs the term 
"choice," this word does not possess the same meaning 
for him as it would for a thinker who conceived of 
this choice as a deliberate self-activity. Leibniz's 
ambiguous use of the word "choice" is illustrated in 
a statement from The New Essay Concerning Human Under-
standing, 
2Philip Wiener (ed.), Leibniz Selections, p. 437. 
You can will only what you find to be good, 
and according as the faculty of understand-
ing is t"mproved the choice of the will is 
better. 
Leibniz adds, 
According as man has vigor of will he de-
termines his thoughts according to his 
choice, instead of being determined and carr~ed away by involuntary perceptions. 2 
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Although the use of the word "choice" in these 
two instances certainly conveys a metaphysical meaning 
in its context, it would appear from our discussion of 
Leibniz's notion of freedom that the word "choice" does 
not refer to an irreducible activity of the self. The 
person is aware of many desires and rational motiva-
tions but he, as an active person does not exercise 
any energy in the implementation of these choices. 
Although the individual is self-determined in the 
sense that he is not manipulated from without in a 
mechanical fashion, it appears that the person is deter-
mined by his inner motives, which are called volitions 
when rationally deliberate. 
1A.G. Langley (ed. and trans.), New Essay Con-
cerning Human Understandinf, by Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz; Together with an ~ppendix of Some of His 
snorter P~eces, p. US.5 (underl~ning m~ne) • 
2rbid. (underlining mine). 
j 
162 
Notwithstanding the fact that Leibniz seems to 
reject the view which maintains that the self is active 
over and above the sum total of its motivations, he 
does insist that men have a voluntary nature. Freedom, 
for Leibniz, depends upon the power to will as one 
ought and to do what one wills. 1 But if the person is 
to will as he ought and not merely as he wants, it 
would appear that there must be some activity to inte-
grate and activate the various processes of the ra-
tional self. How does Leibniz account for the fact 
that the mind is turned toward reason rather than to-
ward appetite or impulse? Leibniz answered, "There is 
need ••. that the mind be prepared beforehand."2 
d) The Preparation of the Mind for Rational Action 
How does the mind prepare itself? Leibniz says, 
It is well to accustom one's self to collect 
one's self from time to time, and to raise 
one's self above the present tumult of im-
pressions, to go forth ... a~d to say to 
one's self ... where are we? 
In these moments of quiet meditation concerning the ends 
of life, the person, according to Leibniz, can prepare 
1Philip Wiener (ed.), Leibniz Selections, 
p. 433. 
2Ibid., p. 437. 3Ibid., p. 438. 
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himself for the battle with the passions and appetites 
which will ensue in more heated moments. Consequently 
it is by means of meditation and training that one be-
comes master of himself and follows reason rather than 
impulse in life situations. 
If these statements from the New Essay were 
merely underlining the importance of building up good 
habits or training the mind to scrutinize its rational 
principles, they would not be as significant for our 
discussion of freedom as they are in the setting of 
Leibniz's philosophy. For in Leibniz's theory of the 
person the voluntary nature of the person, which has 
theoretical and practical consequences, is grounded in 
this notion of training, preparedness and habit. 
In the interest of clarity, we might ask sev-
eral questions. What determines a person to "collect 
oneself from time to time?" Why is one person contem-
plative and another concerned only about day to day ex-
istence? Why does one person prepare himself for 
heated moments and another merely decide the issue at 
the time of battle? Perhaps if Leibniz were philoso-
phizing today he would reply that education is the 
answer to the problems raised above. 
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There is little doubt that education is an im-
portant ally of moral action and reasonable conduct, 
but can education, by itself, supply the principle upon 
which Leibniz has erected his theory of voluntary ac-
tion? Education and training presuppose trainers and 
educators. Apparently the teachers, be they parents 
or professional teachers, selected principles which 
they evaluated in the light of some system of values. 
Notwithstanding the importance of preparedness 
and training, it would appear that contemplation, 
preparation, and building good habits all presuppose 
furthermore a selective activity and the effort of per-
sons to implement their ideals. 
e) Conclusions 
Leibniz, in his notion of self-determination, 
differentiates action which follows from unconscious 
tendencies, desires and reason. His definition of the 
voluntary nature of the person is based upon the fact 
that the person, although often moved by impulses and 
appetites, can be motivated by reason. 
At this point, Leibniz employs the word "choice" 
and apparently moves in the direction of a position 
which he rejects in the correspondence with Clarke. 
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Recognizing the importance of voluntary action and fear-
ful of any unlawful activity, Leibniz turned to the no-
tion of preparedness and training. 
Although this solution may be satisfactory as 
a refutation of the mechanical scheme, it would seem 
that this interpretation of choice would not qualify as 
an example of individuality in which the person orders 
his sensations and desires by means of an irreducible 
activity. 
It would appear, at this stage, that the alleged 
pervasive concept of individuality, in Leibniz's thought, 
seems to be reduced to an elaborations of universals in 
epistemology and ethics. 
2. Factors which Conflict with the Rationalistic 
Interpretation of Individuality 
Although, for the final solution to the problem 
of individuality in Leibniz's system, we must await the 
discussion of his metaphysics, there are intimations in 
his writings which seem to conflict with what appears 
to be a very rationalistic interpretation of individu-
ality set forth in the preceding section. 
1Philip Wiener (ed.), Leibniz Selections, p. 495. 
166 
For example, in his discussion of Spinoza's 
philosophy, he says, "He [Spinoza] is • wrong in 
thinking that affirmation or negation is volition, since, 
moreover, volition involves, in addition, the reason of 
the good." 1 
A critic might reply that this quotation could 
well be harmonized with a rationalistic interpretation 
of desire, since the reason of the good merely reiter-
ates a persistent Leibnizian theme that ethics involves 
analyzed desire. 
However, Leibniz adds, "The will is only an en-
tity of reason. So Spinoza. But we take the will for 
the power of choosing, the exercise of which is voli-
tion . "1 Notwithstanding the fact that this passage 
could likewise be twisted to fit the rationalistic 
scheme, it is our belief that such interpretation would 
distort Leibniz's meaning in this quotation. 
If rational volition merely refers to the pro-
cess by which the tools of a given perspective are 
brought to perception, would not the resulting unifica-
tion be merely "an entity of reason?" 2 
Although a critic might remind us that Leibniz 
did not fail to emphasize the role of tendency and 
1Ibid. 
-
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desire in the preceding description of his epistemology 
and ethics, it would seem that tendency and desire be-
come terms which describe the orderly process or law by 
which perspectives of the whole elaborate the whole 
from their own point of view. But would not this process 
reduce the will to "an entity of reason?"1 
If Leibniz is serious in his intentions not to 
reduce will to "an entity of reason,"2 then this may 
lead him to a reinterpretation of tendency and other 
similar concepts on the metaphysical level. 
Although we are moving in this study from anthro-
pic analogies toward a metaphysical view, it will be 
permissible, for the purposes of illustration, to invoke 
two brief examples from Leibniz metaphysics which seem 
to strengthen the case for individuality in Leibniz's 
theory of the person. In the Discourse on Metaphysics, 
Leibniz states that God has the will to choose the best, 
and then he adds that human spirits are made in the 
d . . . 2 J.VJ.ne J.mage. He continues in his article entitled 
"Refutation of Spinoza" by saying, "There is nothing 
lovable in a God who produces without choice and by 
3Leroy Loemker (ed.), Leibniz: Philosophical 
Papers and Letters, Vol. I, p. 504. 
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necessity, without descrimination of good and evil."1 
Finally, he says, "One single spirit [hmnan] is worth 
a whole world, because it not only expresses the world 
but also knows it and conducts its life after the man-
ner of God." 2 
Although these passages could also be inter-
preted rationalistically, there are two elements in 
these quotations which would seem to rule out such a 
reduction. First, the construction of these statements, 
especially the second one, intimates that the being 
selecting, namely, God, has a choice between alterna-
tives and secondly, the statements, especially the 
third one, suggests a contrast between "expresses" and 
"a knowledge which guides action." Leibniz's use of 
the word "expresses" in the third quotation is especi-
ally relevant, since this word is used as a synonym 
for "representation" throughout Leibniz's writings. 
Leibniz would appear to be indicating that the 
human spirit does not merely represent the world, even 
according to the law of desire, but the person knows 
1Philip Wiener {ed.), Leibniz Selections, 
p. 496. 
2Leroy Loemker {ed.), Leibniz: Philosophical 
Papers and Letters, Vol. II, p. 504. 
169 
the world and conducts his life in the manner of God 
who can be judged as lovable or not lovable on the 
basis of his choices. 
3. Conclusions 
In the discussion of Leibniz's doctrine of free 
will and choice, evidence has been presented which would 
seem to indicate that Leibniz would reject a view which 
interpreted the person as a unique cause. Likewise, 
certain evidence has been cited from Leibniz's writings 
which seems to conflict with the reduction of factors 
which support individuality to rationalism. 
For these reasons we will designate the concept 
of individuality as a problem area which will be 
studied further in Chapter V. Leibniz's writings would 
seem to support the correctness of this procedure. He 
says, 
Individuality involves the infinite, and only 
he who understands the latter can have first-
hand knowledge of the principle of individua-
tion of this or that thing; this arises from 
the influence (rightly conceived) of all things 
in the universe on one another.! 
Although we will not claim at any time in this 
study to "know the infinite," it may be in the interests 
1Philip Wiener (ed.), Leibniz Selections, p. 451. 
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of this investigation to bracket the question of indi-
viduality until we reach that aspect of our study which 
investigates the principles which Leibniz invokes to 
deal with infinite questions. 
Let us turn now to that aspect of personality 
which Leibniz conceives as the key to metaphysical 
reasoning. 
E. Analogical Concepts Esfecially 
Relevant to Leibniz s 
Theorizing 
In the section dealing with the pervasive con-
cept of activity we studied the way in which certain 
dispositions ordered the sensory elements. Leibniz, 
however, points out that these dispositions which we 
have discussed up until now, are phenomenal in nature. 
He declares, "Matter, taken for mass in itself, is only 
a phenomenon or a well-founded appearance, as are space 
and time."1 He adds, "I can say the same thing about 
magnitude and motion, namely that these qualities or 
predicates are of the nature of phenomena, like color 
and sound, and though they involve more distinct 
1Leroy Loemker (ed), Leibniz: Philosophical 
Papers and Letters, Vol. I, p. 528. 
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knowledge, they can no more sustain a final analysis."1 
If these concepts do not shed light upon the 
nature of reality, where does Leibniz, who has been 
shown to be deeply interested in metaphysical questions, 
turn for insight into the nature of general principles 
which will illuminate first person experience? 
says, "It is ... the consideration of myself 
He 
which provides me with concepts in metaphysics. " 2 
We have studied some of these principles such 
as identity, and reason as they actually function in 
ordering experience. Leibniz, however, indicates that 
these concepts which we discover within may be employed 
to illuminate metaphysical principles. 
Returning to an early quotation, we recall that 
Leibniz said, "there is in us: being, unity, substance, 
duration, change, action, perception ... [and]other 
objects of our intellectual ideas. " 3 In another section 
of the New Essay Concerning Human Understanding Leibniz 
2Ibid., Vol. II, p. 891. 
3A.G. Langley (ed. and trans.), New Ess~ 
cerning Human Understandinf, by Gottfried Wilhe 
Leibniz; To~ether with an ppendix of Some of His 
Pieces, p. 5. 
Con-
Shorter 
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says, "Now the soul comprises being, substance, identity, 
cause, perception, reason and many other notions which 
the sense cannot give."1 
We have combined and reduced this list to five 
pervasive concepts: unity, activity, purpose, contin-
uity and individuality. Leibniz includes in his list 
of ideas, which we discover as we look within, several 
important concepts not included in our set of five per-
vasive concepts. Is it possible to reduce, without 
loss, these concepts to our original five? What are 
these other concepts which we will attempt to reduce 
to the five concepts selected for this study? They are: 
being, substance, perception and action, duration and 
change, identity, cause, reason and the possibility of 
a unique type of action . 
It may be that several of these concepts will 
overlap. We shall include concepts in the list which 
appear to be nearly identical, since it is one of our 
aims in this section to justify the selection of only 
five pervasive concepts in our study of Leibniz's 
theory of personality. If it can be shown that these 
five concepts include the other notions in Leibniz's 
lists, this purpose will be advanced. 
1Philip Wiener (ed.), Leibniz Selections, 
pp. 409~410. 
1. The Relation of Analogical Concepts Not Selected 
for this Study to Five Pervasive Concepts 
a) Being 
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In regard to the concept of being Leibniz says, 
"A being is that whose concept involves something posi-
tive or that which can be conceived by us provided what 
we conceive is possible and involves no contradiction."1 
According to Leibniz, we know~ being first if the con-
cept of this being is explained perfectly and involves 
nothing confused, but there is a shorter way to being. 
If a thing actually exists, then it must certainly be a 
being. 
Accordingly, Leibniz says, "That which has 
sensible qualities, or is perceptible is called a be-
ing.n2 Leibniz adds, "The I who thinks and am called 
a mind or soul, is incomparably more certain than the 
existence of sensible things." 3 
Since Leibniz acknowledges the fact that only 
in the realm of ideas of reason are we able to per-
fectly analyze our concepts, the first definition of a 
being would not seem to be relevant to the area of 
1Leroy Loemker (ed.), Leibniz: Philosophical 
Papers and Letters, Vol. II, p. 602. 
2Ibid., Vol. I, p. 141. 
3Ibid. 
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metaphysics which we have defined as a way of illuminat-
ing the world of fact. However, Leibniz does not limit 
his definition of being to the clear and distinct ideas 
discovered in mathematics and logic. In fact he states 
that the most perfect definition of being is discovered 
in experience. 
Since the pervasive concept of activity deals 
with the way in which the active person experiences 
and orders sensations, it has been possible for us to 
deal with the intelligible concept of being under the 
pervasive concept of activity without misinterpreting 
Leibniz's scheme. 
b) Substance 
Leibniz lists the concept of substance as an-
other idea we discover by looking within. This con-
cept is closely related to the second definition of 
being discussed in the preceding section. The two es-
sential concepts included in the idea of substance, 
according to Leibniz, are perception and action. He 
says, "When it is said that there are innnaterial sub-
stances, one means by this that there are substances 
which include other concepts, namely perception and a 
principle of action or change. n1 
1Ibid., Vol. II, p. 896. 
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(1) Perception and Action.--The concept of 
perception, for our purpose may be reduced to the con-
cept of unity, in Leibniz's thought. Leibniz says, 
'~e ourselves experience a multitude in a simple sub-
stance when we find that the slightest thought which 
. f ld . t . . b . "1 we perce~ve en o s a var~e y ~n ~ts o Ject. In 
the Monadology Leibniz states that a monad cannot be 
other than its perceptions, that is to say, the repre-
sentation of that which is outside, in the simple and 
its appetitions, which are the principles of change. 2 
Since we are employing the concepts of unity, activity 
and purpose among the pervasive concepts, it has been 
possible to include the unity in manifold of changing 
substances under these three concepts. 
(3) Levels of Substance.--Leibniz not only 
defines substance in terms of perception and action, 
he also recognizes grades or levels of perceptions. In 
as much as the pervasive concept of continuity has re-
ceived our attention, the notion of levels of substance 
may be subsumed under this concept in this study. 
1Ibid.' p . 1046 
2Robert Latta (ed . and trans.), The Monadology 
and Other Philosophical Writings, p . 407. 
I 
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c) Duration and Change 
Since the unity of the self, in our scheme, in-
cludes the permanence of the self through time or change, 
the concepts of duration and change which Leibniz men-
tions in his list would seem to be included in the five 
pervasive concepts selected for this study. 
d) Identity 
On occasions Leibniz employs the word "identity" 
to refer to the permanence of the self through time, 
which is similar to the conception of duration discussed 
above . This use of the term would be classified under 
the pervasive concept of unity in our scheme. If the 
concept of Identity refers to logical identity, then 
we would turn to concept of activity which included the 
role of logical incompatibility in the construction of 
perceptual objects . Let us turn to the concept of 
cause. 
e) Cause 
Leibniz states that we experience the concept 
of cause when we look within. The concept of cause is 
included under the concepts of purpose and activity in 
our scheme. As we order the non-rational sensory 
I 
elements we are aware of ourselves as a cause. 
Likewise, we are aware of ourselves as a cause 
as we control our actions in the light of a purpose or 
rational volition. Therefore the idea of cause may be 
reduced to the five pervasive concepts. 
f) Reason 
The concept of reason which is included in 
Leibniz's list may also be included in the concepts of 
activity and purpose. It has been indicated that 
reason plays an important role as it brings light to 
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our system of ideas in epistemology and guides our 
actions in the ethical sphere. Although reason has been 
classified under other concepts such as activity and 
purpose in this study, nevertheless, the concept of 
reason has been recognized as an important notion. 
g) Action--A Unique Cause 
Although the concept of action has been classi-
fied under the pervasive categories of activity and 
purpose, whether or not this concept also suggests a 
type of unique action in which the individual person 
is to be conceived of as an irreducible cause remains 
to be seen. 
I 
178 
At this stage we merely wish to point out that 
if the concept of action proves to be so interpreted 
in Leibniz's theory of personality and metaphysics, our 
scheme, which includes the pervasive concept of indi-
viduality, is adapted to deal with this concept. 
2. Summary 
In this section we have not attempted to exhaust 
all of the ways in which Leibniz's two lists of intelli-
gible concepts overlap the pervasive concepts in our 
scheme. 
Our intention has been merely to show that the 
scheme selected for this study will include all of the 
inte~ligible ideas which Leibniz has listed as concepts 
which he discovers as he "looks within." 
Inasmuch as we have shown that the concepts 
of unity, activity, continuity, purpose and perhaps 
individuality are: (1) presuppositions of the knowing 
and acting person which seem to pervade all of the 
activities in Leibniz's theory of personality and 
(2) the intelligible concepts which Leibniz includes 
in the lists which he explicitly acknowledges as use-
ful tools in metaphysics, it will now be possible to 
utilize these pervasive anthropic concepts in our study 
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of Leibniz's metaphysical scheme. 
F. Summary 
Chapter III has been included in this disserta-
tion because it is necessary to understand the meaning 
and relation of the pervasive concepts which will be em-
ployed as analogies in later chapters. Since the essence 
of this study is the comparison of relations in the per-
sonal and the metaphysical realms which either establish 
or fail to establish anthropic analogies, it is essen-
tial to understand the relations on the personal level 
from which structures on the metaphysical level will be 
inferred. 
We have selected five concepts: unity, contin-
uity, purpose, activity and individuality which have 
been suggested by a quotation from Leibniz's writings 
as possible pervasive concepts of Leibniz's theory of 
personality. 
The remainder of the study in this chapter has 
had the dual purpose of showing (1) that these five con-
cepts are pervasive concepts, since they are presupposed 
by many activities of the person and (2) how each of 
these concepts are related to other pervasive concepts 
I 
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of personality and how they are related to the more 
specific functions of the person such as the perception 
of a concrete object. These relations will be employed 
as analogies in later chapters. 
After setting forth the five pervasive concepts, 
we turned to a brief preliminary discussion of three of 
the five pervasive traits of personality--unity, contin-
uity and purpose. 
Following the introduction of these three con-
cepts, we studied the pervasive concept of unity and to 
a certain degree the concept of purpose as they actually 
function in the active person. This section necessarily 
illuminated the pervasive concept of activity. 
After investigating the way in which the various 
selected concepts pervade the active person, we studied 
the concept of purpose and continuity in the light of 
the preceding investigation of the concept of activity. 
We then turned to an investigation of the per-
vasive concept of individuality. Our inquiry centered 
around the question: Do we discover in Leibniz's theory 
of the person an irreducible or unique activity by which 
the individual actually introduced novelty into the 
world as he orders the world from his point of view and 
is the individual free in his ethical choices? 
181 
After studying Leibniz's theory of freedom and 
choice, we concluded that the alleged pervasive concept 
of individuality, in Leibniz's thought, appears to be 
reduced to the elaboration of universals in epistemology 
and ethics. 
However, we discovered various factors in 
Leibniz's writings which conflicted with this conclusion. 
Therefore, we designated the concept of individuality 
a second problem area which will be studied further in 
Chapter V. 
After completing our study of the five pervasive 
concepts of Leibniz's theory of personality, we returned 
to study another type of intelligible idea, the analogical 
concept. Leibniz believes that by'tookin~ within it is 
possible to discover certain intelligible ideas which 
provide him with concepts in metaphysics. 
We have suggested that the various intelligible 
objects which may, according to Leibniz, be employed in 
metaphysics are reducible without loss to the five per-
vasive concepts which have been selected for study in 
this chapter. 
We attempted to justify this reduction in the 
following section by comparing the various intelligible 
ideas found in Leibniz's writings with the five selected 
I 
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concepts. 
We shall turn next in our study to the step by 
step investigation of the way in which these pervasive 
concepts of personality are employed by Leibniz in meta-
physics, beginning with Leibniz's use of the analogy of 
the abiding self to illuminate the structure of phenomena. 
CHAPTER IV 
LEIBNIZ'S USE OF THE ANALOGY OF THE ABIDING 
SELF TO ILLUMINATE THE STRUCTURE OF 
PHENOMENA 
Chapters IV and V will deal with a similar prob-
lem but in a different way . In both chapters we shall 
be endeavoring to establish analogies of personality 
which will illuminate some other realm of discourse. In 
Chapter V we shall seek to establish analogies based upon 
relations within personality which will shed light upon 
metaphysical principles, whereas in Chapter IV we shall 
be attempting to construct analogies which will relate 
the enduring or abiding self, which is a unity through 
time, to complex phenomenal categories in such a way as 
to illuminate the manner in which these categories are 
related to events and other categories within first per-
son experience . 
Our aim in Chapter IV will be to show that we 
can better understand the phenomenal categories and 
what they refer to by thinking in terms of characteris-
tics of the abiding, time-transcending self. 
- 183 -
184 
All of the analogies established in this chapter 
will employ the relation of the time-transcending char-
acter of the human person to the factors unified or re-
lated as an analogy which makes possible an understand-
ing of the relationship between certain active cate-
gories, such as space and time and the events or cate-
gories which are unified. Both orders, which ground 
the analogy, involve an identity of character pervading 
a distinct set of events. Just as the abiding self is 
necessary to a sensory, perceptual and conceptual ex-
perience, so it is also necessary to shed light upon 
how the complex categories can operate in relation to 
each other. 
In Chapter III we endeavored to show that the 
concept of unity, as well as other concepts, are pre-
suppositions of the various activities of the self. 
For example, the ordering of phenomenal objects in a 
spatial-temporal framework is made possible by the 
unity of the self. 
On the basis of the evidence set forth in 
Chapter III, we concluded that we could consider the 
unity of the self through time as a pervasive concept 
which elucidates our first person experience. 
Although these pervasive concepts will be em-
ployed later to shed light upon non-human structures, 
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we must recognize, at this stage, the ontological status 
of the abiding self. The ontic self is not directly 
experienced, it is rather a principle which the mind 
constructs to shed light upon the possibility of organ-
ized experience. 
With this distinction between phenomenal and 
ontological principles in mind, we may point out the 
difference between t he two structures which are being 
compared. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the phenomenal 
principles under investigation, in this chapter, are 
aspects of the self's thought, these abstractions are 
clarified as they are compared to the ontic unity of 
the self. Although they are aspects of the self, these 
categories are still in need of further clarification. 
For example, one may study the various aspects of per-
sonality, showing that unity is a pervasive concept, 
without understanding the precise relation of a given 
phenomenal principle to the events which it unifies. 
It is possible, for instance, to understand 
the ontological principle of the identity of the self 
without understanding precisely the way in which the 
mathematician conceives of unity and how he employs this 
concept in arithmetic and geometry. 
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Therefore, the aim of this chapter is not merely 
to present illustrations of the pervasive concepts dis-
cussed earlier. It is rather to show how Leibniz em-
ploys an ontological principle, the identity of the 
self which illuminates, as we have discovered, a rich 
content of sensory, perceptual and conceptual experience, 
to shed light upon the precise relationship of given 
categories to the events they elucidate. 
The understanding of phenomenal concepts such 
as identity and diversity, space and time, and quantity 
is essential to our study of Leibniz's metaphysics 
since, Leibniz would agree with Schopenhauer as he says, 
"Metaphysics • is the correct explanation of experi-
ence as a whole." 1 In other words, one's system of 
general notions must have a place for and illuminate 
phenomenal principles as well as principles which 
elucidate experience on a deeper level of analysis. 
A. The Model of the Enduring Self 
It has been indicated that in the self Leibniz 
finds that which is not merely a succession of 
1Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and 
Idea, Vol. II, trans. by R.B. Haldane and J. Kemp 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul LTD, 1957), p. 387. 
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experiences, but is rather a being who is aware of an 
experience of succession. It has been pointed out that 
the unity of the self is a presupposition of phenomenal 
principles such as coexistence, phenomenal cause and 
space and time. 
The identity of the self through time makes pos-
sible the comparing of conscious states. For example, a 
teacher may think in the present that he is the same 
self who lectured this morning. In the first place, he 
is comparing his present state with a conscious state 
which was lived through this morning which is continu-
ous with the present state and, therefore, he uses the 
word "my" to describe the past state. Consequently, 
identity is a presupposition of the act by which the 
person compares the past and the present state in the 
present and concludes that they are one. 
Moreover, the possibility of comparing the two 
states involves the activity of the mind in the past 
state as well as the present. For example, while the 
teacher lectured he was aware of sights, sounds and 
tactile sensations which he perceived as objects and 
persons. Without this rudimentary activity, which is 
dependent upon memory and the identity of the self, the 
unity of the state in the past would be immediately 
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dissolved and there would be no unified past to compare 
with the present. 
Not only does Leibniz underscore the importance 
of the unity of the self in thinking, but he believes 
that real and personal identity is proved with the ut-
most possible certainty by present and immediate reflec-
tion upon the continuity of our present self with the 
ego which was in the cradle. 1 
It is this unity of self illustrated by both 
the unity in a manifold in a present perception and the 
identity of the self through time which will serve as 
a model to illuminate the structure of phenomena. 
We will now endeavor to show how the model of 
the abiding self elucidates specific phenomenal struc-
tures. Let us turn first to identity and diversity. 
B. Specific Phenomenal Structures 
Illuminated by an Analogy 
with the Enduring Self 
1. Identity and Diversity 
OUr aim in this section is to employ the analogy 
of the abiding self to shed light upon the specific 
Con-
Shorter 
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meaning of the abstract, phenomenal category of identity 
in diversity as it refers to the configuration of im-
pressions which are the same and diverse. 
Let us turn to a concrete example . One observes 
that the various qualities such as redness, juiciness, 
hardness, and roundness coexist and persist through 
time maintaining this particular relationship . One may 
label this configuration of qualities an "apple." 
At this stage one does not commit himself to an 
hypothesis regarding the metaphysical nature of the 
thing . One is not only aware of the identity of the 
configuration of qualities through time, but he also ob-
serves that the qualities which make up this configura-
tion change. The red of the apple changes and the hard 
apple becomes softer. Notwithstanding these changes, 
we still conceive of this particular unification of 
elements as an apple. One may also observe that another 
configuration of qualities which we label a "pear" per-
sists through time in a manner similar to the apple . 
In each of these examples diverse configurations 
of qualities are continually related to preceding con-
figurations. After this process is repeated on several 
occasions we are able to conceive of the abstract cate-
gory of identity and diversity. 
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Not only may diverse states of a persisting con-
figuration of qualities be compared with one another, 
but different configurations such as those which make up 
the apple and the pear may also be compared. However, 
the two different configurations which are compared are 
not completely different. An apple differs from a pear, 
nevertheless, they are both members of the class, fruit. 
Consequently, we find another unification made 
possible by the activity of the self. However, our in-
terest at this stage, is not the investigation of the 
pervasive concept of activity which makes possible such 
a unification. We are rather concerned with the elucida-
tion of the specific meaning of the abstract concept of 
identity and diversity. 
A critic may reply that we are able to describe, 
in the preceding paragraphs, the relation of the con-
figuration of qualities which make up the changing apple 
and changing pear and then compare the two without call-
ing upon an anthropic analogy. 
At this point we would disagree with our critic. 
As we analyze our thought process more carefully, it 
appears that we were implicitly, and even at times ex-
plicitly, without actually writing the words on the paper, 
turning to the analogy of the abiding self to check our 
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meaning as we expressed the relationship between the 
concepts and what these concepts refer to in impression. 
Let us set down in words the implicit analogy 
which made possible the understanding of the concept of 
identity and diversity. In the category of identity 
and diversity, A is compared with non-A. Likewise, in 
the abiding self the present state is compared with a 
different state. In comparing two objects or two states 
of the same object, we are aware of the fact that A and 
non-A are related in one act of mind. Similarly, as one 
recalls a past experience he recognizes that his present 
conscious experience truly refers to what he experienced 
in the past. Moreover, he may be aware of the fact that 
he now feels differently toward the same experience. 
What then is the proportion which establishes 
the analogy which relates the category of identity and 
diversity and the enduring self? In the abiding self, 
the time transcending character of the self which re-
lates the present self with a past experience, which is 
different from the present experience, is to the complex 
of categories and elements which make up the whole of 
the enduring self; as the principle of logical identity 
and diversity is to two or more states of a configura-
tion of qualities which are partly the same and partly 
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different. 
Secondly, the abiding self is to the complex 
categories and elements which make up the enduring 
self as the concept which grounds any particular re-
semblance, is to the similar or diverse configurations 
of qualities compared. 
Let us illustrate further the last proportion. 
On the one hand, if we compare two apples we relate 
two configurations of qualities to a common concept 
with the emphasis upon the resemblance of the two con-
figurations. 
However, in order to compare these diverse con-
figurations it is necessary to relate them by means of 
a structure which they hold in common. Therefore, 
whether we are comparing different states of the same 
configuration, comparing two similar configurations or 
comparing two apparently different configurations, the 
notion of unity and difference which we discover in the 
abiding self facilitates the process of understanding 
the relation which the abstract category of identity 
and diversity bears to the impressions to which it re-
fers. 
What then are some of the differences which pre-
serve the analogical character of the relation of the 
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enduring self to the category of identity and diversity. 
The difference between the abiding self and the 
category of identity and diversity must be viewed in 
relation to the purpose of this chapter. In Chapter III 
we discovered that the pervasive concepts of unity per-
vaded all aspects of the personality. Within the endur-
ing self we found abundance of structures, relations and 
purposes. 
In this chapter we have employed the unity of 
the self which manifests itself in many aspects of the 
personality as an analogy which sheds light upon the 
category of identity and diversity. We have not merely 
abstracted the category of identity and diversity from 
the self as a whole. 
We are comparing the relation of the unity of 
the self to the complex categories and elements unified, 
to the relations between the abstract category of iden-
tity and diversity and the impressions to which this 
category refers. 
of this category. 
We do not know the precise meaning 
Consequently, we call upon the unity 
of the abiding self which includes many complex struc-
tures to elucidate this specific phenomenal category 
which is much simpler than the enduring self. 
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Employing the same method which has been em-
ployed in this section we will turn to another phenome-
nal structure, regular sequence. 
2. Regular Sequence 
Is it possible to establish an analogy between 
the enduring self and the regular pattern of impressions 
which appear in our conscious experience? On the one 
hand, as we look within we discover an orderly progres-
sion of states of consciousness involving unity in se-
quence. It would seem that one of the most significant 
features of the identity of the self through time is the 
sequence of states which belong to the same self. What 
is the proportion which would appear to establish the 
. analogy between the abiding self and the orderly sequence 
between items of perception . It would seem that the 
analogy of proper proportionality between the enduring 
self and the orderly sequences of our impressions must 
be established in two stages. 
In the first instance, the category of regular 
sequence, is to the qualities, complex qualities and 
events which make up first person experience; as the suc-
cession of states of consciousness, are to the complex 
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of categories and activities which make up the states of 
the enduring self. 
Since the phenomenal category of regular sequence 
involves the repetition of certain causal relations, 
the second stage of the process of establishing the an-
alogy involves the previously established category of 
relation--namely the activity of comparison. One must 
observe several causal sequences and abstract the orderly 
relation which binds the qualities or objects ordered. 
What is the difference between the regular se-
quences of first person experience and the enduring 
self? Without anticipating our discussion of the cate-
gory of cause on the metaphysical level, we might sug-
gest that the enduring self is not, for Leibniz merely 
a succession of states. What a person is tomorrow de-
pends upon the way he unifies his experience today and 
the unification of this data may well be in harmony with 
long range purposes and plans. 
Leibniz's notion of rational volition and his 
emphasis upon appetition suggests, at least, that the 
individual is ordering the world from his own point of 
view. He is lured on by a vision of his future develop-
ment and the development of other persons within his 
community. This intimation that causal efficacy and 
rational direction are present in the enduring person, 
highlights the differences between a mere sequence of 
events and the enduring self, since the phenomenal 
structure which has been clarified by an analogy with 
the abiding self, is, at this stage, merely a regular 
relation between impressions and does not involve an 
efficient cause guided by a rational purpose. 
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Notwithstanding these differences, the analogy 
of the abiding self helps us understand the regular 
sequence between impressions. 
In the first instance, the unity in a manifold 
which we discover in the self illuminates the pattern 
we discover in regular sequence between, for example, 
the match and the melted butter. Secondly, while, in 
the self one state follows another, we find an identity 
which connects the two states. In regular sequence, 
likewise, the cause precedes the effe~t, but is nonethe-
less related to the effect. The identity of the self 
helps us understand the relation between successive 
impressions. Thirdly, since the phenomenal category of 
regular sequence involves the repetition of certain 
causal relations and the comparison of these relations, 
we must invoke the category of identity and diversity, 
which was previously shown to depend for its clarification 
upon the analogy of the abiding self, to understand 
the phenomenal category of regular sequence. 
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It would seem that we more fully understand the 
structure of the phenomenal category of regular sequence 
by turning to the analogy of the abiding self. Let us 
now turn to the category of quantity. 
3. Quantity 
As qualities are compared, different quantities 
emerge, as we discover a "this" and a "that." Conse-
quently, there are at least two qualities. The act of 
comparison, thus results in the conceptual realization 
of the category of quantity. 
Samuel Alexander in Space, Time and Deity says, 
Being a plan of constitution of a whole of 
parts, a number is universal . The vari-
ous empirical universals which are special 
plans of whole and parts.l 
Each integer, however, is a whole made of anum-
ber of units. In analyzing the category of quantity we 
are faced with the problem, not only of accounting for 
number, but also the units which compose numerical 
wholes. 
1samuel Alexander, Space Time and Deity, Vol. I 
(New York: Humanities Press, 19So), p. 314. 
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a) The Unit 
How is it possible for us to gain insight into 
the nature of a unit which by its very definition is 
simple? In a preceding section we quoted Leibniz to the 
effect that the idea of unity is discovered within the 
self. It seems that Leibniz is also saying that we 
would not know what to look for as a unit, if we did not 
have the unity of the self as an analogical base. 
Although the law of identity, in ordinary dis-
course, refers to the identity of qualities, objects and 
events; by abstraction one may extend this principle to 
abstract mathematical objects, 1 : 1 and is different 
from 1+ 1. 
What is the proportion which establishes the 
analogy between the mathematical unit and the enduring 
self. It may be that this analogy will have to be es-
tablished in two stages. The first proportion is: the 
characteristic of enduring unchanged through time, is 
to the simple or complex qualities under discussion 
(such as a book); as the characteristic of enduring 
unchanged through time, is to the complex of categories 
and activities which make up the enduring self. The 
second stage involves the repeating of this operation 
two or three times. The third stage, employing the 
analogy of relation already established, involves the 
comparison of these three processes. On the basis of 
this comparison, one may abstract the identical 
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features and employ this bare identity as a mathematical 
unit. 
After establishing the unit on the basis of an 
analogy, we now turn to the category of number and ex-
tension. At this point we receive specific guidance 
from Leibniz. 
b) Number and Extension 
In the New Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
Leibniz states the position of John Locke as he says, 
By repeating the idea of a unit and joining 
it to another unit, we make a collective idea, 
which we call two . And whoever can do that 
and advance always by adding one more to the 
last collective idea to which he gives a 
particular name, can count so long as he has 
a set of names and sufficient memory to retain 
them.l 
Leibniz replies, 
By this means alone one cannot advance very 
far. For Memory would be too heavily loaded 
1A.G. Langley {ed. and trans.), New Essay Con-
cerning Human Understanding! by Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz: Together with an ~ppendix of Some of His 
~hprter PLeces, p. 160. 
if it must retain an entirely new name for 
each addition of a new unit. That is why 
a certain order and a certain repetition 
of their name is necessary • • • in ~c­
cordance with a certain progression.l 
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Leibniz illustrates the order of repetition of 
parts by means of an example from geometry. He says, 
Let us take a straight line and prolong 
it until it is double the length of the 
first. Now it is clear that the second 
line, being perfectly similar to the first, 
may itself be doubled in order to have a 
third, which is similar to the preceding, 
and the ratio holding good always, it is 
never possible to stop the process.2 
In the very same section from which the preced-
ing quotation has been extracted Leibniz adds, "This 
shows us now what gives completion to the conception 
of this idea [the adding of line to line on the basis 
of a given ratio] is found in ourselves." 3 
Let us more specifically analyze the categories 
which are involved in the process of repeating arith-
metical units or sections of straight lines, in order 
to discover whether the unity in the self illuminates 
the concept of number. It has been indicated that 
Leibniz believes that we gain insight into the notion 
of phenomenal unity as we look within the unity of 
1Ibid. 2Ibid., p. 162. 
3Ibid., pp. 162-163. 
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the self and then abstract the idea of bare oneness 
from the concrete unity of personal existence. 
It has been indicated that Leibniz says that 
what gives completion to the conception of adding one 
line to another on the basis of a given ratio is found 
in ourselves. 1 What specifically is it within our-
selves which gives completion to this idea? What cate-
gories are involved in the process of repeating line 
segments or arithmetical unities to arrive at the 
notion of number and extension? 
First of all, the idea of the unit is based 
upon an analogy already established. Secondly, the 
mathematician compares the second line segment with the 
first. This process involves the category of relation 
(resemblance) which also is based on personal analogy. 
Thirdly, the mathematician adds the second unit or 
line segment, which has a certain ratio to the first 
line or unit. It would appear that this process could 
be based on the idea of regular sequence, which is de-
rived analogically from the enduring self; together with 
the experience of efficient causality which, likewise, 
finds its analogical source in the abiding self. 
1Ibid.' p. 162. 
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c) Conclusion 
Throughout this section dealing with the cate-
gory of quantity we have employed the abiding self to 
clarify phenomenal structures. By calling upon the 
various characteristics of the enduring self such as 
identity through time, the unity in a manifold, the 
repetition of an operation which is compared with a 
previous operation and the use of efficient cause which 
finds its source in the abiding self, it has been pos-
sible to shed light upon the nature and structure of 
such mathematical concepts as the unit, number and ex-
tension. 
Notwithstanding the similarities between the 
enduring self and these mathematical concepts, there 
are also differences between the structures. The 
mathematical unit, as it has been shown, is an abstrac-
tion from a perceptual object. Bare oneness is not one 
book, one table or one pencil. Therefore, the mathe-
matical structure differs from a perceptual object which 
are structures within the person. Moreover, the mathe-
matical concepts such as bare extension and number do 
not contain the rich integration of categories, imagin-
ings, feelings, emotions, desires and rational volitions 
which we discover in Leibniz's interpretation of the 
----
enduring person. 
Consequently, the differences as well as the 
similarities which establish the analogy between the 
enduring self and the mathematical concepts must be 
underscored. 
4. The Spatial Configuration of Impressions 
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Following the methodology employed in discussing 
the preceding categories, we shall limit ourselves to 
the spatiality and temporality of first person experi-
ence. 
Let us first of all turn to Leibniz's defini-
tions of time and space. He says, 
Time is the order of those things which are 
not simultaneous . . • Duration is magnitude 
of time . . • Space is the order of coexisting 
things, or the order of existence for things 
which are simultaneous . • . Extension is 
magnitude of space.l 
In order to uncover Leibniz's view of phenomenal 
space and time it may be necessary to turn to certain 
metaphysical arguments and then relate these statements 
to the phenomenal realm. Leibniz says, 
1Leroy Loemker (ed.), Leibniz: Philosophical 
Paper and Letters, Vol. II, pp. 1083-1084. 
Extension is an abstraction from the extended 
and can no more be considered substance than 
can number or a multitude, for it expresses 
nothing but a certain non-successive (i.e., 
unlike duration) but simultaneous diffusion 
or repetition of some particular nature, or 
what amounts to the same thing, a multitude 
of things of this same nature which exist 
together with some order between them; and it 
is this nature, I sayi which is said to be 
extended or diffused. 
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This argument is employed by Leibniz in a meta-
physical context to show that bare extension cannot 
account for the active, physical world, but it may be 
possible to relate this discussion to the first person 
experience. Leibniz states, "Quantity or magnitude 
is that in things which can be known only through their 
simultaneous compresence--or by their simultaneous 
perception."2 
He further points out that it is impossible 
to know what a foot or yard is unless we have something 
to serve as a measure. A foot or a yard, therefore, 
cannot be explained adequately by a definition. That 
is by a definition which does not include something 
which is similar to the thing defined. If we say that 
a foot is twelve inches, we still have the problem of 
defining the inch. We cannot say, according to 
1 Ibid., p. 874. 2Ibid., p. 1084. 
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Leibniz, that the notion of an inch or a foot is prior 
since it is entirely arbitrary which we assume is 
b . 1 as~c. 
But he says, "Quality is wha t can be 
known in things when they are observed singly, without 
requiring any compresence. " 2 In our earlier discussion 
of quantity, Leibniz was quoted as saying that no one 
can explain, from the knowledge of perception and 
extension alone, what we sense in red, bright and hot. 
This internal principle of distinction may well be the 
key to the understanding of Leibniz's view of phenomenal 
space because quantity involves a comparison or addition 
of a to b. 
Leibniz says, " Space is the order of coexisting 
things. " 3 What are the coexisting entities in the 
phenomenal realm? It would appear that the qualitative 
aspect of conscious experience which originates in 
sensation are the entities which are given this spatial 
form or coexist. The argument which Leibniz employs 
in metaphysics stresses the fact that extension depends 
upon the repetition or diffusion of some particular na-
ture (a wha t). vlhen this argument is applied to the 
3Ibid., p. 1083. 
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phenomenal realm, it tends to support the conclusion 
that phenomenal space is, for Leibniz, the coexistence 
of sense impressions. 
In order to refute the preceding conclusion, one 
might suggest that the mathematical line is not dependent 
upon the order of sensation. Leibniz, as we have indi-
cated, constantly underscores the abstract character of 
such an order. He says, '~xtension [as a conceptual 
entity] is an abstraction from the extended."1 
At first glance, it would appear that the iden-
tity of the enduring self would not serve as an analogy 
which would explain the spatial configuration of the 
impressions which make up first person experience. One 
of the important conclusions of the discussion of 
Leibniz's conception of the person was the non-spatial 
character of the more active aspects of man's conscious 
experience. How, then, is it possible to employ the 
enduring self, which includes the cognitive activity of 
persons, as an analogy which will elucidate the spatial 
configurations of our sensations? 
In formulating the analogy which related the 
abiding self to mathematical extension, we suggested 
1Ibid.) p. 874. 
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that (1) the idea of unit is based upon a previous 
analogy, (2) the mathematician compares the second line 
segment with the first, which involves the category of 
relation (resemblance) which is understood by means of 
an analogy with the enduring self and (3) the mathe-
matician adds the second unit or line segment which has 
a certain ratio to the first line. 
In constructing spatial configurations of con-
crete impressions, instead of adding bare mathematical 
units to one another, the person adds one quality to 
another. As the blind man feels along the edge of a 
pencil he is predisposed to relate one impression of 
touch to another and thereby construct a concrete ex-
ternal object. 
Returning to our original scheme, we substi-
tuted the qualitative factor for the bare mathematical 
units, but, notwithstanding this difference, Leibniz 
would seem to believe that, if we are to understand the 
process by which we construct concrete spatial objects, 
we must assume that the pattern which explains the way 
in which we construct a mathematical line applies as 
well to the construction of the concrete spatial con-
figuration. 
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Although the process by which we construct such 
spatial configurations becomes habitual and automatic, 
in this study we are endeavoring to understand better 
the structure of the phenomenal category of spatial 
configuration of qualitative factors. It is, there-
fore, helpful to turn to the abiding self which: 
(1) illuminates the oneness of the qualitative factor 
which is extended, (2) elucidates the category of rela-
tion (resemblance) which is involved as we compare im-
plicitly, if not explicitly, one quality with another 
and (3) sheds light, on the basis of the analogy of 
efficient cause discovered in the person, upon the 
active process by which one quality is added to another. 
We discover in the activity of the geometrician 
extending a line, perhaps, a better illustration of 
the role of analogy in spatial discourse, never-
theless the part-whole relation is present in both 
the perceptual and mathematical spatial orders. It 
may be that the perceiving person is less aware of 
the process by which he orders his sensations than the 
mathematician, as he constructs his lines and figures, 
but if one is to understand the spatial configuration 
of impressions it seems that he must employ the analogy 
of the abiding self. Let us turn to a study of the 
role of the enduring self in elucidating the phenomenal 
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categories of space and time. 
5. The Spatial-Temporal Order 
a) Space 
There are, of course, many relations, but one 
of these orders is the perceptual, spatial order in 
which impressions are related in such relations as: in 
front of, behind, straight ahead, below and right or 
left. 
It has been pointed out that, according to 
Leibniz, we arrive at the notion of spatial order when 
we discover that one of the coexisting things changes 
its relation to a multitude of others which do not 
change their relations among themselves. We indicated 
that Leibniz states that this relation of one thing to 
another is more or less single. 
What proportion is suggested by the relation 
of the spatial order to the enduring self? The spa-
tial relation, is to the complex of qualities and ob-
jects ordered as the unity of the self is to its con-
crete contents. How, more specifically, does the anal-
ogy of the abiding self illuminate the structure of the 
phenomenal category of space? 
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First, this category is based upon the phenomenal 
category of the spatial configuration of impressions, 
which is, as we have shown, derived analogically from 
the enduring self. Secondly, since Leibniz states that 
in the spatial relation the relation of one thing to 
another is more or less single, it would seem that, if 
we are to understand this category, we must turn to 
what Leibniz considers to be the only real example of 
unity--namely, the abiding self. 
Our understanding of this concept, however, is 
not as yet complete. Leibniz indicates that we must 
further relate one set of relations before a given 
change to a set of relations after one object has 
taken leave of this particular configuration and has 
been replaced by another object . In this way we formu-
late the notion of place. 
It would appear that this process is, likewise, 
illuminated by the category of identity and diversity, 
which is derived analogically from the abiding self. 
Finally, after comparing various spatial relations, 
which results in the conception of place, we formulate 
the idea of one single space which includes all pos-
sible relations of perceptual objects. It would seem 
that the idea of a single space may also be illuminated 
211 
by an analogy with the abiding self because the self, 
like space abides despite changes in its content and 
relations. 
We have pointed out several similarities between 
the phenomenal spatial order and the abiding self. Are 
there any differences between these two analogates? 
It has been indicated that the unity and order 
which we discover in the enduring self would not serve 
as an analogy which would explain the spatial configura-
tion of the qualities which make up perceptual objects, 
since Leibniz maintains that the more active aspects of 
man's conscious experience are non-spatial. 
This difference which manifests itself on the 
level of the spatial configuration of qualities also 
appears as we compare the enduring self with the spatial 
order. Notwithstanding this important difference between 
the phenomenal spatial order and the enduring self, an 
understanding of the phenomenal spatial order is enhanced 
as we recognize that the spatial order: (1) builds upon 
the oneness of the perceptual object which, though sub-
ject to the same limitation mentioned above, is derived 
analogically from the enduring self, (2) is dependent upon 
the analogically derived category of relation (resemblance) 
which is involved in Leibniz's analysis of the process 
by which we arrive at the notion of place and (3) is 
·------
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conceived of as a single spatial order inclusive of all 
places and relations between places which may well be 
illuminated by the singleness of the abiding self. 
Moreover, since Leibniz does not accept an abso-
lutistic interpretation of a spatial whole, the part-whole 
relation is a developing system. However, many other 
part-whole relations which we discover in the enduring 
self are likewise developing orders. 
Admittedly, the differences between the spatial 
order and the enduring self are manifold. However, 
recognizing the differences between the non-spatial 
unity of the self and the spatial phenomenal order and 
the singleness of the unified self and the developing 
relations which are involved in Leibniz's view of space, 
there are, nevertheless, indications, which have been set 
forth, that the unity of the self and other categories 
understood on the basis of an analogy with the abiding 
self, illuminate the spatial phenomenal order in 
Leibniz's philosophy. 
b) Time 
What is Leibniz's conception of phenomenal time? 
He says in a letter to DeVolder, "Space is nothing but 
the order of existence of things possible at the same 
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time, while time is the order of existence of things 
possible successively . " 1 Therefore, one of the im-
portant characteristics of phenomenal time which we 
shall attempt to clarify, in this section, is the notion 
of succession . 
Another characteristic of phenomenal time, ac-
cording to Leibniz, is duration. It must be pointed 
out, at the outset, that Leibniz is concerned with a 
duration which will provide a measure for change . Ac-
cordingly, duration, for Leibniz, is based upon a judg-
ment. 
This conclusion is confirmed by Leibniz as he 
says, "A succession of perceptions awakens in us the 
idea of duration but it does not make it. " 2 Why does 
the succession of perception not "make the idea of 
duration?" 3 
We would suggest that a succession of percep-
tions do not "make the idea of duration"4 because 
1
rbid.' p . 874. 
2A.G. Langley (ed. and trans.), New Essay Con-
cerning Human Understandin~, by Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz; Together with an ~ppendix of Some of His 
Shorter Pkeces, p. 156. 
•. 
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Leibniz believes that duration, which must serve as a 
measure of change is based upon a judgment which con-
nects events which change according to a uniform pat-
tern. Leibniz says, "Changing perceptions furnish us 
the occasion for thinking of time and we measure it by 
uniform change& But were there nothing uniform in na-
ture, time could not be determined."! 
We turn, therefore, to the revolution of the 
earth about its axis or the revolution of earth about 
the Sun to discover a duration which is sufficiently 
uniform to serve as a measure of time. 
Leibniz's answer to Locke underlines this point. 
Locke says, "Our measure of time would be more exact if 
we could preserve a past day in order to compare it with 
the days to come, as we preserve the measure of space."2 
Leibniz replies, "But instead of that we are reduced 
to preserving and watching bodies which move in nearly 
equal times." 3 
These selections from Leibniz's writings empha-
size the fact that the judgment of duration involves 
uniform changes. His definition of duration cited 
earlier, "duration is magnitude of time," involves a 
whole made up of many units of time. The basic unit 
2Ibid., p. 157. 
of time, unlike the bare units of space, if there are 
any such bare units, succeed one another. 
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Therefore, succession, which we indicated was 
one of the important characteristics of phenomenal time, 
is united with duration which underscores the uniform 
relations which bind temporal events. 
Leibniz recognizes the fact that the concept of 
duration involves succession and unity, which not only 
is made possible by the abiding self, but which may 
also be better understood if it is compared to the 
structure of the enduring self. 
In a passage which is primarily designed to 
criticize the substantial reality of bare extension, 
there is an element which is relevant to the subject 
of phenomenal time. Leibniz says, 
Extension is an abstraction from the extended 
and can no more be considered substance than 
can number or a multitude, for it expresses 
nothing but a certain nonsuccessive (i.e., 
unlike dur~tion) but simultaneous oiffusion 
or repetition of some particular nature.l 
The phrase which is most significant for our 
purposes in this section is the one that reads "non-
successive (i.e., unlike duration)." 2 It would seem 
1Leroy Loemker (ed.), Leibn~: Philosophical 
Papers and Letters, Vol. II, p. 874. 
2Ibid. 
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that, for Leibniz, duration as a concept, which is a mag-
nitude of time, is not a static whole. It is a whole 
which includes parts which are succeeding one another, 
but still remain unified. 
Therefore, this quotation further underscores the 
importance of both unity and succession in Leibniz's con-
ception of phenomenal time. How then does the analogy of 
the abiding self illuminate the structure of the phenom-
enal category of time in Leibniz's philosophy. 
We are suggesting that it is possible to under-
stand better the phenomenal temporal order which involves, 
in Leibniz's thought, a succession of events ordered by a 
mind which relates events such as the various positions of 
the earth as it revolves around the sun according to laws 
of uniform change, by comparing the phenomenal temporal 
order to the abiding self and other phenomenal categories 
which have been derived analogically from the enduring 
self. 
First, according to Leibniz, the phenomenal cate-
gory of time involves a succession of events. These 
events may be better understood by turning to the concept 
of the unit which is derived analogically from the endur-
ing self. 
Secondly, these events succeed one another. This 
succession of events may be illuminated by turning to the 
category of regular sequence which is also derived 
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analogically from the enduring self. 
Thirdly, the concept of duration, as Leibniz con-
ceives it, is based on a judgment which connects regular 
changes. This characteristic of phenomenal time may be 
better understood by turning to the phenomenal category of 
relation (resemblance) which is, likewise, derived analog-
ically from the enduring self. 
Fourthly, after clarifying a succession of events, 
according to certain uniform patterns which may be used 
as measures of change, the person is able to form a con-
cept of a single temporal order similar to the single spa-
tial order discussed earlier. This single spatial or 
single temporal order need not commit Leibniz to an abso-
lute space or time, which incidentally be rejects, since 
these concepts are derived from the relation of events. 
The characteristic of single time may be elucidated, by 
means of an analogy based upon the relation of the empir-
ical self to the time-transcending self. 
We have pointed out various similarities between 
the phenomenal category of time and the abiding self. Are 
there any differences between the two realms? 
It has been indicated that for Leibniz, the 
phenomenal category of time involves a succession of 
events measured by a standard unit of time which is based 
on uniform changes which Leibniz believes he discovers in 
nature. Without dealing with metaphysical problems, at 
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this stage, it is possible to conceive of this standard 
as a phenomenal concept which is based upon an orderly 
relation of impressions. How then does phenomenal time 
differ from the abiding self? 
While the structure of time merely involves events 
which succeed each other and a standard measure of change, 
in Leibniz's system, the abiding self includes desires, 
emotions and purposes which enrich the concept of time. 
Successive moments of time are not merely related to an 
abstract standard, in the human person, but they take on 
life and blood as time is related to human interests. 
Notwithstanding the difference between time as it is lived 
through by the human person and phenomenal time, the sim-
ilarities between the two realms has helped us understand 
the category of time in Leibniz's philosophy. 
c) Conclusions 
In conclusion, another way of expressing the rela-
tion of simultaneity, the coexistence of impressions at 
the same time, to duration is to state that an order can 
spread itself both spatially and temporally. This order 
can include sets of entities which are contemporary with 
each other and it can include sets of entities which 
are relatively past and future. If the order of events 
is purely temporal, then we shall not discover any si-
multaneous events. If the order is purely spatial, then 
we shall not properly recognize what Leibniz labels 
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the experience of the "succession of perception."1 
In a study of first person experience it is pos-
sible to overlook the differences in these two kinds of 
order. Both orders involve a unity of character pervad-
ing a distinct set of events. But the principle of con-
nection in one case relates past, present and future and 
in the other case the principle of order relates simul-
taneous events spatially. 
It has been our aim in this section to show how 
Leibniz employs the analogy of the abiding self to 
illuminate the meaning of the spatial-temporal cate-
gories--thus avoiding the confusion which might otherwise 
result. 
C. Summary 
In this chapter we have attempted to show how the 
relation of the time-transcending character of the human 
person to the factors unified, may be employed as an 
analogy which makes possible an understanding of the 
relationship between certain active categories, such as 
1A.G. Langley {ed. and trans.), New Essa~ Concern-
ing Human Understandin~l by Gottfried Wiihetrn Le~bniz; 
Together with an Appen ~x of Some of His Shorter Pieces, 
p. 156. 
space and time and the events or categories which are 
unified, in Leibniz's philosophy, 
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Following a review of the model of the enduring 
self, we endeavored to study the way specific phenomenal 
structures such as i dentity and diversity, regular se-
quence, quantity and space and time are illuminated by 
the analogy of the abiding self. 
The construction of the analogies which illumin-
ated the quantitative and the spatial and temporal cate-
gories follow more closely explicit statements in 
Leibniz's writings, whereas the construction of the 
early categories, while based upon Leibniz theory of 
personality, were projections of the way in which we 
believe Leibniz would have employed the analogy of the 
abiding self to shed light upon these phenomenal struc-
tures, if he had chosen to follow the same method which 
guided him in his analysis of the quantitative categor-
ies. 
Let us now turn to a study of the way in which 
analogies based upon relations within personality 
illuminate Leibniz ' s metaphysical principles. 
I 
